S E C R E T 311400Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54636

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDTRAMP SDPLOD

1. SDTRAMP/1 SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT NASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/1 HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMBRYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE).

2. T/1 OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN ASSUMING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9.C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

1. NO PROBLEM ADDITION ...

2. PROPOSED EXTENSION OF A'S VISIT RAISES QUESTIONS OF HIS SAFETY AND OF SDPLOD/1'S (P/1'S) EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RTACTION MANIPULATION OF THE REVOLUTION. KNOWING NO MORE THAN WE DO ABOUT A'S PROFILE HERE DURING HIS PCS TOURS, MUST DEFER TO HIM AND HQS FOR CONSIDERATION OF PERSONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A SERIES OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS. REGARDING POSSIBLE POLITICAL FALLOUT, WE THINK THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS INVOLVED, AND THE CHARGE ADVISES THAT HE IS CONCERNED. WE ASSUME THAT A'S PROLONGED PRESENCE COULD NOT BE CONCEALED FROM THE IRANIANS, AND THAT NO INNOCUOUS PRETEXT SUCH AS TOURISM WOULD BE CREDIBLE. AT LEAST SOME OF THE PROPOSED CONTACTS WOULD THEREFORE PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE DECLARED TO P/1 AND COMPANY.

IN ORDER PERMIT EVALUATION OF THE RISKS AND BENEFITS ... HQS IDENTIFY THEM FOR US, AND INDICATE

S E C R E T 3114?2Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54636

TO: DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL SDTRAMP SDPLOD

1. SDTRAMP/1 SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT NASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/1 HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMBRYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE).

2. T/1 OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN ASSUMING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND.

3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 31OCT99 DRV DS.C.I. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

HUSAYN/YAZDI TALKS HELD IN HAVANA, IRAQ WOULD STILL LIKE TO SETTLE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THEIR CONCERN IS THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE IN FULL CONTROL AND HUSAYN DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS."

3. APPRECIATE STOCKHOLM COOPERATION ON SDPLOD/1 CASE.

4. FILE 201-962054. RVW 290CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3945

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-258-344

[redacted]79 04 13Z
01 NOV

S E C R E T 311613Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543216.

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDPLOD

1. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 HE WAS PLANNING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 25 OCTOBER. HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP HIS WIFE IN STOCKHOLM THEN PROCEED TO OSLO TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS. WHILE IN TEHRAN, SDPLOD/1 WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND ASKED US FOR ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE MAY HAVE WHICH BEARS ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND PASSING FOLLOWING REPORT TO SDPLOD/1, EMPHASIZING THAT REPORT FORWARDED BY ADLESICK IN REPLY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY SDPLOD/1 IN TEHRAN.

2. TEXT OF REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAYN ISLAND THE IRAQI VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS DETAILING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAYN.

"PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IRAN WAS ACTIVELY PURSUING ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAYN, IRAQI LEADER SADAM HUSAYN HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI IN HAVANA DURING THE COURSE OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME PROBLEM IN DETERMINING THE PROPER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PGOI. SADAM HUSAYN HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. AT THE MOMENT THE IRAQIS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PGOI, AS THEY INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT MUCH AND REAL POWER LIES IN THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

"DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE

SECRET OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS , DIRECTOR.

NI ACT DIRECTOR , PARIS.

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

EYES ONLY FOR COS , PARIS AND MR.GEORGE CAVE

REF: DTRECTOR , 536769

]. ACOS CALLED SDPLOD/] AT OFFICE ON AFTERNOON OF2] OCTOBR AND TOLD HIM THAT MR.GEORGE CAVE WANT TO DISCUSS REF MATTER WITH HIM TOMORROW STOKHOLM.SDPLOD/] SAID THAT HIS PLANS HAD-- CHANGED AGAINAND HE WOULD BE STAYING IN TEHRAN UNTIL THURS-DAY ,25OCTOBER . ACOS TOLDSDPLOD/] THAT MR.CAVE WOULD TRY TO COME - TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCTOBER FOR MEETING. SDPLOD/] REPLIED THAT MEETING IN TEHRAN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. ACOS TOLD SD-PLOD/] THAT IN CASE MR. CAVE COULD NOT MEET IN TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCT, WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM TO KEEP TRACK OF HIS SCHEDU -LE.

2. SDPLOD/] OFFICE NUMBER IS 666-885RPT 666-885. RESIDENCE PHONE NOT AVAILABLE . RVW 2] OCT 99 DRV D9C.].

a SECRET

SECRET /ETX]/EOT JAUMOTTE

PLOD- 19

[redacted]

ENTEZAM

666-885

Mr. Cave wishes discuss matter revealed at meeting with Chargé. Mr. Cave will be in Stockholm when E. arrives 22 Oct.

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE:TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO :IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR.

NIACT PARIS, DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

EYES ONLY FOR COS PARIS AND MR.GEORGE CAVE

REF: A.DIRECTOR 536767
      B.TEHRAN 54539

]. SINCE REF B. HAVE LEARNED THAT SDPLOD/] TOOK PART INMEETING which CHARGE AND MR. HENRY PRECHT HAD WITH PRIMENISTER BAZARGAN - AND FOREIGN MINESTER YAZDI TO PASS MESSAGE ON RN OUT STAY'S HEALTH AND IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN UNITED STATES. SDPLOD/]'S REACTION WAS THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES.

2. YAZDI WAS SOME WATH SCEPITICAL OF NECESSITY FOR TREATMENT IN NE -YORK OR EVEN UNITED STATES AND MADE SUGGESTIONS BASED ON HIS OWN PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.

3. SINCE SDPLOD/]NOM FULLY APPRISED OF RN OUT STAY'SPLANS, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO ADVISE HIM THAT MR.CAVE HAS IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE FOR HIM.PLS ADVISE WHETHER HQS STILL WANTS STATION TO ALERT SDPLOD/] THAT MR.CAVEWANTS TO MEET HIM IN EUROP AS POSSIBLE RVW 2]OCT 99DRVD9C.].

ALL SECRET/

S E C R E T

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTION)

TO : IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR.

NIACT DIRECTOR ,PARIS

WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY

REF : A.DIRECTOR 536766
B.PARIS]37]5

]. CHARGE AND MR.HENRY PRECHT MET SDPLOD/] MORNING OF 2] OCT ON PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED CALL. SDPLOD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT HE STILL PLANS TO DEPART FOR STOCKHOLM ON 22 OCTOBER. CHARGE DID NOT DISC -USS RN OUT STAY WITH SDPLOD/].
RVW2]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 201022Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54536 (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO: PARIS, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

REFS: A. PARIS 13694 (NOT SENT LONDON)
B. TEHRAN 54526
C. TEHRAN 54527 (NIT 10,778)
D. TEHRAN 54528 (NIT 10,779)
E. TEHRAN 54502

1. REFS B-E BEING RELAYED LONDON PARIS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FILE: ~~201-962054~~. RVW 200CT99 DRV D9C.1.
ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 192350Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54533

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
VNINTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 536170

MR. CAVE DEPARTED TEHRAN FOR PARIS FRIDAY MORNING, 19 OCTOBER. RVW 19OCT99 DRV DSC.3. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

PPT

20Oct79 08 25z

S E C R E T 191800Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13694

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

1. PLEASE RELAY ALL SDPLOD/1 TRAFFIC PARIS AND LONDON FOR ADLESICK INFO.

2. NO FILE. RVW 19 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

PPS

19Oct79 04 07z

S E C R E T 182250Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535235.

TO: AUTHORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT SDPRETEXT

TEHRAN 54511

1. WE AGREE THERE NO REASON TO DISCLOSE TO GNGRAPH
HE'S TRAVEL IRAN OR OUR EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO PGOI'S
IT IN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW RECENT
AVEL EXCHANGE WITH GNGRAPH ON IRANIAN SITUATION, BELIEVE
OULD TDY LONDON BRIEFLY ENROUTE HQS FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS
RECENT GNGRAPH PAPER ON IRAN AS POINT OF DEPARTURE. REQUES
COS/COM CONCURRENCE.

2. CONCUR NO CONTACT WITH SDPRETEXT THIS TRIP.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE ACCOUNT OF ANY DISCUSSIONS HELD
AR WITH SDPLOD/1 ON RESUMPTION SOME FORM INTEL RELATIONSHIP.

4. NO FILE. RVW 18OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
R E T.

no 2/4/7
needed

1.THERE IS SPLIT IN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT.THE SPLIT IS PRIMARILY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES.THE BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY WAS DRAWN UP BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM .THE POLICY WAS BASICALLY A FREE MONEY POLICY CALLING FOR A TWO PRONGED PROGRAM OF(a)MAKING MONEY AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY ON SOFT TERMS SO THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY COULD CONTINUEAND(b)PROVIDE EXTENSIVE FUNDS FOR LABOR INTENSIVE PROJECTS SO AS TO LOWER THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE.ALI MOINFAR MINISTER OF OIL OPPOSED THIS PLAN WITH A PLAN OF HIS OWN CALLING FOR A POLICY OF TIGHT MONEY.THE CABINET VOTED FOR THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN WITH 12 CABINET MEMBERS APPROVING OF IT.HOWEVER,MOINFAR WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE GOVERNMENT TO GO SLOW. THERE HAS BEEN SOME CHANGES IN THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN AS A RESULT OF MOINFAR S ACTION BUT THESE ARE MINOR IN NATURE AND THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN IS NOW READY FOR IMPLIMENTATION.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NO FORN -- NO CONTRACT --

OR CON

COUNTRY:IRAN

SUBJECT:

SOURCE:

I.THE REFERENDUM FOR THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE.MAJLIS ELECTIONS WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REFERENDUM.PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN HAS DECIDED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT A MAJORITY OF CLERICS FROM GETTING ELECTED TO THE MAJLIS.IN MID OCTOBER,THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT,INCLUDING HIMSELF,FORIEGN MINISTER EBRAHIM YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM CONFFERED WITH AYATULLAH KHOMIENI ON THIS SUBJECT .THEY WISHED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CONVINCING KHOMIENI THAT THE MAJLIS MUST HAVE A SECULAR MAJORITY.THEY ALSO WANTED TO PREVENT HIM FROM GIVING HIS SUPPORT TO LARGE NUMBER OF CLERICS AS THEY BELIEVE THAT ANYONE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY KHOMIENI WILL WIN.

2.DESPITE THE NEED TO BROADEN ITS BASE PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS,THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF BUILDING INTITUTIONS THAT COULD STRENGTHEN IT.SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ,SLOW PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN REORGANIZING THE MILITARY AND THIS SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP TO THE GOVERNMENT.HOWEVER,EFFORTS TO BRING THE PASDARAN UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE ARMY HAVE FAILED.THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL STILL CONTROLS THE PASDARAN.

S C R E T OCT 79
CITE: TEHRAN

TO:DIRECTOR INFO AMAN,BEIRUT,CAIRO,ISLAMABAD,JIDDA,KARACHI,KUWAIT MANAMA,NEW DEHLI,TEL AVIV.

WNINTEL SDPLOD INTEL

SUPDATA:SDPLOD/].DIRECTOR SEE TEHRAN ..... WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT DISSEM.NO LIAISON.NO FILE. NO INDEX.OBTAINED BY ADLESICK.FIELD REPORT NO.NIT--]0,779.CL BY 0]5356.

PAQUIN

REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN

NO CONTRACT ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: EFFECT OF KURDISH FIGHTING ON IRANIAN RELATION WITH IRAQ.

]. DURING THE PAST WEEK, THE SITUATION IN IRNIAN KURDISTAN DETERIORATED CONSIDERABLY IRANIAN MILITARY TOOK OVER]00 CASULTIES DURING THE PAST WEEK : PRIMINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN IS TRYING TO DEVISE SOME WAY OFENDING THE FIGHTING A HURRY AS HIS GOVERNMENT,S VIEW IS THAT THE ONLY LASTING SETTLEMENT TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM MUST COME FROM THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA AND THIS CAN-NOT BE STARTED UNTIL THE SITUATION RETURNS TO NORMAL.

2.DURING HIS VISIT TO HAVAN FOR THE NON-ALIGEND CONFERENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN. DURING THIS CONVERSATION,YAZDI ASSURED HUSAYN THAT IRAN WAS ENGAGING IN NO AGITATION AMONG THE SHI;A-COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, ADDITIONALLY IRAN HAD NO DESIGNS ON BAHRAIN. NOR WOULD THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION BE EXPORTED TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AT THE TIME YAZDI AND HUSAYN AGREED TO MEET LATER, EITHER IN TEHRA-N OR BAGHDAD. YAZDI TOLD HUSAYN THAT THEY COULD THEN DISCUSS THE CONTINUATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT WERE THE BASIS OF THE MARCH BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. UPON RETURN TO IRAN. YAZDI WAS PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE NEWSPAPER JUMHURI ISLAMI FOR HAVING GONFERRED WITH HUSAYN IN HAVAN-A. GIVEN THE CURRENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN YAZDI IS AFRAID THAT ANY PUBLIC OVERTURE TO THE IRAQI GOVERMENT WILL MEET WITH SEVERE CRITICISM IN IRAN. THEBAZARGAN GOVERMENT HAD CONSIDERED HAVING MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFECT THAT IRAN DID NOT INTEND TO EXPORT THE REVOLUTION AND NAS DOING NOTING AGAIAST THE TERRITORAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ. THE COMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEADER OF SHI,A COMMUNTY IN IRAQ IS INDEPENDENT OFKHOMEINI AND IF HE CHOSE TO IGNORE OR QUETION KHOMEINI,S STATEMENT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

4. ACQ:]8OCTOBER]979.

5.FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAM ABAD, JIDDA, KARACHE, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEWDEHLI, TELAVIV.
REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHOD-S INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEAS ABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRCTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACT _ION OF INFORMATION CONTROLED BY ORIGINATOR . RVW]8 oct 99 DRV D9C.].CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.ALL PORTION CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. S E C R E T

GAVE HIM HIS HOME PHONE NUMBER IN U.S. P/I SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL FROM EUROPE IF ANYTHING COMES UP. HE MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION WHICH ADLESICK WILL DISCUSS WHEN RETURNS TO HQS. P/I ASKED IF WE HAD ANY PROBLEM WITH CONTINUING THE CONTACT THROUGH HIM. ADLESICK SAID NO, WE WERE DISPOSED TO PROCEED AT A PACE SET BY THEM.

3. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

BT
#4526

S E C R E T 181602Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54526

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT (SDPLOD)

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54527
B. TEHRAN 54528

1. ADLESICK MET WITH SDPLOD/1 ALONE FOR ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS AFTERNOON OF 18 OCTOBER. WILL BE REPORTING INTEL SEPARATELY. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT AFTER BRIEFINGS ON 15 OCTOBER, HE, YAZDI AND BAZARGAN HAD MET AND DISCUSSED BRIEFINGS. WHILE BRIEFINGS INTERESTING THEY WERE NOT PRECISELY WHAT BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEIR WANTS AT THE MOMENT WERE BASICALLY FOR TACTICAL INFORMATION ON KURDISH SITUATION AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ON WHO SUPPORTING KURDS AND WHY. THIS LED TO LONG DISCUSSION IN WHICH ADLESICK APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISABUSED SDPLOD/1 OF ANY ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQIS IN SUPPORTING IRANIAN KURDISH INSURRECTION. P/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD HOPED THAT ADLESICK WOULD HAVE MADE A POSITIVE SUGGESTION ON HOW THEY COULD EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THE KURDISH PROBLEM. WHILE IT MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE, WHAT THEY REALLY WANT IS FOR US TO DEVISE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT THEY SEEK TO DEAL WITH KURDISH SITUATION THROUGH VEHICLE OF OLD TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT. TURKS WORRY ABOUT ANY UNSETTLED CONDITION IN KURDISTAN AND WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME CHANCE TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH IRANIANS. P/1 ASKED IF USG COULD PROVIDE ANY INCENTIVES TO TURKEY AND IRAQ TO HELP SETTLE KURDISH PROBLEM. POINTED OUT TO P/1 THAT USG DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY THOUGHT USG WOULD ENCOURAGE IRANIAN TURKISH COOPERATION ON KURDISH PROBLEM. EMPHASIZED TO P/1 THAT WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ SUPPORTING KURDS, LAST THING THAT IRAQ WOULD WANT TO SEE WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH REPUBLIC FORMED ON IRANIAN SOIL.

2. WITH REGARD TO LIAISON, SDLOD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE CONTACT TO BE WITH HIM FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ADLESICK

S E C R E T 181150Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54511

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, LONDON.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPRETEXT

1. WISH RAISE WITH HQS QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR ADLESICK TO STOP BY IN LONDON ON THIS TRIP. DO NOT THINK WE WANT TO REVEAL MEETINGS WITH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/I TO GNGRAPP AT THIS TIME. DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY MERIT IN SEEING THEM IN SITUATION WHERE WE ARE NOT GOING TO BENEFIT MUCH, AS BELIEVE IF DO MEET WITH THEM IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONCEAL FACT THAT ADLESICK HAD MADE TRIP TO TEHRAN.

2. ADDITIONALLY THERE SEEMS TO BE NO PRESSING REASON TO SEE SDPRETEXT AT THIS TIME. SINCE HE HAS NOT CONTACTED ADLESICK, THERE IS PROBABLY NOTHING NEW ON SDJANUS/32 ALL WE COULD GET FROM HIM IS CURRENT RUMOR MILL AMONG IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN ENGLAND.

3. PLEASE ADVISE HQS VIEWS.

4. FILE: 201-215177. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

ARGUMENTS THAN HE WAS TO YAZDI'S. WHAT STRUCK CHARGE WAS THAT BY END OF MEETING YAZDI HAD DROPPED HOSTILE ATTITUDE EVINCED IN RECENT MEETINGS AND EVEN INDICATED SOME PROGRESS IN SETTLING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, HE WENT SO FAR AS TO ADMIT THAT SOME OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS MAY BE CAUSED BY LACK OF COORDINATION ON IRANIAN SIDE.

5. AT END OF MEETING ADLESICK POINTED OUT TO BOTH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/I THAT KIND OF TACTICAL INFORMATION THAT THEY WANTED ON IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WAS IN GREAT PART COLLECTABLE BY TECHNICAL MEANS AND URGED THEM TO MAKE USE OF THEIR CAPABILITIES.

6. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 17 OCT 95 DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T 170751Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54502

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WINTEL EYBAT (SDPLOD)

1. CHARGE, MR. RON SMITH AND ADLESICK MET WITH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/1 FOR TWO HOURS AFTERNOON OF 16 OCTBER. SUBSTANCE OF MEETING BEING REPORTED BY CHARGE VIA STATE CHANNELS. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT CHAMRAN UNABLE TO ATTEND MEETING BECAUSE HE WAS DETAINED IN KURDISTAN. THEY EXPECTED HIM BACK IN TEHRAN MOMENTARILY. ADLESICK PLANNING TO STAY COUPLE OF DAYS IN HOPE CHAMRAN SHOWS UP. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEY CONTINUE MUCH INTERESTED IN REESTABLISHING LIAISON.

2. CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH IRAQ AND KURDISH PROBLEM. YAZDI HAS FAIRLY UNSHAKEABLE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH IRAQIS IN SUPPORTING KURDISH INSURRECTION. WE WERE ABLE TO POINT OUT HOW HIGHLY UNLIKELY THIS IS, BUT FACT THAT YAZDI BROUGHT IT UP & SERIOUS IRANIAN CONSIDERATION INDICATES DEGREE OF PARANOIA ABROAD IN BAZERGAN GOVERNMENT.

3. MR. SMITH GAVE VERY GOOD BRIEF ON SOVIET ENERGY PROBLEMS. FROM DISCUSSION WITH YAZDI, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE OF CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR CANCELLING GAS CONTRACT WITH SOVIETS. BELIEVE THAT THIS BRIEFING TOGETHER WITH ADLESICK BRIEFING HAS GIVEN THEM FACTUAL INFORMATION TO MULL OVER WHEN CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT. AT ONE POINT IN THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI RATHER NAIVELY SAID THAT HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND SOME OF OUR POINTS IN LIGHT OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO HIM WHICH HAD BEEN VERY FRIENDLY RECENTLY. WE POINTED OUT THAT GIVEN THE OUTPUT SITUATION, THE SOVIETS HAD LITTLE IN THE WAY OF ALTERNATIVES BUT TO BE FRIENDLY FOR THE TIME BEING. THE CRUNCH WOULD COME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BECAME A NET OIL IMPORTER.

4. SDPLOD/1 IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL 22 OCTOBER. DURING COURSE OF MEETING HE SEEMED MORE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN

TO : PRIORIORTY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLOD

REF: TEHRAN

].IDEN : 66-68-85 RPT 66-68-85 .

2.NO FILE . RVW]]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T PAQUIN

S E C R E T

CITE TEHRAN

TO : PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLOD

REF: DIRECTOR 5277]5

]. SDPLOD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT , FOR SECURITY, HE STAYS OVER NIGHT AT DIFFERENT PLACES SAID HE CAN USUALLY BE REACHED AT IDEN UNIT - ABOUT]900 HOURS.

2. ADLESICK AND BRIEAFING OFFICER WILL BE MET. SHOULD THERE BE ANY DIFFICULTY AT AIRPORT , ADLESSICK SHOULD CONTACT EMBASSY . PREFEARABLY BEFORE CALLING SDPLOD/]. NUMBERS ARE 8]-00-9], 82-50-9] AND 82-90-5]. CHARGE'S EXTENSION, FOR USE DURING OFFICE HOURS, IS]6000R]602 MARINE SECURITY GUARD IS]2]4.

3. PLS ADVISE IT INTERARY.

4. NO FILE. RVW]]OCT 99DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T PAQUIN

A E 2 STOCKHOLM 26286 S E C R E T

4. PER STATE INSTRUCTIONS, DCM HAS MEETING WITH DEPUTY 1400 HOURS TODAY (5 OCT) BEFORE LATTER LEAVES AE BRIEFED DCM ON ABOVE TO AVOID CROSSING WIRES AND INADVERTENT FAUX PAS.

5. FILE. 21-96205. FWW 05 OCT 99 DRV DSC.

S E C R E T

BT
26286

6 Oct 79

E C R E T 051044Z OCT 79 STAFF

TE STOCKHOLM 26286

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL EYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

E: DIRECTOR 525381

passed Chargé 10 Oct

1. PASSED IBEX MATERIAL WITH REF CAVEAT 5 OCTOBER. SDPLOD/1 PLANS STAY TEHRAN THROUGH 17 OCT, THEN RETURN STOCKHOLM TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI. THIRTY OF FORTY DAYS AFTER THAT, HE WILL RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR ELECTIONS AND FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT. HE NOT SURE HOW LONG HE WILL BE ASSIGNED STOCKHOLM AND ASSERTED HE INDIFFERENT TO ASSIGNMENT, SINCE HE "JUST A SOLDIER" IN SERVICE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. SDPLOD/1 TOOK OPPORTUNITY SPONTANEOUSLY TO RAISE GOI DISSATISFACTION WITH STATE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. NEW REGIME HAD BEEN IN POWER 8-9 MONTHS AND U.. HAD TAKEN NO INITIATIVES TO SOLVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1, WE UNDERSTOOD THESE PROBLEMS AND HAD THE SOLUTIONS TO HAKEM. THIS LEFT REGIME WITH IMPRESSION THAT U.S. PLAYING WAIT-AND-SEE GAME WITH OBJECTIVE OF INTERFERRING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS IN FUTURE. GIVEN THE PAST, IT WAS UP TO US TO MAKE PROPOSALS AND MOST OF THE "SACRAFICES," SDPLOD/1 SAID "THEY" DISLIKED THE RUSSIANS, BUT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN TO SEE GOI "100 TIMES, HAD BEEN KICKED OUT 100 TIMES" BUT PERSISTED IN OFFERING HELP AND SOLUTIONS". ASKED WHAT "PROBLEMS" HE REFERRED TO, SDPLOD/1 MENTIONED ONLY "SPARE PARTS" AND "BLOCKED FUNDS".

3. SANDAGGER MADE NO COMMENT DURING THIS MONOLOGUE, WHICH DELIVERED POLITELY BUT FIRMLY, EXCEPT TO DENY, OF COURSE, THAT U.S. HAD ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERRING IN ARANIAN AFFAIRS. SDPLOD SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE, BUT LACK OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES LEFT GOI WITH BAD IMPRESSION FUELED BY PAST AND CURRENT CRITICISM OF REGIME, INCLUDING RECENT REMARKS BY CHARGE IN TEHRAN RE ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS. SDPLOD/1 SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SPEAKING FRANKLY AND WANTED ME TO CONVEY HIS REMARKS TO USG.

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LL ESA383BRA200
OO RUQMHR
DE RUFHRS #3025 3031452
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301446Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1535
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1410
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 087
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5551
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 4679
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 328
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1642
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 3025

CHARGE

FILE COPY
DUMMY CHRON

EXDIS

RABAT FOR DAS CONSTABLE

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/30/89 (HAYNES, ULRIC, JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, OVIP, AG, US

SUBJ: 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 281872, B. MONROVIA 8576, C. TRIPOLI 1709,
D. STATE 282984

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DEPENDING ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOA PRESIDENT BENDJEDID AND/OR FONMIN BENYAHIA, FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE CONTACTS FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND LEADING MEMBERS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS TO BE PRESENT FOR CELEBRATIONS (REF A, PARA 11):

A) SPAIN - SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOS MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY (I.E., SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT) PEREZ-LLORCA AND GOS MFA DIRGEN FOR AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST AGUIARRE-BENGOA;

B) FRANCE - FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA IS EXPLORING POSSIBLE INTEREST OF SECGEN OF QUAI DE LEUSS IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS;

C) LIBYA - IF GOL PRESIDENT QADHAFI DOES ATTEND CELEBRATIONS, LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SHOWED CAUTIOUS INTEREST IN PROPOSING HE MEET WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI (REFTEL C);

D) IRAN - IRANIAN CHARGE IN ALGERIA INFORMED ME TODAY HE CABLING TEHRAN TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE INTEREST OF PM BAZARGAN OR OTHER MEMBERS OF GOI DELEGATION IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS (REFTEL D).

3. THE ABOVE REFLECTS LIVELY INTEREST ON PART OF ALL CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTLY IN ALGIERS (GOA OFFICIALS, DIPLOMATS, PRESS) IN FACT THAT USG HAS FIELDED A HIGH-POWERED DELEGATION BY VIRTUE OF ITS HAVING DR. BRZEZINSKI AS HIT HEAD. ONCE IN ALGIERS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WILL CERTAINLY ABOUND. DELEGATION AND OTHERS SHOULD NOTE THAT ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS CONSIDER DR. BRZEZINSKI AS MAJOR USG PROPONENT OF POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO MOROCCO. HAYNES
ET
#3025

VZCZC 266
CC RUEHC
DE RUQMER #1151 2950904
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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S E C R E T TEHRAN 11151

FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 10/22/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, US
SUBJECT: GEORGE CAVE VISIT TO TEHRAN

REF: TEHRAN 11133

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS REFTEL INDICATES, ENTEZAM WAS AMONG GROUP THAT I BRIEFED ON SHAH'S ILLNESS AND PLANNED TRIP TO U.S. ENTEZAM UNDERSTANDS AS WELL AS ANYONE IN PGOI THE NEED FOR KEEPING POLITICAL REACTION UNDER CONTROL.

3. SINCE GEORGE CAVE HAD ALREADY DEPARTED TEHRAN WHEN WE MADE OUR REPRESENTATIONS YESTERDAY I ASSUMED HE WOULD NOT RETURN NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY NEED FOR HIM TO RETURN. I NOW UNDERSTAND THAT AGENCY HAS INSTRUCTED HIM TO RETURN FROM PARIS AND THAT HE WILL BE ARRIVING TOMORROW MORNING. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT, ASSUMING THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONCURRED THAT WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR HAND HERE. HOWEVER I DO WANT TO SAY THAT FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT AND IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ENTEZAM (WHO HAS NOW DELAYED HIS DEPARTURE FOR STOCKHOLM UNTIL LATE THIS WEEK) HIS PRESENCE WOULD NOT SEEM NECESSARY. LAINGEN
BT
#1151

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VZCZC 266

KHOMEINI IS AN ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY [illegible]. THE SHAH PUT IT THIS WAS AN UNPARDONABLE ERROR ON KHOMEINI'S PART. YAZDI ATTEMPTED TO DRAW ANALOGY BETWEEN KHOMEINI'S SITUATION AND THAT OF ANDREW YOUNG IN U.S. WE RESPONDED THAT ANALOGY WAS HIGHLY IMPERFECT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT NAZIH'S WHEREABOUTS, YAZDI SAID HE WAS ALIVE AND WELL IN TEHRAN.

9. A GREAT DEAL OF CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO KURDESTAN. YAZDI WAS CONVINCED THERE IS MAJOR FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR KURDISH INSURRECTION, DESCRIBING SITUATION THERE AS SERIOUS. PGOI HAD INFORMATION WHICH THEY CONSIDER RELIABLE INDICATING THAT U.S. AND ISRAEL WERE COOPERATING WITH IRAQ IN FOMENTING KURDISH INSURRECTION. CHARGE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN POINTING OUT THAT U.S. HAD LITTLE TO GAIN BY AIDING KURDISH REBELS. U.S. INTEREST IS IN STABILITY, AND INTEGRITY OF IRAN. ESSENTIAL U.S. INTEREST IN IRAN IS THAT OIL KEEPS FLOWING; ANY SITUATION IN IRAN WHICH THREATEN THAT FLOW WOULD BE INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.

10. WE ALSO TRIED TO GET HIM TO CONSIDER THE ABSURDITY OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQ, NOTING THAT KIND OF SUPPORT NEEDED BY KURDS DID NOT REQUIRE ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT. MOREOVER, IRAQ COULD NOT RISK EXPOSURE OF DEALING WITH ISRAEL. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT SUPPORT KURDS ON ITS OWN. WE POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ PROBABLY VERY CONCERNED OVER EXTENSION OF SHIA NATIONALISM AND COULD WELL CONSIDER SUPPORT TO THE KURDS AS WEAKENING PGOI. YAZDI SAID THAT ADEQUATE ASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SADAM HUSAYN WITH REGARD TO THE SHIA MAJORITY IN IRAQ. YAZDI INDICATED THAT IF IRAQI INTERFERENCE CONTINUED, IRAN WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER RETALIATION AMONG THE IRAQI SHIA COMMUNITY.

11. THESE AND OTHER COMMENTS BY YAZDI REFLECTED CONSIDERABLE PARANOIA. E.G., IN DISCUSSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN, HE SPECULATED THAT SOME GROUP WITHIN USG PROBABLY CIA, MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE PGOI WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR USG OFFICIALS. CIA HAD DONE SUCH THINGS IN THE PAST, SAID H

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[redacted] YAZDI AND [redacted] SUBJECT PLEASED [redacted]
[redacted] PROVIDED BY SMITH AND CAVE. YAZDI SEEMED
[redacted] INTERESTED IN THE BRIEF ON SOVIET ENERGY
[redacted]. HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE EFFECT OF THE ABROGA-
[redacted] GAS CONTRACTS ON SOVIET ENERGY PLANS. HE
[redacted] THEY WERE ACTIVELY TRYING TO RAISE CURRENT
[redacted] OF GAS FROM 25 CENTS PER 1000CUBIC-F.
WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES
RAISED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE NET
EXPORTERS OF OIL SOMETIME IN THE 1981-85 TIME FRAME.
SINCE IRAN WAS THE MOST LIKELY PLACE FOR THE SOVIETS
TRY TO BUY OIL ON FAVORABLE TERMS, YAZDI INDICATED
CURIOSITY ABOUT WHAT KIND OF PRESSURES COULD BE EXPECTED.
COMMENTED THAT RECENT SOVIET OVERTURES HAD BEEN VERY
FRIENDLY.

. WITH REGARD TO WHAT SOVIETS MIGHT DO WHEN FACED WITH
[redacted] OIL, POSITION TAKEN BY AMERICAN SIDE
[redacted] THAT WE ARE BASICALLY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING
FACTUAL INFORMATION, THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES SHOULD
DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO YAZDI
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME IN
TRYING FOR OIL IN HARD CURRENCY AS THIS WOULD CURTAIL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CURRENTLY 40 PERCENT OF SOVIET
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS COMES FROM OIL; THUS LOSING
THIS INCOME IS GOING TO BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THEIR
ECONOMIC PLANNING; WHAT MAKES IT MORE SERIOUS IS THAT THIS
[redacted] WILL COME RELATIVELY SOON. INITIALLY WE EXPECT
SOVIETS WOULD SEEK TO PURCHASE OIL ON SOFT TERMS AND
WILL PROBABLY PUT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO AGREE TO SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT. YAZDI DISCOUNTED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT
IRAN WOULD AGREE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

. DURING DISCUSSION OF OIL, SUBJECT OF FORMER [redacted]
CHAIRMAN, HASAN NAZIH, WAS RAISED BY CHARGE. [redacted]
EXPLAINED THAT NAZIH HAD MADE A SERIOUS PROPOSAL [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

3

2/6/POL/A15/1/16

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/13/7
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAI
DRFTD: GCAVE:FM
CLEAR: NONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 11088 R: CHARGE

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 10/13/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF YAZDI AND ENTEZAM

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AFTERNOON OF 15 OCTOBER, CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY RON SMITH AND GEORGE CAVE, MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN, ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM. DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN WAS TO HAVE ATTENDED, BUT WAS ABSENT IN KHUZESTAN.

3. CHARGE INITIALLY CALLED YAZDI'S ATTENTION TO A PARTICULARLY INTEMPERATE COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY [illegible] RADIO ON OCTOBER 15. YAZDI AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE ARTICLE AND PRESS TREATMENT WAS A THEME THROUGHOUT MEETING. YAZDI INSISTED THAT THERE IS AN ORGANIZED ANTI-IRANIAN CONSPIRACY IN THE U.S. PRESS. YAZDI SAID THAT WHEN IN NEW YORK HE HAD INVITED NUMEROUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. MEDIA TO A MEETING. HE DID NOT MAKE CLEAR EXACLY WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, OR WHEN IT TOOK PLACE. WE NOTED NO MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUCH A YAZDI PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS NEW YORK VISIT.

4. YAZDI ASKED WHAT USG REACTION HAD BEEN TO HIS MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS. YAZDI WAS TOLD THAT FROM U.S. POINT OF VIEW THE MEETINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL. WE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE LAID THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING IRANIAN-U.S. RELATIONS. BUT THE STAND TAKEN BY YAZDI DURING THE VANCE MEETING INDICATED TO US THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE AN EVEN SLOWER PROCESS THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. ISSUES HAD BEEN PORTRAYED AS BIGGER THAN LIFE. IN PURSUING THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI SEEMED MORE TEMPERATE THAN IN RECENT MEETINGS.

5. WHEN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN RESOLVING MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES, HE CONCEDED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEM WAS DUE TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION ON USOI SIDE. BUT HE WAS VOCAL IN EMPHASIZING THAT HE HAD NOT TO SEE PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. HE SAID HE WAS ESPECIALLY TROUBLED TO HEAR OF PROBLEMS IN THE SECURITY AREA (THE 1974 MOU). HE CLAIMED NEITHER THE EMBASSY NOR THE MOD HAD TOLD HIM OF U.S. CHANGE EMPHASIZED USG'S READINESS TO RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING [illegible]. YAZDI INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO HAVE [illegible] EMBASSY, MOD) WORKING GROUP TO [illegible]

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C O N - I D

* U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979—294-930

THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI HAD REPEATED ARAFAT'S CHARGES ON THE THREE AMBASSADORS. ENTAZAM APPEARED SUITABLY EMBARRASSED AND SAID "BUT WE HAVE ALREADY CORRECTED THAT STORY. HAVEN'T YOU SEEN IT IN TODAY'S PRESS?" ENTAZAM CONTINUED THAT IN A TALK WITH BAZARGAN AND TABATABAI, HE HAD OBTAINED AGREEMENT THAT AN IMMEDIATE RETRACTION OF THE STORY WOULD BE PRINTED IN PARS AND THEN PICKED UP BY ALL IRANIAN PRESS. (COMMENT: NO RETRACTION HAS BEEN CARRIED IN ANY OF THE PRESS TO DATE).

12. STUDENTS: ENTAZAM SAID THERE WERE ABOUT 3200 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN AND 30-40,000 IN EUROPE. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE STUDENTS IN SWEDEN WERE LEARNING ONLY SWEDISH RATHER THAN A WORLD LANGUAGE AND OBSERVED HE WOULD PREFER STUDENTS TO LEARN A WORLD LANGUAGE. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT THE US EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION HAD ALSO TIGHTENED ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS GRADES AND LANGUAGE ABILITY AND WAS CHECKING TO ASSURE THE INSTITUTIONS WERE PROPERLY CERTIFIED. WE HOPE THE PGOI APPRECIATES WHY OUR REFUSAL RATE OF STUDENTS IS HIGH. WE ARE TRYING TO ASSURE THAT ONLY PROPERLY QUALIFIED STUDENTS ARE ADMITTED TO THE US. ENTAZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT INDEED IRANIAN EMBASSYS ABROAD WERE IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO ASSURE IRANIAN STUDENTS DO NOT BECOME "PERPETUAL STUDENTS".

13. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THE CHARGE AGAIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ENTAZAM WOULD HELP PGOI UNDERSTAND THAT USG WAS TAKING ACTION TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE HOPED THAT ENTAZAM COULD DO SOMETHING TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE US IN THE PRESS. ENTAZAM REPLIED THAT HE SINCERELY THOUGHT THAT THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP SHOULD IMPROVE AND REQUESTED AGAIN THAT THE US TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO OUR MUTUAL PROBLEMS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY THE CHARGE, ENTAZAM SAID THAT KHOMEINI DOES DISTRUST THE US. HE TRUSTS BAZARGAN, ENTAZAM, AND YAZDI, AND THAT IS "WHY WE ARE HERE." ENTAZAM INTIMATED THAT IF THEY ARE ABLE TO PRODUCE RESULTS BY SOLVING THESE US-IRANIAN ISSUES THIS WILL HELP THEIR POSITION. ENTAZAM SAID THAT CHARGE MIGHT ASK YAZDI TO SET UP AN APPOINTMENT TO GO AND SEE KHOMEINI.
HALEGEN

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...PRESS ATTACK ON USG AS A COUNTER TO ENTEZAM'S ...
...PLAINS THAT USG WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ...
...US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP, CHARGE POINTED OUT ARTS ...
...PGOI HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TO BE HELPFUL SUCH AS ...
...TO USG MILITARY PROPERTIES, PAYMENT FOR DAMAGE ...
...BY DOING TRACTOR, JAILING OF OF CITIZENS ...
...CHARGES, EXPULSION OF JOURNALISTS AND TROUBLES ...
...STAFF AT EMBASSY COMPOUND. ...WE TRY TO BE ...
...LIKE SUPPLYING HEATING OIL OF FIND OURSELVES ...
...AZIZ. ONE PGOI DO'S NOT SEEM TO ... ALIZE THE ...
...SITUATION HAS THIS WEEK HAS TOUCH ... OUTSIDE THE ...
...HOW THEY SEE IN OUR COUNTRY ... US OR POLICY ...
...ISSUE ... IN THE U.S. ... THEY ... NO PLACE SIMPLE NAIVE ...
...PLANE ... MASS-LESS CITAL ... O ... IN THE ... ICH IS A MI-GOVT ... CONTROLLED. THE CHARGE ...
...ALLEGED FOR US AMBASSADORS WERE CONSPIRING AND CIA ...
...BRING DOWN THE REVOLUTION WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ...

...ENTEZAM ALSO PLIED THAT THE PGOI WAS NOT ALWAYS FIRM ...
...STATEMENTS; IT WAS ...-B PRESS. THE CHARGE POINTED OUT ...

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[illegible] REFUSING WHERE THE PGOI HAD ITSELF DELAYED IN GETTING SPARE PARTS MOVING (EMBASSY IS PREPARING A BRIEF SUMMARY) HE CALLED ON US TO PREPARE "SUGGESTIONS" OF HOW ALL OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED (I.E. IN THE FAVOR OF THE PGOI). HE SEVERAL TIMES OFFERED TO SET UP A "COMMITTEE" TO MEET WITH THE US SIDE WHEN WE HAD PREPARED OUR SUGGESTIONS. ALTHOUGH ENTAZAM WANTED A LETTER OF "SOLUTIONS" TO THE CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS QUESTION, CHARGE REPLIED THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE DEALT WITH ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM POINTED OUT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING AND WERE CONTINUOUSLY COMING UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS. THE US HAD NOT OFFERED ANYTHING.

5. ECONOMIC ISSUES: DURING CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM MADE SAME POINT ON ECONOMIC ISSUE AS ON MILITARY SALES: THE USG CAN DO MUCH MORE THAN IT IS PRESENTLY DOING TO HELP PGOI IRON OUT ITS COURT CASES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. EVERY DAY, ENTAZAM SAID, WE ARE "LOSING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS" ON THESE CONTRACTS WHILE THE USG MOVES VERY SLOWLY. CHARGE SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS SORT OF STATEMENT, NOTED LIMITATIONS ON WHAT WE COULD DO VIS-A-VIS JUDICIARY UNDER OUR SYSTEM, AND OUTLINED WHAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN VARIOUS CASES (READING AND BATES, EDS ETC).

6. CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL CALLS: DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, CHARGE EXPLAINED TO ENTAZAM THE BACKGROUND OF HIS TALKS WITH SABAGHIAN ON THE EXECUTIONS OF THE FORMER SENATORS. HE STATED THAT WHILE HE FELT THE TALKS WITH SABAGHIAN HAD BEEN PROFITABLE AND INTERESTING, HE REGRETTED EXECUTION ISSUE HAD BEEN MADE A PUBLIC ONE. ENTAZAM REPLIED THAT HE HOPED IN FUTURE THAT CHARGE WOULD LIMIT SUBSTANTIVE CALLS LIKE THIS TO BAZARGAN, YAZDI OR CHAMRAN. IF HE WANTED TO SEE OTHER PGOI OFFICIALS HE SHOULD FIRST CLEAR THE TALKS DIRECTLY WITH YAZDI. "WE ARE IN A MINORITY" ENTAZAM SAID. MANY OF THE OTHER PGOI LEADERS SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT IRAN SHOULD MAINTAIN BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. THEY MAY WELL EXAGGERATE WHAT IS SAID IN MEETINGS AND GO PUBLIC LIKE SABAGHIAN. IF YAZDI OR ENTAZAM WERE CONSULTED FIRST THIS COULD GIVE THEM A CHANCE TO BRIEF THE OFFICIALS TO BE VISITED AHEAD OF TIME. HE AND YAZDI DID NOT WANT TO LOCK THE CHARGE'S ACCESS TO PEOPLE BUT TO ASSURE THAT NO PROBLEMS AROSE. CHARGE DEMURRED POLITELY POINTING OUT THAT ALL HIS REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS GO THROUGH THE MFA PROTOCOL OFFICE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EMBASSY FELT IT SHOULD HAVE MUCH MORE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS, ESPECIALLY THE ISLAMIC LEADERS. ENTAZAM AGREED BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE CHARGE NOT DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN SUCH MEETINGS. "IF YOU GO DEEPLY INTO A DISCUSSION THE RESULTS WILL DISTURB EVERYTHING." "BE LIKE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR" HE SAID. HE NEVER VOLUNTEERS ANY OPINIONS. INDEED HE NEVER EVEN COMMENTS WHEN HIS GOVERNMENT IS ATTACKED BY THE IMAM AND YAZDI. HE SIMPLY FORGETS ALL ABOUT SUCH STATEMENTS. (ENTAZAM SEEMED TO INCLUDE ALL PGOI LEADERS WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CHAMRAN ON HIS LIST OF WHOM HE SHOULD BE CHECKED WITH YAZDI.)

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STOCKHOLM, PLAYING A "WAITING GAME". CHARGE THEN WENT OVER QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES, POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH DR. YAZDI IN NEW YORK HAD CHARGED WE WERE DELAYING DELIVERIES, MUCH OF THE DELAY LAY IN PGOI'S FAILURE TO ASSIGN FREIGHT FORWARDERS.

5. ENTAZAM STATED IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ONE OF THE MAIN UNSOLVED PROBLEMS WAS THE DELIVERY OF CLASSFIED SPARE PARTS. CHARGE REPLIED THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA CAUSED BY OUR REGULATIONS AND BY THE NEED TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE STILL HAVING MAJOR PROBLEMS SIMPLY GETTING ACCESS TO THE F-14'S. WE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES ON CASE BY CASE BASIS. SWEEPING THIS EXPLANATION ASIDE, ENTAZAM STATED THAT "FOR US IT LOOKS LIKE YOU ARE JUST WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION FOR A NEW PLOT AGAINST THE COUNTRY." ENTAZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT THAT IN GENERAL THE IRANIAN PEOPLE BELIEVED IT. IF THE US WANTS TO PROVE IT IS SINCERE, IT SHOULD COME TO THE PGOI WITH OFFERS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING CASES. THE PGOI CONSIDERS THAT THE USG IMPOSED THESE MILITARY CONTRACTS ON THE FORMER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. IF THE USG IS NOW SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS IT WILL SIMPLY CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS.

6. CHARGE'S REPLY OUTLINED THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE RECENTLY TO BE FORTHCOMING ON FMS QUESTIONS (WORK WITH THE TRUST FUND, BRIEFINGS, INFORMATION, ETC.). HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE SUSPICIONS OF SOME IRANIANS THAT THE USG WAS DELAYING. THERE WAS A CERTAIN IRONY, HOWEVER, THAT THE USG IS PRESENTLY BEING CRITICIZED IN THE US BECAUSE OF A US PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE USG IS ESCALATING SPARE PARTS AND EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AT A TIME WHEN IRAN IS FIGHTING GOING ON IN KURDISTAN.

7. WHILE CONVERSATION RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE EACH TIME CHARGE'S EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT WE HAD DONE ANSWERED WITH ENTAZAM'S REQUESTS THAT THE US BE MORE FORTHCOMING. SPECIFICALLY HE ASKED FOR A LETTER

Document Classified by 5 USC 552 (b)(1) Reason 1.5(c) Declassify on: 19-0-204-89

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UNCLAS #4277/01 [illegible] **
ONY ZCC6C ZZH
P 131325Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4287
INFO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0018
ZFT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHGE: STAT 10/15/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGE
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA ECON CONS CHRON RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10977

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/15/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR, MASS
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S TALK WITH AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTAZAM

REF: STOCKHOLM 4184

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE CALLED ON IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTAZAM OCTOBER 13 FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US IRANIAN RELATIONS. DURING DISCUSSIONS, ENTAZAM POINTED TO SUSPICION OF IRANIANS THAT US IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME WITH PGOI IN HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL FALL. HE ASKED THAT US TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO OFFER PGOI SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS SUCH AS CLASSIFIED MILITARY SPARE PARTS AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS. ENTAZAM SUGGESTED THAT CHARGE CLEAR ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI SO THAT YAZDI WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROPERLY BRIEF THE OFFICIALS. CHARGE DEMURRED GENTLY, POINTING OUT THAT ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS ARE ALREADY REQUESTED THROUGH OFFICE OF CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTAZAM POINTED OUT THAT KHOMEINI "TRUSTS US" (HIMSELF, YAZDI, BAZARGAN) BUT INFERRED IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO THIS GROUP IF THE US COULD HELP THEM PRODUCE SOLUTIONS FOR US-IRANIAN PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTAZAM OCTOBER 13 WAS HELD AT PRIME MINISTER'S FORMER OFFICE (HE HAS JUST MOVED TO GOVEYDA'S OFFICE) INDICATING ENTAZAMS CONTINUING CLOSENESS TO PM BAZARGAN. ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS COOL AT OUTSET BUT WARMED UP CONSIDERABLY BY END. ENTAZAM THROUGHOUT WAS UNCOMPROMISING IN PRESENTING PGOI'S VIEWS AND COULD NOT BE SWAYED FROM THE CONVICTION THAT US MUST TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF US-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE TO BE IMPROVED. ENTAZAM PLAINLY CONSIDERS HIMSELF PART OF A SMALL ELITE GROUP OF MODERNISTS (BAZARGAN, YAZDI, CHAMRAN) WHO ARE TRUSTED BY KHOMEINI AND WHO ARE STRUGGLING TO PROTECT IRAN AND THE US AGAINST A CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY.

4. MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES. CHARGE OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION FOR HELPFUL TALKS ENTAZAM HAD HELD WITH EMBASSY STOCKHOLM. HE WENT ON TO REVIEW RECENT EVENTS IN US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, EMPHASIZING THAT WE WANTED TO MOVE AHEAD IN ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND WAS NOT, AS ENTAZAM HAD STATED TO OUR DCM I-

In addition we have informed MOND officials in Tehran that we are prepared to participate in a continuing working group here to ensure fullest possible understanding of the FMS cases.

We understand the PGOI is also considering establishing in the U.S. an Iranian military purchasing mission to facilitate understanding of and procurement under the FMS program. The USG would welcome this.

October 15, 1979

At the same time the MOND was informed that we were prepared to sell urgently needed Iranian Air Force spare parts against new money from the PGOI totalling $5.5 million. The MOND was informed that similar arrangements could be made for the Navy, the ground forces and Army Aviation.

Additional details on this arrangement for urgently needed spare parts had been provided by letter of July 30 to Brigadier General Emanian.

For some reason, the PGOI had not completed arrangements for all necessary freight forwarding agents as of the end of September.

As of October 9, however, the Arya Shipping line had been designated by the Iranian Navy and Army to carry their spare parts and other bulk shipments. These shipments should start moving soon.

Contract arrangements for shipment of Iranian Air Force parts are only now being completed by the PGOI. When this is done spare parts under both the emergency program and those in the Trust Fund financed pipeline can move.

FMS helicopter spare parts are currently being prepared for shipment based on arrangements worked out in late September by General Safari. These parts are expected to reach McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey later this month for pick-up by IIAF aircraft. Bell Helicopter has about 90,000 pounds of FMS related spares for delivery to McGuire under this arrangement.

Bell Helicopter also has about 110,000 pounds of commercial spares for delivery and is trying to work out charter flight for these spares. Earlier, Bell Helicopter had shipped at its own expense a quantity of spares by one C-130 and one DC-8.

During the meetings with Dr. Yazdi in New York on October 4, U.S. military representatives reviewed these and other matters. General Safari was informed that a list of all material in the pipeline and a list of closed FMS cases had earlier been provided to the PGOI. U.S. representatives reiterated our invitation to MOND officials to travel to Denver, if they wished, to review each and every FMS case file.

Iran - Military Supply Procedures Affecting Spare Parts

USG posture throughout regarding the Trust Fund has been to work to ensure that its solvency could be assured at all times as the Provisional Government of Iran (PGOI) scale down its procurement and looks toward a new military procurement program from the U.S. at a reduced level.

This effort was made in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding with Iranian authorities of February 3, 1979, that provided for major revisions in the purchase of military materiel from the U.S. Involved were agreed cancellations, terminations, and reductions of several major programs -- all designed to meet the interests of both governments in assuring the solvency of the Trust Fund.

Insolvency of the Trust Fund would have caused termination of the entire Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for Iran, with the risk of very substantial termination liability costs for Iran.

A major element in that approach was the diversion to U.S. procurement of the Spruance class destroyers (CG-993's), resulting in July in sufficient funds being placed in the Trust Fund to ensure its continued solvency.

As part of this continuing effort to ensure fullest possible U.S.-Iran understanding on the status of the Trust Fund and all FMS cases therein, the total FMS community in the was involved during the month of August in a case by case study of the financial status of the entire Trust Fund.

Meetings were held in Washington and Denver (August 22-28) to review the results of this study. PGOI was invited to send representatives but declined.

ARMISH/MAAG representatives participated in this meeting, returning to Tehran in early September with a representative from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). This team then reviewed the Trust Fund and Memorandum of Understanding of February, 1979, with PGOI authorities (MOND, MFA and services).

In early August (letter to Col. Kamkar of August 4) the PGOI was informed that non-sensitive FMS items in the pipeline and financed by the Trust Fund were ready to move, subject to shipping arrangements being arranged by the PGOI.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tehran, Iran

October 15, 1979

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

When we talked the other day you asked me for a piece of paper describing the status of spare parts deliveries as we see it.

A piece of paper of this kind is attached. I hope it will be useful.

I appreciated the opportunity to talk frankly about some of the problems in United States-Iranian relations. As the Secretary indicated to Dr. Yazdi in New York, our purpose is to work closely with your government in every way possible to build a relationship based on the new realities in Iran.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

His Excellency Amir Entezam,
Ambassador,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran, Iran.

CHARGE:LBLaingen:em 10/15/79

cc: A/MAAG and DAO

7. ENTEZAM REFERRED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTRUST OF THE SOVIET UNION BY LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IS THE MOST ACTIVE IN TEHRAN, VISITING GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS DAILY WITH OFFERS OF ANY AND ALL KINDS OF ASSISTANCE. HE IS CONSOSTENTLY REBUFFED BUT CONSISTENTLY SURFACES TO TRY AGAIN. SOVIET ACTIVITY IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO US POSTURE, ENTEZAM SAID, WHICH IN THE EYES OF MANY TOP IRANIANS, IS COMPLETELY PASSIVE. IN RESPONSE, DCM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE NOT TO TAKE US AT ITS WORD THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND MUTUAL INTEREST. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT ENTEZAM MIGHT CALL ON CHARGE LAINGEN WHEN NEXT IN TEHRAN TO DISCUSS US POLICY. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND NOTED HE WILL BE IN TEHRAN OCTOBER 9-17.

8. ENTEZAM LEFT FOR PARSI OCTOBER 6. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE THERE WILL BE TO SET UP AN IRANIAN "NEWSPAPER" TO BE PUBLISHED IN GERMAN, FRENCH AND ENGLISH. FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT ERUPOE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO AN OPERATION NOW CARRIED OUT IN WASHINGTON -- THE VOICE OF IRAN -- AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO DESCRIBE THE GOALS, METHODS, POLICIES AND PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION.

9. ENTEZAM WILL RETURN TO STOCKHOLM OCTOBER 18 AND WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI SHORTLY THEREAFTER.
KENNEDY-MINOTT
BT
#4164

5. AS FOR NAZIH, ENTEZAM SAID HE IS "SAFE" IN HIDING. EXCELLENT LAWYER AND MANAGER BUT INDISCREET IN HIS COMMENTS. SEVERAL REMARKS IN A SPEECH BY NAZIH A MONTH AGO, EXPRESSING ANGER AND CASTING SUSPICIONS FOR SLOW ECONOMIC PROGRESS, SPELLED HIS DOOM IN OIL MONOPOLY. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF NAZIH "BELIEVE HE CAN BE SAVED."
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BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4164

EXDIS

6. ENTEZAM'S FOCUS NEVER DEVIATED FAR FROM US-IRANIAN RELATIONS. HE DESCRIBED THE SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HE AND OTHER FOREIGN-EDUCATED, FOREIGN-TRAVELED IRANIANS WERE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF US FAILURE TO CONVEY THOSE SIGNALS WHICH WOULD INDICATE US ACCEPTANCE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND A WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE REVOLUTION ON BASIS OF EQUALITY AND RESPECT. ENTEZAM SAID THE US KNOWS EXACTLY HOW TO RESPOND TO CURRENT IRANIAN NEEDS --- AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS, AN UNBLOCKING OF IRANIAN FUNDS IN US, RAW MATERIALS FOR IRANIAN INDUSTRIES, ECT. WHILE US OFFICIALS IN TEHRAN AND IN WASHINGTON MOUTH ENCOURAGING WORDS, THEY FAIL TO TAKE THE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THEM. THE SUSPICION GROWS AMONG THOSE WHO KNOW THE US BEST THAT WASHINGTON IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME. IF THAT IS THE STRATEGY, IT WILL FAIL, ENTEZAM SAID. IRAN HAS ITS SHARE OF DIFFICULTIES, THERE ARE ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS DIFFERENCES ON HOW FAR AND FAST TO PROCEED WITH THE REVOLUTION, BUT ALL ARE UNITED IN THE SENSE THAT "THE KING YOU SUPPORTED" OR ANY OTHER KING WILL NEVER BE ALLOWED TO GOVERN. THE US WILL PAY A HIGH PRICE FOR THIS WAITING GAME. ENTEZAM SHRUGGED OFF SUGGESTIONS THAT US LAWS AND NOT US POLICY WERE DELAYING SHIPMENTS TO IRAN, E.G., OF HELICOPTER SPARE PARTS. HE SAID THAT US SUCCESSFULLY FOUND WAYS TO PROVIDE WHAT THE SHAH WANTED, WHEN HE WANTED IT. THE US COULD EASILY -- "IN A MOMENT" -- FIND WAYS TO ASSIST TEHRAN NOW.

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4164

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CHARGE

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 10/9/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH ENTEZAM

REF: (A) STATE 252415, (B) TEHRAN 13467

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DCM CALLED ON ENTEZAM TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, AS SUGGESTED REFTEL, ON OCTOBER 5. ENTEZAM'S WILLINGNESS TO DESCRIBE SPECIFIC CHANGES, SUCH AS NEW CABINET PERSONALITIES, HOWEVER, WAS CONSISTENTLY PUT ASIDE IN HIS DETERMINATION TO DISCUSS US-IRANIAN RELATIONS GENERALLY. HE LAMENTED AT LENGTH THE FAILURE OF U.S. TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF BAZARGAN AND THOSE AROUND HIM, LIKE ENTEZAM, WHO "DESPITE REBUFFS FROM US" ARE STILL DETERMINEDLY PRO-WEST, AND BEGIN TO SOFTEN THE ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, "THE LEADER WITH WHOM YOU (THE US) MUST GET ALONG."

3. IT WAS CLEAR AT AN EARLY POINT THAT ENTEZAM'S HEART AND MIND WERE NOT AND WOULD NOT BE FOCUSED ON DESCRIBING NEW CABINET MEMBERS. HE DID SAY THAT, LOOKED AT AS A WHOLE, CABINET CHANGES WOULD HARDLY AFFECT THE BASIC POLITICAL THRUST OF BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT OR DEVELOPMENTS IR IRAN. IF ANYTHING, NEW PERSONALITIES WOULD STRENGTHEN DETERMINATION TO CLEAN UP THE PAST AND GET ON WITH TASK OF CONVERTING IRAN IN NEXT SEVERAL YEARS INTO TRUE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. SEVERAL NEW MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY YADOLLAH SAHABI AND HIS SON, EZZATULLAH SAHABI, ARE CONSIDERED "VERY RELIGIOUS," AND HOPEFULLY, WILL HELP TO EASE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECULAR FIGURES AND CLERICS.

4. IN BRIEFEST TERMS, ENTEZAM RESPONDED TO NEW CABINET NAMES AS FOLLOWS:
-- CHAMRAN-BRILLIANT ENGINEER, ABSOLUTELY DEDICATED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT LEADER. SPENT 15 YEARS IN US, WORKED ON SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAMS AT BELL LABORATORIES UNTIL US "KICKED HIM OUT" FOR HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. CHAMRAN WILL BE ONE OF GREATEST LEADERS OF REVOLUTION. DESPITE HARSH TREATMENT BY US, CHAMRAN WANTS TO MAINTAIN OPEN DOOR TO US. "IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR YOUR COUNTRY TO IGNORE CHAMRAN AND IRAN'S (DEFENSE) NEEDS."
--FOROUHAR - EXCELLENT LAWYER, ABOUT 50, WAS A LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATION MOVEMENT.
--SEPAHBODI - MID-40'S, MEMBER OF FREEDOM PARTY "AS I AM." (ENTEZAM PROBABLY REFERRING HERE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN - LMI.)
--EZZATULLAH SAHABI - ENGINEER, GRADUATE OF UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN, ABOUT 52. RESISTANCE MOVEMENT MEMBER WITH ENTEZAM.
--BANIASSADI - EARLY 40'S GRADUATE OF US COLLEGE.
--HABIBI - FREEDOM PARTY MEMBER, RESIDENCE IN FRANCE, ABOUT 48.
--YADOLLAH SAHABI - ABOUT 74, "VERY RELIGIOUS," FATHER OF EZZATULLAH SAHABI.

Tahn Bio

10/10

POL-Conn

Do we know about this? If not, let's get cable & ask for background.

Tom - what is your reading of Entezam - mine is that he is still on outs?

Am — 1/8, on

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RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6852
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5773
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2746
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2735
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 257
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2922
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1421
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5300
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3638

9. ENTEZAM WILL ARRIVE IN COPENHAGEN ON SEPTEMBER 4 FOR FOUR DAYS, DURING WHICH HE WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS. HE WILL SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEED TO OSLO, HELSINKI AND REYKJAVIK FOR SAME PURPOSE.

10. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM WAS EXTREMELY WARM, OPEN AND FRIENDLY YET VERY SERIOUS WHEN DISCUSSING CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US WOULD NEVER AGAIN ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO "INSULATED FROM THE TRUTH FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD AS 25 YEARS." HE SAID THE US COULD HAVE KNOWN THE TRUE FEELINGS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE BUT CERTAIN AMONG YOU DIDN'T WISH TO KNOW THE TRUTH."

11. ENTEZAM AND HIS WIFE, A FORMER STUDENT AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY, SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT THEIR RESIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA. ANVAR ENTEZAM IS A PETITE, BEAUTIFUL WOMAN WITH A FIN SENSE OF HUMOR AND AN OPEN AND AFFECTIONATE MANNER. SHE SPEAKS COLLOQUIAL AMERICAN ENGLISH AND IS A VERY CHIC DRESSER.
THE ENTEZAMS HAVE THREE CHILDRED, AGES 9, 7 AND 2. KENNEDY-MINOTT
BT
#3638

ENTEZAM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH DCM WHEN LATTER WAS CHARGE, AND WOULD, OF COURSE, WISH TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

8. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED SOME DISTASTE FOR SWEDISH MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY KURKISH SITUATION, AND OF ITS DESCRIPTION OF HIM. AS INDICATED REFTEL, SWEDISH PRESS HAS LAMBASTED ENTEZAM AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF KHOMEINI'S FANATICISM WHICH HAS LED TO BARBARIC CRUSHING OF KURDS. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS UNHAPPY AS WELL WITH SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENT ON GOI'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL EFFORT AGAINST THE KURDS.
BT
#3638

SIONALS, I.E., IRANIANS WITH TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS. HE SAID THERE WERE MANY MORE IRANIANS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY STUDENTS, THAN OFFICIAL STATISTICS INDICATED BECAUSE DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME MANY, IF NOT MOST, STUDENTS FEARED EXPOSURE TO IRANIAN EMBASSIES. HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT MANY IRANIAN STUDENTS ALSO HAD BEEN SAVAK AGENTS. THROUGH DISCUSSION GROUPS, SEMINARS AND PRESS CONFERENCES, ENTEZAM SAID, HE WOULD MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH THESE IRANIANS. THE GOI, HOWEVER, WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUBSIDIZE THEIR RETURN TO IRAN OR PROMISE THEM "PROGRAMS" OR EMPLOYMENT WHEN THEY RETURNED. HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD RETURN OUT OF THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITH AND A SENSE OF NATIONALISM AND PRIDE. ENTEZAM ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE BETWEEN 3,000-3,500 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN, A CONSIDERABLY HIGHER FIGURE THAN HAS BEEN MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. ENTEZAM DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN IRANIANS AND IRANIAN STUDENTS OF KURDISH ORIGIN IN SWEDEN. NOR DID HE MENTION THAT 200 KURDS HAD MARCHED ON HIS EMBASSY ON AUGUST 25 AND THAT THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF HIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN OCCUPIED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK BY GROUP OF KURDISH STUDENTS ENGAGED IN HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST THE "CRUSHING" OF THE KURDS.

5. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS CERTAIN THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MIXED UP "INDIRECTLY, NEVER DIRECTLY," WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S CURRENT REBELLION, WHICH HE THOUGHT THE ARMY WOULD SOON CRUSH. HE SAID THAT KHOMEINI'S "CALL TO ARMS" WAS A NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT ACT AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE RESPONSE OF ALL TRUE IRANIANS. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CAPABLE OF ERADICATING MARSIXT, LENINIST AND MAOIST THOUGHT AS WOULD BE SEEN AS EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE. WHEN ASKED HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE FOR SITUATION TO STABILIZE, HE SAID BETWEEN SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR.

6. ENTEZAM SAID THAT WHILE IRAN'S NEEDS ARE GREAT, THERE IS NO NEED FOR MORE ARMS SO MUCH AS A NEED FOR SPARE PARTS, PARTICULARLY FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT. HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 HELICOPTERS GROUNDED BECAUSE OF IMPROPER MAINTENANCE AND UNAVILABILITY OF SPARE PARTS. HE TERMED THIS PARTICULAR NEED AS "VITAL." HE EXPLAINED THAT THE SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT WERE OVERLOADED WITH SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT BUT THAT THERE WAS A PAUCITY OF BASIC REQUIRED HARDWARE. HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WOULD HELP GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO US OFFICIALS AND AMBASSADOR ASSURED HIM THAT HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON.

7. ENTEZAM AND AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT A MASSIVE EFFORT WAS REQUIRED NOW TO EDUCATE BOTH IRANIANS AND AMERICANS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S RESPECTIVE PORBLEMS AND ABOUT EVENTS IN IRAN. AMBASSAODR ASSURED ENTEZAM OF HIS DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIM.

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RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6851
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5772
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2745
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2734
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 256
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2921
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1420
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5299
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3638

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 9/1/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH NEW AMBASSADOR OF IRAN

REF: STOCKHOLM 3629 (NOTAL)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ABBASS AMIR ENTEZAM, IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (AND THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES) CALLED ON AMBASSADOR AUGUST 30, LESS THAN 48 GOURS AFTER PRESENTING CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM COVERED THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS DIPLOMATIC MISSION, THE KURDISH REBELLION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND HIS DISTASTE FOR THE SWEDISH MEDIA. END SUMMARY.

3. ABASS AMIR ENTEZAM, FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT AND LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, PRESENTED CREDENTIALS AS IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ON AUGUST 28 TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. ON AUGUST 30, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, ENTEZAM PAID COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR AT RESIDENCE. IT WAS AN AMIABLE, OPENLY FRIENDLY MEETING, DURING WHICH ENTEZAM VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION ON THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS MISSION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, THE KURDISH PROBLEM, AND THE SWEDISH MEDIA.

4. SPEAKING IN A SERIOUS, NO-NONSENSE VEIN, ENTEZAM SAID A PRINCIPAL TASK FACING HIM IS TO UNDERTAKE EXTENSIVE TRAVEL THROUGHOUT EUROPE (THE IMPRESSION HE LEFT WAS ALL OF EUROPE) TO CONTACT AND EDUCATE TWO PRIMARY GROUPS OF IRANIANS ABOUT THE "REALITIES" AND "TRUTH" OF THE REVOLUTION: STUDENTS AND PROFES-

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TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4159
INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2545
BT
S E C R E T STATE 218664

Return to BL

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 8/20/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINR, IR

SUBJECT: BRIEFING

3:00

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BRIEFING OFFICER ROBERT CLAYTON AMES WILL ARRIVE ON AF-168 AUGUST 21 AT 10:00 P.M. FROM PARIS. HE WILL HAVE A COURIER LETTER IN ORDER TO PROTECT BRIEFING MATERIALS IN HIS POSSESSION. AMES'S PASSPORT X1351Ø1 ISSUED JUNE 1, 1978, IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST.

Who to go?

3. IF FEASIBLE SUGGEST YOU CONDUCT REHEARSAL OF BRIEFING WITH AMES BEFORE GOING TO MEETING WITH IRANIANS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#8664

PM: Offic first

Entezam 666810

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INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9252
BT
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 3328

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ROGER<CHANNEL

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CHRON

ROGER CHANNEL

Say that I'll need to get in touch w/ Wa

EO 12065: XDS-4 8/14/99 (CANNEY, PAUL) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

REF: A) STATE 208779, B) CANNEY-PRECHT TELCON

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS INDICATED REF B, ENTEZAM WILL BE IN TEHRAN AUGUST 18-22. HE DEPARTS STOCKHOLM AUGUST 15 FOR BONN "TO HELP SOLVE THE STUDENT PROBLEM" AND DEPARTS FRANKFURT AUGUST 17 FOR TEHRAN.

3. DCM CONVEYED PRECHT MESSAGE. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD EITHER CALL DR. YAZDI BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR IRAN OR IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL THERE RE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. ENTEZAM UNDERSTANDS THAT THE BRIEFING MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD IT BEEN SCHEDULED FOR PERIOD AFTER SEPT 1%. ENTEZAM SAID CHARGE LAINGEN WOULD BE CONTACTED AFTER HIS CONVERSATION WITH YAZDI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS.

KENNEDY-MINOTT

BT
#3328

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(CW)

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BT
S E C R E T STATE 208779

EXDIS DEANNET

E.O. 12065: XDS-4, 8/10/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

A IS ASKING OUR CHARGE IN STOCKHOLM TO INFORM M THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING ANY TI[illegible]FTER SEPTEMBER 18. THE CHARGE WILL ASK ENTEZAM TO [illegible]TACT DR. YAZDI AND HAVE YAZDI CONTACT YOU SO THAT THE [illegible]ACT DAY FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET. WE ARE [illegible]ING THIS PROCEDURE TO ASSURE THAT ENTEZAM AND YAZDI [illegible]LY COORDINATED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE [illegible]NG.

[illegible] SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME RAISE THE SUBJECT OF A [illegible] WITH DR. YAZDI OR THE PRIME MINISTER. IF THE [illegible] IS RAISED WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD ASK WHO WILL BE [illegible]IZED TO ATTEND AND SAY THAT YOU WILL BE BACK IN [illegible] AFTER FURTHER COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON.

[illegible] IS POSSIBLE THAT GEORGE CAVE WI[illegible] MAKE ANOTHER [illegible] STOCKHOLM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH ENTEZAM. [illegible] DEFERRED APPROVAL FOR SUCH A TRIP PENDING ADDI- [illegible]EVIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT. COOPER

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—225-323

OF EIGHT 50-WATT TRANSMITTERS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN TO BROADCAST "SUBVERSIVE" MATERIAL. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION HAD LOCATED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL GEAR. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS WERE A PROBLEM. IN ONE CASE, PGOI GAVE PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT OF MADANZARAN AT 21,000 FEET. PLANE CAME IN AT 4000 AND EN ROUTE TO PERSIAN GULF DROPPED AT LEAST ONE LARGE PACKET TO DISSIDENT KURDS. PGOI HAS IN HAND REQUESTS FOR BALUCHISTAN OVERFLIGHTS WHICH IT HAS NOT APPROVED. ENTEZAM SAID PGOI IS NOW CONVINCED GEORGE HABBASH WAS IN KHUZISTAN TEREE TIMES AND HAS BEEN FINANCING ARABS THERE.

14. ENTEZAM SAID REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS CURRENTLY

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 206891/03

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REVIEWING TWO ALTERNATE ECONOMIC PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF COUNTRY. ENTEZAM SAID PLAN HE HIMSELF HAD ORGANIZED CALLS FOR MORE DEEP-CUTTING MEASURES TO PUT TWO TO THREE MILLION BACK TO WORK. ALTERNATIVE PLAN CALLS FOR LESS STRINGENT ACTIONS TO GET 500,000 TO A MILLION OFF UNEMPLOYMENT ROLLS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON DETAILS.

15. BIO NOTE: IN CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING EMERGED: ENTEZAM GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN ENGINEERING IN 1955, THEN WORKED AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER UNTIL HE WENT TO PARIS FOR ELEVEN MONTHS IN 1963. FROM 1964-66 HE STUDIED AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, WHERE HE GOT AN M.A. IN ECONOMICS. HE WORKED IN US FROM 1966 UNTIL MARCH 1969, WHEN HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER. HE SET UP HIS OWN FIRM IN 1971 WHICH HE HAS JUST DISBANDED. HE SOLD ALL HIS HOLDINGS EXCEPT THOSE IN SMALL FOOD PROCESSING OPERATION (FOR WHICH THE FEDAYAN ACCUSE HIM OF BEING A CAPITALIST). HE IS MARRIED, HAS ONE OTHER DAUGHTER ABOUT COLLEGE AGE, AND TWO YOUNGER SONS, ABOUT FOUR AND SIX. HIS WIFE WAS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT COMING TO STOCKHOLM, BUT HAS BEEN UNDERGOING SOME HOMESICKNESS RECENTLY. VANCE
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HAS SAID HE WOULD NOT. ENTEZAM THOUGHT THAT BAZARGAN WOULD BE A RELUCTANT CANDIDATE, BUT WOULD BE FORCED TO RUN, AND WOULD BE THE BEST CHOICE. FEDAYAN AND LEFT ARE NO REAL PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT SERIOUSLY -- I.E., TAKE DECISIVE STEPS WHEN IT MUST. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH EXTERNAL SUPPORT BEING GIVEN BY SOVIETS, LIBYANS, AND IRAQIS TO VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS, PARTICULARLY KURDS AND KHUZISTAN ARABS. EXCEPT FOR EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ENTEZAM BELIEVES MOST ARE HAPPY WITH NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND EVEN KURDS BECAME WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WHEN PGOI MOVED ARMY FORWARD.

10. ENTEZAM DESCRIBED RESULTS OF RECENT SHUFFLE IN PGOI. HE SAID FIVE WHO WERE MOVED INTO PGOI FROM REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ARE NOW KNOWN, THOSE WHO WENT FROM GOVERNMENT TO COUNCIL ARE NOT. HE DECLINED TO GIVE NAMES FOR SECURITY REASONS. COUNCIL HAS STABILIZED WITH 25 MEMBERS AND WILL STAY THIS WAY. (NOTE: THIS IS MORE THAN OTHERS HAVE CLAIMED.) COMMUNICATION IS MUCH BETTER BETWEEN COUNCIL AND PGOI SINCE SHIFT. AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI BECAME DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER AND TOOK OVER REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS (PASDARAN) FROM DR. CHAMRAN, WHO BECOMES DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS A DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER. OTHER DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER IS AYATOLLAH KHAMENI. ALSO GOING TO DEP. MIN. OF INTERIOR IS AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI-KANI, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF COMMITTEES AND FULFILLS SAME ROLE IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THIS HAS WORKED BETTER THAN ENTEZAM THOUGHT IT WOULD.

11. FIFTH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER GIVEN PGOI JOB IS ABDOL HASSAN BANI-SADR, WHO WAS ASKED TO BECOME DEP. ECON MIN IN CHARGE OF BANKING SYSTEM. HE REFUSED TITLE, BUT HAS GRUDGINGLY TAKEN ON JOB. ENTEZAM WAS ABSOLUTELY ACID ABOUT BANI-SADR, DESCRIBING HIM AS MENACE WHO WANTS TO TALK AND COMPLAIN, BUT DOES NOT WANT RESPONSIBILITY. HE HAD SIMILAR BUT LESS HARSH WORDS FOR HIS OLD ACQUAINTANCE SADEQ GHOTBZADEH OF NATIONAL RADIO/TV (NIRT), WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS SOLID KHOMEINI LOYALIST BUT ONE WHO IS "NOT AMENABLE" TO NECESSARY PGOI DIRECTION.

12. IN ADDITION TO CHAMRAN, ABDOLFAZL BAZARGAN (PM'S NEPHEW) AND SADEQ TABATABAI ARE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS. ABBAS SAMII IS NOW HEAD OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S YOUNGER BROTHER IS VICE MINISTER OF HEALTH.

13. ON SUBJECT OF EXTERNAL THREATS, ENTEZAM SAID PGOI HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET HANKY-PANKY, INCLUDING PLACEMENT

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 206391/02

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A MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS MEN ON IT AND WILL BE EXPECTED TO FINISH DELIBERATIONS WITHIN A MONTH. ENTEZAM SAID CURRENT PLAN IS TO HAVE REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTION IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND JOINT PRESIDENTIAL/PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A MONTH OR SIX WEEKS LATER. KHOMEINI IS A GOOD MAN WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "AKHOUNDISM" -- CLERICAL DOMINANCE OF EVERYTHING -- BUT HE IS UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM RADICALS AROUND HIM TO OUST THOSE WHO ARE MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" AND REPLACE THEM WITH CLERICS. ENTEZAM IS RESIGNED TO FACT THAT CLERICAL TYPES WILL PROBABLY WIN MORE THAN HALF OF SEATS IN NEW PARLIAMENT AND CAUTIONED US AND OTHERS THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH CLERICS FOR FOUR YEARS. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED HOPE (BUT WITH DOUBT IN HIS VOICE) THAT MODERATES COULD CONTINUE TO DOMINATE GOVERNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS. HE SEES THIS AS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL TO RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN MIDDLE CLASS AND GETTING ECONOMY GOING.

8. IN REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S EMERGENCE, ENTEZAM PASSED MATTER OFF, SAYING BAKHTIAR WAS "PROBABLY TRYING TO PROMOTE THE BOOK HE'S WRITING." HE SAW BAKHTIAR AS NO THREAT TO THE PGOI. NATIONAL FRONT AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT SIMPLY CAN'T COMPETE WITH RELIGIOUS PARTIES AT POLLS, AND THEY ARE NOT PRONE TO VIOLENCE. KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY UNDER AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI WILL EMERGE AS STRONGEST GROUP. THIS BOTHERS ENTEZAM, SINCE BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI AND MOUSAVVI ARE PRINCIPAL AMONG THOSE URGING KHOMEINI TO TURN TO CLERICS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR KHOMEINI TO MOVE TO TEHRAN, WHERE PGOI COULD SEE HIM MORE THAN THREE HOURS EVERY WEEK.

9. ON QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, ENTEZAM SAID TALEQANI AND BEHESHTI WILL RUN, EVEN THOUGH TALEQANI

REVOLUTION TO KEY FIGURES AND DEAL WITH PROBLEMS THAT EMERGE IN ALL COUNTRIES. ONLY AMBASSADORS APPOINTED TO DATE ARE EITHER "RELIGIOUS FANATICS" OR CAREER MEN WHO ARE NOT CLOSE TO REVOLUTION. HE PICKED SWEDEN AS BASE BECAUSE THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO REPEAT NO PROBLEMS IN SWEDISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS, AND THIS GIVES HIM ROOM TO MOVE AROUND.

7. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN IRANIAN POLITICS. RECENT SHIFT OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCILMEN TO PGOI AND VICE VERSA WAS CASE WHERE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL "GOT MORE THAN IT GAVE," VIS-A-VIS PGOI. NEWLY ELECTED COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS

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TOUCH WITH PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY EVERY 15 - 20 DAYS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PUSH FOR A MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI; C) EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE LATER IN FALL, PERHAPS WHEN NEW PERMANENT ADMINISTRATION IS IN PLACE. ENTAZAM MADE PITCH FOR "SOMEONE LIKE RICHARD COTTAM OR RAMSAY CLARK" TO BE US AMBASSADOR.

4. ENTEZAM SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL THINGS US COULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SINCERITY TOWARD NEW REGIME. THESE WOULD HELP PGOI DEAL WITH THOSE BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHO REMAINED DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF US PAST: A) PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ANY INTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI WITH OUTSIDE SUPPORT; B) BE AS HELPFUL IN ARRANGING FOR SPARE PARTS FOR IRANIAN MILITARY; C) CANCEL "PENALTY CLAUSES" TOTALING DOLS 1.3 BILLIONS DOLLARS (SIC); D) ASSIST IRANIAN INDUSTRIES TO GET RAW MATERIALS -- SOME US COMPANIES HAD REFUSED TO SEND MATERIALS AND TECHNICIANS; AND E) OPEN UP US VISA PROCESSING OPERATION IN TEHRAN -- THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS WANTED TO GO TO THE US. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WANTS MORE STUDENTS TO GO TO THE US AND OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES. HE CITED EXAMPLE OF INDIA, WHICH TOOK 6000 IRANIAN STUDENTS THIS YEAR INSTEAD OF NORMAL 1500, AND HOPED US COULD FOLLOW THAT EXAMPLE.

5. STEMPEL SAID HE WOULD REPORT ENTEZAM'S SUGGESTIONS AND URGED PGOI TO CONTACT EMBASSY ON PROBLEMS OF MILITARY SPARES AND COMPANY NEEDS. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NO HOLDUPS EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SOME CASES WHERE BILLS HAD NOT BEEN PAID. ON QUESTION OF TECHNICIANS, STEMPEL NOTED THAT REVOLUTIONARY COURT ACTIVITIES AGAINST FOREIGNERS--HOLDING PEOPLE IN JAIL AND IN COUNTRY--GOT AROUND US BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND DID NOT HELP CONTEXT. ON QUESTION OF ISSUING VISAS, ENTEZAM WAS TOLD THAT NEW US FACILITY WOULD BE READY TOWARD END OF AUGUST, BUT THAT SECURITY SITUATION HAD TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE IT COULD BE FULLY OPENED. THIS MEANT PRESENT EMBASSY GUARDS HAD TO GO AND BE REPLACED BY UNIFORMED POLICE OR ARMY OUTSIDE US COMPOUND. ENTEZAM TOOK NOTE, AND SAID HE WOULD WORK TO RESOLVE SITUATION "COMPLETELY TO YOUR SATISFACTION" ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO TEHRAN IN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS. STEMPEL URGED HIM TO CONSULT CHARGE LAINGEN UPON ENTEZAM'S RETURN TO TEHRAN.

6. ENTEZAM INDICATED HE IS SERVING AS PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL "SUPER AMBASSADOR" FOR EUROPE TO EXPLAIN

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 206891/01

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NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4, 8/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, IR

SUBJECT: TALKS WITH AMIR ENTEZAM

SUMMARY: ENTEZAM HAD SUGGESTIONS FOR GRADUALLY IMPROVING IRAN-US TIES. HE IS SERVING AS KIND OF "SUPER AMBASSADOR" FOR NEW PGOI IN EUROPE. ENTEZAM IS CONCERNED ABOUT RADICAL RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND ON KHOMEINI. CONSIDERABLE FRICTION EXISTS BETWEEN HIGHLY RELIGIOUS RADICALS AROUND KHOMEINI AND MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" IN LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHO ARE RUNNING GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM SLOUGHED OFF RECENT BAKHTIAR REEMERGENCE AS NO MAJOR EVENT. SECURITY AGAINST LEFTISTS WILL BE NO PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT "SERIOUSLY." ENTEZAM COMMENTED ON ELECTIONS, PGOI ORGANIZATION, EXTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. MAJOR NEW ECONOMIC PROPOSALS FOR RECOVERY PROGRAM NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BIO NOTES. END SUMMARY.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON AUGUST 5, FSO STEMPEL FLEW TO SWEDEN TO ELICIT VIEWS OF IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM ON PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION. ABOUT FOUR AND A HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD OVER TWO DAYS. FOLLOWING CABLE REPORTS HIGHLIGHT OF THESE TALKS, ARRANGED BY SUBJECT MATTER.

3. AFTER STEMPEL OPENED CONVERSATION WITH ASSURANCES OF US GOOD WILL TOWARD PGOI, BRIEF DISCUSSION OF US TIES FOLLOWED. MAJOR POINTS MADE BY ENTEZAM WERE: A) NORMALIZATION SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY TO EASE SUSPICIONS OF THOSE ILL-DISPOSED TO THE US; B) IN TERMS OF CONTACTS WITH NEW PGOI, PROBABLY BEST THING TO DO IS TO KEEP IN

6. ON TIMING, WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH WEEK OF AUGUST 20, ASSUMING BRIEFER COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE HERE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. CHARGE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING AUGUST 27, IF PRESENT PLANS CONFIRMED. ALTERNATIVE TO THESE DATES MIGHT BE WEEK BEGINNING SEPT 10.

7. I AM A BIT DUBIOUS ABOUT RAISING THIS ISSUE WITH PM BAZARGAN DURING COURTESY CALL AUGUST 11. UNLESS I CAN BE SURE THAT ENTEZAM WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE INFORMED PM OF HIS EXCHANGE WITH STEMPEL AND CAVE. REFTEL IS NOT

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CLEAR WHETHER BAZARGAN (AND OTHERS MENTIONED) IS BEING INFORMED OF THE PROPOSED EXERCISE NOW OR WILL BE ONLY AFTER FIRST SESSION IN TEHRAN. I CAN DO SOME PROBING DURING CONVERSATION BUT ANY CLARIFICATION FROM DEPT WOULD HELP. LAINGEN
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SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

E.O. 12065: XGDS-4 8/7/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINS
SUBJ: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH PGOI

REF: STATE 206729

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT: ACTION CABLE)

2. EXCHANGE BETWEEN ENTEZAM AND PSO STEMPEL IS VERY MUCH WHAT WE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ENTEZAM'S EARLIER APPROACHES TO BOTH NAAS (TEHRAN 05491) AND ME (TEHRAN 07898). I THINK WE WILL WANT TO FEEL OUR WAY RATHER CAREFULLY ON THIS EXERCISE, MAKING FIRST BRIEFING FULL ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE OUR BONA FIDES BUT RECOGNIZING ALSO THAT SOME DISCRETION IN FIRST ROUND IS APPROPRIATE IN WHAT IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUSINESS THAT INVOLVES A CAST OF CHARACTERS AND A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ABOUT WHICH OUR INFORMATION IS STILL LIMITED.

3. WE THINK THE EMPHASIS IN ANY INITIAL BRIEFINGS AS TO POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO THE PGOI SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON EXTERNAL SUPPPORT TO SUCH THREATS. DRAWING THE LINE SUFFICIENTLY SO AS TO KEEP US OUT OF INTERNAL MACHINATIONS, WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE PGOI, WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT IT MUST BE A CONTINUING REPORT.

4. WHILE PROBABLY DIFFICULT AT THE OUTSET, WE SHOULD TRY TO SEE THIS EXERCISE EVOLVE IN WAY THAT WILL BRING SOME INTELLIGENCE RETURN TO US AS WELL; E.G., ON PGOI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ, IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS IN AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE PGOI, THE TUDEH, ETC.

5. WE AGREE WITH CAVE'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO ENTEZAM'S IDEA OF HAVING A PERMANENT CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. HAVING BRIEFER COME FROM WASHINGTON WILL HELP OUR COVER ARRANGEMENTS HERE. HOWEVER WE COULD REEXAMINE THIS WHEN WE SEE HOW THE EXERCISE DEVELOPS.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-240-493

4. CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT CONCLUDED WITH QUESTION OF DATES. ENTEZAM RULED OUT WEEK OF AUGUST 27, SINCE HE MUST PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 28. MATTER WAS LEFT THAT USG WOULD GET BACK TO ENTEZAM THROUGH US CHARGE IN STOCKHOLM WHETHER BRIEFING COULD BE WEEK OF AUGUST 20 OR IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD BE PRESENT IN TEHRAN FOR FIRST BRIEFING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR SUBSEQUENT ONES. IN RESPONSE TO USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY, ENTEZAM SAID RECIPIENTS OF INFORMATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, ENTEZAM, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, AND ONE OTHER WHOM ENTEZAM WOULD NAME LATER WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL. CAVE UNDERLINED FACT THAT MUCH SENSITIVE MATERIAL COULD NOT BE REDUCED TO PAPER BUT COULD ONLY BE PROVIDED ORALLY. ENTEZAM HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS.

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5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTION TO THIS EXCHANGE AND ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE AS TO HOW WE PROCEED. WOULD YOU WISH TO RAISE SCHEDULING ON BRIEFING AND MODALITIES WITH PRIME MINISTER WHEN YOU SEE HIM AUGUST 11?
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ROGER CHANNEL
SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

E.O. 12065 XDS-4, 8/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PGOV, PINS

SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH PGOI

SUMMARY: PGOI VERY MUCH WISHES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE THREATS TO PGOI. VENUE WILL BE TEHRAN. DATES REMAIN TO BE SET. END SUMMARY.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING DISCUSSIONS (SEPTEL, NODIS) BETWEEN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ENTEZAM AND ECO STEMPEL IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 5, AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED STRONG CONTINUING PGOI INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH US REGARDING POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI WITH EMPHASIS ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT. ENTEZAM PUT SUCH DISCUSSION AT TOP OF HIS LIST OF SUGGESTIONS FOR US ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GRADUALLY LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. HE SAID DECISION TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN PERSONALLY APPROVED BY KHOMEINI.

3. FOLLOWING DAY STEMPEL INTRODUCED FORMER TEHRAN SRO OFFICER GEORGE CAVE TO ENTEZAM FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING WHAT BRIEFING WOULD INVOLVE AND MODALITIES. CAVE OUTLINED SENSITIVE NATURE OF MATERIAL AND NEED F CLOSEST CONFIDENCE. ENTEZAM SAID PGOI WISHED TO HAVE SUCH EXCHANGES IN TEHRAN WHERE THEY WOULD BE CLOSER TO SCENE OF ACTION. CAVE SAID USG WOULD SEND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING OFFICER TO TEHRAN. US CHARGE IN TEHRAN WOULD COORDINATE EVENT. ENTEZAM SAID HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE CONTINUING BUSINESS, AND CAVE SAID USG SAW IT AS SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT BE DONE EVERY THREE TO SIX MONTHS, WITH SPOT INFORMATION BEING PASSED IF PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. ENTEZAM ASKED IF THERE COULD BE A CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS. CAVE SAID THAT WAS SUBJECT FOR FUTURE; THERE WAS NO ONE THERE NOW. (NOTE: CAVE WAS INTRODUCED AS SENIOR BRIEFING OFFICER FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. TERM CIA WAS NEVER USED.)

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E.O. 12065:GDS 8/1/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM

REF: STOCKHOLM 3147

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. STEMPEL WILL ARRIVE SUNDAY, AUGUST 5 VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT NO. 30 AT 9:15 A.M., AND WILL DEPART ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 7. PLEASE MEET AND LODGE, AND ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM PREFERABLY LATE ON SUNDAY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP MEETING ON MONDAY. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0710

AND GOI POLICY. THE PEOPLE OF IRAN HAVE LONG SUSPECTED AND FEARED SOVIET ENCROACHMENT AND SIMILAR WARNINGS HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO MOSCOW.

3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ENTEZAM SAID HE PLANS TO BE AN ACTIVE AMBASSADOR, NOT ONLY IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES TO WHICH HE WILL BE ACCREDITED, BUT AS A ROVING AMBASSADOR THROUGHOUT EUROPE. HE IMPLIED THAT, AS A FORMER HIGH OFFICIAL OF GOI, HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY TEHRAN TO KEEP A CLOSE WATCH OVER IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH ALL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS(AS WELL AS IRANIAN AMBASSADORS IN THESE CAPITALS). THE PURPOSE, HE SAID, WAS TO LIFT THIS PARTICULAR POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN FROM THE SHOULDERS OF THE BAZARGHAN GOVERNMENT. HE MENTIONED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE MOST PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO VISIT WEST GERMANY SOON "TO CLEAR UP A SMALL PROBLEM." IN SWEDEN, HE PLANS TO MEET REGULARLY WITH COUNTRYMEN HERE (MOST ARE IN THE STUDENT COMMUNITY) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT ALL IRANIANS, INCLUDING THOSE IN COMMUNIST PARTY, CAN WORK FOR THE GOOD OFIRAN. THUS FAR HE HAS MET WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED IRANIAN STUDENTS TO REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION AND TO EXPLAIN WHY IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO SUSPEND FOR A PERIOD THE GOI'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR STUDIES. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD WEED OUT THE "PROFESSIONAL" STUDENTS AS WELL AS THE ACADEMICALLY POOR STUDENTS AND WILL EVENTUALLY PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WITH GOOD RECORDS.

4. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS TIME IN NATIONAL RESISTENCE MOVEMENT IN THE EARLY '50'S. A GOOD FRIEND OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AT THAT TIME IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS POLITICAL OFFICER RICHARD COTTAM (PHONETIC, ENTEZAM NOT SURE OF SPELLING). HE SAID COTTAM WAS ONE OF THE FEW AMERICAN DIPLOMATS WHO UNDERSTOOD AT THE TIME THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE US INSISTENCE ON PUTTING THE SHAH IN POWER. ENTEZAM SAID COTTAM MAINTAINED HIS INTEREST IN IRAN, HAD MET KHOMEINY IN PARIS LAST OCTOBER AND HAD VISITED TEHRAN IN NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT COTTAM WAS NOW TEACHING AT AN EAST COAST UNIVERSITY (POSSIBLY PRINCETON OR PENNSYLVANIA), AND HE REMARKED ON WHAT A WISE STEP WOULD BE TAKEN, IN HIS VIEW, IF THE US WERE TO APPOINT COTTAM AS THE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO IRAN.

5. IN WELCOMING ENTEZAM TO STOCKHOLM, CHARGE ASSURED HIM OF THE EMBASSY'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH HIS MISSION, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL WHENEVER APPROPRIATE. ENTEZAM SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THIS EARLY CONTACT AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PASS TO HIM WHATEVER "NEW INFORMATION OF MUTUAL INTEREST" MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE.

6. COMMENT: CHARGE LAINGEN'S DESCRIPTION OF ENTEZAM AS A CHARMING INTELLIGENT, AND HIGHLY ARTICULATE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE. ENTEZAM IS INDEED ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US AND SEEMS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN HELPING TO RESTORE GOOD US-GOI BILATERAL RELATIONS. EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH ENTEZAM AS FREQUENTLY AS POSSIBLE. CANNEY

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CHARGE
D CHRON

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INFO RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 250
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6802
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4013
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5726
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2712
BT
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 3159

EXDIS

Shows to [illegible]

(35)

EO 12065: GDS 8/1/85 (CANNEY PAUL F) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR IR SW
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM

REF: TEHRAN 8089 (NOTAL), B) STATE 198860 (NOTAL),
C) STOCKHOLM 3147 (NOTAL)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. CHARGE MET WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM AFTERNOON JULY 31 IN ENTEZAM'S OFFICE. THE FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ARRIVED IN STOCKHOLM IN LATE JULY AND WILL BE ACCREDITED TO THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES (RESIDENT IN STOCKHOLM). HE IS SCHEDULED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF ON AUGUST 28. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS STUDENT DAYS AT BERKELEY, HIS GENUINE ADMIRATION FOR MANY AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION OVER US POLICY IN IRAN OVER PAST 25 YEARS, AND HIS DETERMINATION NOW TO HELP REBUILD GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT RAPPROCHMENT COULD ONLY COME ABOUT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, NO US INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NO DISTURBANCE OF IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE. HE SAID US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY CONFUSED POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN TODAY. DESPITE THE DAY TO DAY BACK AND FORTH, THE IRANIANS ARE BUILDING, ALBEIT PAINFULLY SLOWLY, AN ISLAMIC MODEL WHICH, SEVERAL YEARS HENCE, OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WISH TO DUPLICATEM IRAN WISHES GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND OTHERS, BUT THEY WILL BE DEVELOPED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR IRAN, ITS ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. IF THE US HAS NOT LEARNED A LESSON FROMTHE REVOLUTION AND ATTEMPTS ARE MADE NOW OR LATER TO REKINDLE THE KINDS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE SHAH, THE ENMITY TOWARD THE US MANIFESTED OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS WILL BECOME A PERMANENT FEATURE OF IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION

31 Jul [illegible] 3:2

[illegible]
DE RUEHC [illegible]
O R [illegible]
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5107
INFO AMEMBASSY/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 3774
BT
E N D P E T STATE 190852

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EXDIS ONLY FOR THE CHARGE AND THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: GDS, 7/27/88 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: [illegible], IR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SHOULD HE LEAVE TEHRAN FOR HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT AS AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM, AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD OUR CHARGE THAT HE WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH USG OFFICIALS ONCE HE WAS OUTSIDE OF IRAN. AS ONE OF QOM'S TOP MEMBERS OF THE PGOI INTERNAL CIRCLE WHILE HE WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ENTEZAM COULD, IF HE WAS WILLING, IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE.

3. IF YOU PERCEIVE NO OBJECTION, WOULD YOU FIND AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH HIM AND TO RAISE THE FOLLOWING POINTS DISCREETLY:

-- IF TERRORISM MAY BE MENTIONED, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR[illegible] BASED IN DAMASCUS.

-- IF AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM WOULD FIND IT CONVENIENT, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SEND FORMER MOSBAH POLITICAL [illegible] COME OVER AND HAVE A MEETING. [illegible] A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED ON RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE. IT COULD BE HANDLED DISCREETLY.

-- [illegible] IF ENTEZAM IS INTERESTED A SHIP COULD BE [illegible]
NAVAL ACADEMY AND WE WOULD [illegible]
INTERESTED A SHIP COULD BE [illegible]
HAROS
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R 191014Z JUL 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5068
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3538
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 186468

19 JUL 79 1153 Z

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/9/99 (MCAFEE, WILLIAM)

TAGS: PINR, IR, SW

SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN, ABAS AMIR-ENTEZAM

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 2492, B) TEHRAN 6550

1. (C) THE DEPARTMENT HAS LITTLE TO ADD TO REFTEL B. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, THAT AMIR-ENTEZAM ALWAYS MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, FOR WHOM HE SAYS HE HAS MUCH RESPECT. HE ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE FRIENDS ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES.

2. (LOU) THE DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, OR PHOTOGRAPHS, THAT BECOME AVAILABLE ON AMIR-ENTEZAM DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO STOCKHOLM. EVALUATIVE COMMENTS ON HIS PERFORMANCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. VANCE
BT
#6468

NNNNEXO

DE RUQMHR #8089 212 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2971
INFO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0011
BT

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL
CHRGE: STATE 7/31
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHG:LBLAINGEN/BJH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL RF CHRON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 08089

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, IR
SUBJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN

REF: TEHRAN 7315 (NOTAL), STATE 198060

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT TO THE DEPT OF CABLE SENT JULY 16

1. I HAVE SENT YOU A LETTER TELLING YOU ABOUT IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (WHO WILL ALSO BE ACCREDITED TO THE OTHER FOUR SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES). HOWEVER THE POUCH SERVICE FROM HERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY SLOW TO YOUR PART OF THE WORLD AND SO I OUGHT TO ALERT YOU TO HIS ARRIVAL THERE THIS PAST WEEK.

2. ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM, WHO WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HERE AND ALSO GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, IS A CHARMING MAN, URBANE AND WESTERN IN STYLE AND HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE U.S., BUT HE HAS ALSO BEEN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY INNER CIRCLE. JUST WHY HE HAS LEFT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR TO US AND ANYTHING YOU CAN PICK UP ON THAT SUBJECT FROM HIM WOULD BE USEFUL. HE IS ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH US, SO I AM SURE HE WILL SEEK YOU OUT AT AN EARLY DATE. WE COMMEND HIM WARMLY. LAINGEN
BT
#8089

NNNN

Tehran, July 11, 1979

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you again for sparing time in your busy schedule to permit me to see you before your departure. Your kindness was a further indication to me of what I believe continues to be a good reservoir of friendship toward my country in Iran.

I have written to each of our Ambassadors in Scandinavia telling them of your appointment and your impending arrival there. I know they will welcome seeing you.

Again, my best wishes for your success in your new assignment. I look forward very much to seeing you on your first visit back to Tehran.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Abbas Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister,
Tehran.

Having said all that, we confess to being without real intelligence as to his departure. He will we meeting and talking with you, and we would welcome anything you can tell us about his views and composure from that distance. Indeed, anything that he might have to offer on the inner circles of the leadership here and their inter-relationship will be of interest to us.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

cc: Hon. Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Hon. Louis A. Lerner
Hon. Warren D. Manshel
Hon. Rozanne L. Ridgway

Tehran, Iran
July 10, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

The Honorable
Rodney Kennedy-Minott
American Ambassador
Stockholm, Sweden

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

You will soon have an Iranian colleague in the person of Abbas Amir Entezam, formerly Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman here, who has been named by his government to be Ambassador to Sweden with accreditation to Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland, as well. Lucky man!

I am sending copies of this letter to each of your colleagues in these other four countries.

We will send you separately some biographic information about Entezam. Briefly, he is an unusually polished and urbane and westernized Iranian, very much in the inner circle of the revolution here in Iran, but hardly a revolutionary in style or appearance. He has spent considerable time in our country and knows and likes the United States very much. You will like him.

One of the more frequently posed questions on the diplomatic circuit here currently is, "Why is Entezam leaving?" We don't have a very good answer to that yet. He has said to some of us here that he might be in a better position to answer that in Stockholm than here. The assumption is that his departure is to some degree at least a product of intrigue and maneuvering within the inner circles of the revolution and it has resulted in his feeling more comfortable outside Iran at the moment. He tells us that he intends to continue to be actively involved and interested in what goes on here, albeit at a distance.

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

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[illegible] WHO WOULD [illegible]

17. ENTEZAM INTIMATED THAT HIS DEPARTURE [illegible] NOT NECESSARILY MEAN AN END TO THE CHA[illegible] THROUGH HIMSELF BETWEEN THE PSOI AND [illegible]. "IT MAY BE EASIER," HE SAID, "FOR US TO TALK FRANKLY THERE THAN IT IS HERE OR WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON." MOREOVER, HE WOULD RETURN AT REGULAR INTERVALS—EVERY TWO MONTHS OR SO—TO IRAN. WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT IRAN'S PLANS FOR AN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD [illegible] A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS BUT THEN INTIMATED THAT HE HIMSELF MIGHT BE THE NOMINEE. ENTEZAM ALSO PRESSED ME FOR INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS GOING ON IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY [illegible] GAVE HIM A VERY GENERAL [illegible] OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF [illegible] SITUATION [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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...BY PGOI. THE PM AND THE CABINET HAD APPROACHED ...ECHIVI ...HUNDREDS OF TIMES," HE SAID, BUT UNTIL TWO WEEKS EARLI..., ...WHEN THE PGOI HAD DECIDED TO TAKE A FIRM STAND, NOTHING ...HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HE SAID THAT THE PGOI WANTED TO ...RETURN CONDITIONS TO NORMAL JUST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ...AND PREDICTED THAT "WITHIN A WEEK OR TWO" THERE WOULD ...BE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES ...AGREED UPON IN RECENT MEETING WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. ENTEZAM SAID, IN ...ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, THAT PM [redacted] DETERMINED ...TO DO HIS JOB THROUGH [redacted] CONCLUSION. ...HE CITED HIM AS THE IDEAL [redacted] FOR THE JOB HE HAS. ...AN INDIVIDUAL WHO RECOGNIZES THE IMPRACTICALITY ...OF [illegible] BY THE RELIGIOUS REACTIONARIES

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EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REGARDING THE TIGHTENING COMMODITIES MARKET AND THE NEED TO ACT PROMPTLY IN MAJOR PURCHASES WERE CONTEMPLATED.

6. MOVING ON TO THE ISSUE OF TREATMENT OF MINORITIES I REMINDED ENTEZAM OF THE GREAT INTEREST IN THE U.S., PARTICULARLY IN THE CONGRESS, IN THIS SUBJECT. I THEN ASKED HIM ABOUT HAI AND DANIELPOUR (REF B), NOTING THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY WASHINGTON TO CHECK THE ACCURACY OF REPORTS THAT THEY WERE CURRENTLY ON TRIAL. ENTEZAM WAS COMPLETELY IGNORANT OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAD EVEN BEEN ARRESTED, BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND LET US KNOW THE RESULTS OF HIS INQUIRY.

7. I THEN SOLICITED ENTEZAM'S VIEWS ON HOW THINGS WERE GOING DOMESTICALLY FOR THE PGOI WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT HAD BEEN HELD IN QOM LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE CABINET AND KHOMEINI AND KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI CONTINUES TO HAVE MANY PROBLEMS, MOST OF WHICH WERE CAUSED BY "IDEALISTIC PEOPLE WHO WANT TO HELP." HE SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THESE, AND THAT "WE--AND YOU--MUST BE PATIENT." THE PGOI, HE CONTINUED, HAS HAD DIFFICULTY ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY BUT IS INEVITABLY HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER HAPPENS. MANY PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LEAVE THE PGOI ALONE TO GET ON WITH THE JOB OF RUNNING THE NATION'S AFFAIRS EVEN THOUGH THESE SAME PEOPLE DID NOT HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO RUN THINGS THEMSELVES. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI HAS TRIED TO CONVINCE THESE PEOPLE TO STOP INTERFERING, AN EFFORT, HE CLAIMED, WHICH HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI. HE THEN CHARGED THAT THE LEFT HAS PURPOSELY TRIED TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION AND THAT IT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED IN THIS BY THE SOVIETS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD SHARE ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN WITH THE PGOI.

8. I COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT IRAN FREQUENTLY APPEARS TO BE LOOKING FOR TROUBLE IN THAT A NUMBER OF POLITICALLY PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS HAD MADE STATEMENTS WHICH OTHERS COULD ONLY REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE. ENTEZAM SIGHED AND SAID THAT ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION HAD BEEN TO LEAD EVERYONE TO THINK THAT HE COULD SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE NATION. HE SAID THERE HAD EVEN BEEN DIFFICULTY IN THIS REGARD WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT WAS IRAN'S POLICY TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY ITS NEIGHBORS, BUT THAT VERY DAY NEW PGOI SPOKESMAN SADEGH TABATABAIE, ENTEZAM SAID, HAD MADE A STATEMENT THAT WAS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THE PGOI'S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. THE SAME PROBLEM EXISTED AT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH'S NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (NIRT). NIRT'S BUDGET IS PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE PGOI HAS NO CONTROL OVER PROGRAMING, HE SAID.

9. ENTEZAM SAID THAT VERY SHORTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN FEBRUARY THE PGOI CONCLUDED THAT EVERYONE, WHETHER IT BE THE [illegible]AM HIMSELF, THE COMMITTEES, THE GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION OR THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, WAS WORKING AGAINST

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225 323

OUR RELATIONS INTO PERSPECTIVE. ON THE SUBJECT OF AN AMBASSADOR, I SUGGESTED (AS I HAD WITH YAZDI) THAT FOR THE MOMENT "THE LESS SAID, THE BETTER;" THAT OUR POSITION REMAINED AS THE DEPT SPOKESMAN HAD EXPRESSED IT, BUT NOTED UNOFFICIALLY THAT WE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT INSIST ON SENDING SOMEONE THE IRANIANS DID NOT WANT. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AWHILE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION. I WISHED HIM WELL IN STOCKHOLM.

4. TURNING TO BUSINESS MATTERS, I THANKED ENTEZAM FOR HIS EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE SUCH MATTERS AS THE DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. ARMY COMMISSARY STOCKS AND THE RETURN OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, BUT NOTED THAT WE HAVE CONTINUED TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OWING TO THE DIVIDED AUTHORITY IN ACTUAL CONTROL OF THE MATERIEL AND PROPERTY IN QUESTION. ENTEZAM SEEMED SURPRISED THAT THE MATTER OF COMMISSARY STOCKS HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED. HE REITERATED THE PGOI'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE MOST OF THEM, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ABOUT IT. WHEN I NOTED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ORDERLY DISPOSAL OF ALL ISSUES LEFT OVER FROM THE PREVIOUS ERA OF MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. SO THAT WE COULD GET ON IN DETERMINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IRAN NOW WANTS IN THIS AREA, ENTEZAM SAID THE PGOI HAS PROCEEDED CAUTIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT AND PRESSURES ON THE PGOI, PARTICULARLY FROM THE LEFT, TO ACT PRECIPITOUSLY.

5. I ALSO RAISED GTE WITH HIM, AGAIN POINTING OUT THE NEED TO COMPROMISE IN CASES WHERE THE COMPANIES ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. I NOTED THAT OTHER COMPANIES ARE WATCHING NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE INVOLVING GTE AND WILL BE INFLUENCED IN A MAJOR WAY BY THEIR PERCEPTION OF IRAN'S WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE. ENTEZAM SEEMED RELATIVELY UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CASE, BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING MINISTER OF PTT ESLAMI LATER THE SAME DAY, AND WOULD CONVEY MY VIEWS TO HIM. I ALSO NOTED THE RETURN OF DUPONT EXECUTIVES, WHICH PROMPTED ENTEZAM TO ASSURE ME THAT FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS IN IRANIAN ENTERPRISES THAT ARE NATIONALIZED WILL BE ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED. FINALLY, IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, I NOTED THE RECENT BRIEFING PROVIDED TO THE IRANIAN

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUETC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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S E C R E T SECTION TEHRAN 07064

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 7/3/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAI
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CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG CHRON

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, PINR, SHUM, SOCI, IR, IZ, UR, EINV, BDIS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM

REF: (A) TEHRAN 6941, (B) STATE 175186, (C) TEHRAN 5491
(D) BAGHDAD 1213

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM JULY 7 I REITERATED OUR DESIRE TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF BUSINESS ITEMS, INCLUDING OUTSTANDING MILITARY ISSUES, THE GTE CASE, AND TREATMENT OF MINORITIES. ENTEZAM REVIEWED THE PROBLEMS THE PGOI HAS HAD IN ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE INFORMAL PARALLEL SYSTEM OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. HE ASKED ONCE AGAIN THAT WE SHARE INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES BOTH WITHIN IRAN AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE OF IMPORTANCE TO IRANIAN SECURITY. END SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN MY PRESENTATION USING THE SAME APPROACH ON U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS THAT I HAD EARLIER WITH YAZDI (REF A). I THANKED ENTEZAM SPECIFICALLY FOR THE THINGS HE HAD DONE TO FACILITATE MOVING TOWARD A MORE NORMAL, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD. I MENTIONED, IN THIS REGARD, HIS JUNE 21 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WE SAW AS HELPFUL IN PUTTING

Tehran, July 3, 1979.

Excellency:

As you may know, I have come to Tehran to succeed Charlie Naas as Charge d'Affaires ad interim at this Embassy pending the arrival of a new Ambassador from my country.

Charlie Naas has told me of the courtesies you showed to him and, through him, to this Embassy on a variety of occasions over the past several months. My Government has asked that I convey specifically our appreciation for the comments you made about the United States-Iranian relations in a media broadcast of June 2[illegible]. As I mentioned to the Foreign Minister yesterday, a comment such as yours, as well as the Foreign Minister's statement of June 27, help greatly in developing a better understanding among our two peoples and governments in the difficult but important task of rebuilding a new relationship that reflects the new realities in Iran.

I am sure that you are very much pre-occupied with preparations to take up your new assignment in Scandinavia. Please permit me to express my congratulations on your assignment and my best wishes for your continued success in it.

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Abbas Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister,
Tehran.

GOVERNMENT IN OFFICIAL MATTERS. WHILE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE CABINET, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A MOVE THAT HE MAY INDEED WELCOME AND PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGED. LAINGEN

BT

#6550

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6550

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TO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0006
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2217
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0003
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0006
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0005
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0001
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06550

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 6/24
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH/B
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL-2 RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/24/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PDIP, PINR, IR, SW
SUBJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN

REF: STOCKHOLM 2492

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ABBAS AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS SERVED AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BAZARGAN SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR. HE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESS RELATIONS (SERVING AS THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN) AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE PRIME MINISTRY.

3. AMIR-ENTEZAM IS ABOUT 46 YEARS OLD. HE GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN THE MID-50'S WITH A DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. HE SUBSEQUENTLY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS WHERE HE WAS GRANTED A MASTER'S DEGREE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY WHERE HE RECEIVED A DEGREE IN STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING. WHILE IN THE U.S. HE REPORTEDLY MARRIED AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND FOLLOWING HIS GRADUATION WORKED FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA. WHEN HE RETURNED TO IRAN HE FIRST WORKED FOR A PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRM BUT LATER FOUNDED HIS OWN BUSINESS WHICH ENGAGES IN THE IMPORT OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT.

4. AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS BEEN ONE OF THE STRONGEST ADVOCATES OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. IN THE BAZARGAN CABINET. BECAUSE OF HIS PRO-U.S. POSITION, HE HAS OCCASIONALLY BEEN ATTACKED AS AN AMERICAN STOOGE, BUT IN GENERAL HE HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED BY THESE ACCUSATIONS. AS RECENTLY AS JUNE 10 IN A PRESS INTERVIEW HE SPOKE IN A REASONED MANNER ON THE NEED FOR IRAN TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE U.S.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY DISCOURAGED BY THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS AUTHORITY. HE RECENTLY TOLD COMMENTS PREVIOUS CHARGE THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN MISLEADING TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN THE SITUATION HERE TO NORMAL IN THE SPACE OF A FEW MONTHS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CONTINUING INTERFERENCE OF POLITICALLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1143
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06378

CLASS: CONFIDEN
CHRGD: STATE S/
APPRV: CHG:CWM
DRFTD: POL:VLT
CLRAR: NONE
DISTR: POL S/

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ
SUBJ: IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS
REF: A. TEHRAN 6292, B. BAGHDAD 1308

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. DURING JUNE 18 FAREWELL CALL DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED CHARGE WHAT INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAQI INTENTIONS TOWARD IRAN. AFTER REMARKING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHO CAST THE FIRST STONE, CHARGE OUTLINED THE KINDS OF CONCERNS EITHER ENGENDERED OR EXACERBATED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (REFTELS) AND SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A "PRICKLY HEDGE" ALONG IRAQ'S BORDER WITH IRAN A LA ONE-TIME BRITISH POLICY ON THE DURAND LINE. ENTEZAM HAD LITTLE TO SAY BUT DID INDICATE GENUINE SURPRISE WHEN THE CHARGE MENTIONED THE INFLAMATORY NATURE OF RECENT IRANIAN ARABIC LANGUAGE SERVICE BROADCASTS. HE MADE A WRITTEN NOTE TO HIMSELF AND CONCEIVABLY WILL ATTEMPT TO INTERJECT SOME MODERATION. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS, BUT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE MATTER FOR THE LIGHT IT SHEDS ON THE LACK OF COORDINATION EVEN WITHIN THE RELATIVELY CONFINED CIRCLE OF THE PGOI. WE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH, THE CONTROVERSIAL HEAD OF THE RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION, MAY HAVE BEEN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. NAAS
BT
#6378

NNNN

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—235-323

TEHRAN 1127

of Akron

U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

4. DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION, WHICH RANGED OVER A VARIETY OF TOPICS COVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM, ZAHEDI KEPT COMING BACK TO THE FRUSTRATIONS HE, AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS IN THE PGOI AS WELL, HAS EXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. SEVERAL TIMES HE NOTED THE PROPENSITY OF PEOPLE NOT IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY BUT WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CLOUT TO MAKE OFF-THE-CUFF STATEMENTS THAT MADE THE PGOI'S TASKS ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT. "AFTER MANY YEARS OF DICTATORSHIP," HE SAID, "THESE PEOPLE ARE FREE. THEY THINK THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT. EVERYONE GETS OUT OF CONTROL." AT ANOTHER POINT I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT TO SWEDEN AND HE REPLIED, "IT MAY BE EASIER FOR US TO TALK TO ONE ANOTHER IN STOCKHOLM. WE ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS TO GIVE OUR PROBLEMS. BUT THESE PEOPLE KEEP INTERFERING. WE HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT OUR PROBLEMS. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS REGARD. WE MUST BE PATIENT, EVEN IF IT TAKES TWO YEARS."

5. WHILE ZAHEDI APPEARS GENUINE IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL TOWARD THE U.S. AND SEEMS TO COMPREHEND AT LEAST IRANIANS IN POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE THESE DAYS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US, HE HAS BEEN WORN DOWN BY HIS EXPERIENCE AS DEPUTY PM. HIS DESPAIR IN THE LACK OF PROGRESS WAS ONLY MODERATELY LEAVENED BY REMINDERS (AS HE SAID TO HIMSELF AS TO ME) THAT IRAN, AFTER ALL, HAS EXPERIENCED A VERY TRAUMATIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO SET THINGS BACK IN ORDER. NAAS

[illegible]

[illegible]

E.O. 12065 Guidelines, OADR, 1977-213-323

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CONFIDENTIAL

Zahedi

ACTION #6379 170 **
ANY OOCCC ZZH
O 191134Z JUN 79
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06379

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IR
SUBJ: U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 153316

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: IN FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM I REVIEWED WITH HIM THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. HE EXPRESSED PGOI'S DESIRE FOR NORMALIZATION BUT APPEARED TO BE QUITE FRUSTRATED BY THE OBSTACLES POSED TO THIS BY THE PARALLEL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENTS HERE. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY POLCOUNS I PAID A FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM JUNE 19. I PROVIDED HIM WITH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFTEL (WHICH HE HAD EARLIER REQUESTED). HE TOOK CAREFUL NOTES AND SAID THAT THE DATA WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HE INTENDED TO HOLD WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE SAID THAT HE ALSO INTENDED TO REITERATE AT THAT TIME THE PGOI'S DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT HE AND THE REST OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE PGOI LOOK FORWARD TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ALTHOUGH [illegible] RECOGNIZE THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME. "IT MAY TAKE WEEKS EVEN MONTHS," HE SAID, "BUT WE KNOW THAT WE HAVE MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON." I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO FURTHER THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS. NOTING THAT WE HAVE NO MAJOR POLICY DIFFERENCES, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT LIMIT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN SUCH MATTERS AS CONTRACTS. NONETHELESS, I ASSURED HIM OF OUR BASIC GOODWILL.

4. A SHORT DISCUSSION OF A SCURRILOUS PRESS ARTICLE ENSUED WHICH ENTEZAM ENDED BY SAYING THAT HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PGOI AND THE USG, NOT WHAT THE PAPERS MAY SAY TO MAKE MONEY. IN THIS REGARD, HE ASKED IF I COULD TELL HIM WHETHER OUR PLANS FOR AN AMBASSADOR, I [illegible] IMMINENTLY AWAIT THE PGOI REJECTION OF [illegible] AMBASSADOR CUTLER [illegible] CONTACTS BEGUN IN WASHINGTON THAT NOW HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. [illegible] IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVE TO REPLACE HIM. IN ANY EVENT, I ADDED, THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS IS RELATIVELY LENGTHY AND [illegible] THE PGOI SHOULD BE PATIENT. I SUGGESTED THAT [illegible] NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ON THIS ISSUE [illegible] WHILE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO [illegible] AMBASSADOR CUTLER, [illegible]

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DE RUQMTI 0893 1541310
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P 031155Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6736
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 524
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 0893

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 6/3/99 (HOOPER, JAMES R.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, LY, IR
SUBJECT: (S) PGOI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

REF: TEHRAN 5491

(S) POST WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPY OF ANY PAPER ON LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN PREPARED FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ENTEZAM. SINCE LIBYA APPEARS LIKELY TO RESURFACE IN TEHRAN'S FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH ENTEZAM, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING DEP PM'S OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING JALLUD VISIT TO IRAN AND LIBYAN COMMENTS RE STATUS OF IMAM MUSA SADR.

BLUCKER

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0893

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4. ACTION REQUESTED: IF DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT [RISK] OF SHARING INFORMATION ON PLO, IRAQI AND LYBIAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN IS OUT-WEIGHED BY POTENTIAL [GAIN] TOWARDS OF CLOSER COOPERATION WITH PGOI, REQUEST THAT PAPER BE PREPARED WHICH WE CAN GIVE TO SAVAK. [REMAIN]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 4677

12 MAY 79
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1265

CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:C[illegible]
DRFTD: CHI:C[illegible]/JH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: NONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04677

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/13/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJ: REZA AMINI

REF: STATE 11243

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. AT END OF MEETING WITH PRIMIN BAZARGAN (DEP PRIMIN AMIR ENTEZAM AND ACTG POL COUNSELOR STEMPEL ALSO PRESENT) I RAISED CASE OF REZA AMINI AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBED OUR FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. AMIR ENTEZAM TURNED TO THE PRIMIN AND IN FARSI SAID TO HIM "THIS IS THE PROBLEM I TOLD YOU ABOUT AND WE ARE WORKING ON IT." WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIMIN, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID TO ME "WE WILL PASS THIS APPROACH TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND EXPECT TO HAVE SOMETHING ON IT SHORTLY."

3. A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE KOMITEH STRUCTURE TOLD ACTING POL COUNSELOR MAY 4 AND MAY 6 THAT HE BELIEVED WAY WAS NOW CLEAR FOR FAVORABLE ACTION ON AMINI CASE. WE HOPE SO. NAAS
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#4677

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 4677

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[illegible] FROM OUR FIRST OF IRAN'S WOES. [illegible] ASSERTED THAT [illegible] HIS SOUL BE LIES [illegible] PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH NURSING [illegible] CERTAIN FORMALITIES. INJUNCTION AGAINST SHIPPING GOODS TO IRAN. [illegible] NOTED THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPRESENTED AT HEARING [illegible] AND OPINED THAT IF IT HAD, INJUNCTION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. [illegible] MIGHT REQUIRE COMPROMISE WAS BEING WORKED OUT, NOT ADVISED [illegible] SUGGESTED THAT [illegible] NEED A GOOD LAWYER TO ADVISE ON [illegible] AND [illegible] TO CONTRACTS TO AVOID SUCH [illegible] DIFFICULTIES.

3. [illegible] SAID THEY HAD DISCOVERED TO [illegible] [illegible] THAT [illegible] WERE SOLD QUITE OF SPARE PARTS OF SOME KIND AT [illegible] TO PIECE FROM U.S. ARMED AID FORCE AND IT APPEARS IF [illegible] [illegible] HAVE THIS WITH [illegible] WILL APPEAR IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

4. [illegible] INDICATED THAT PROGRESS CONCERNING U.S. AID STILL BASICALLY IN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JAZDI'S [illegible] WIFE, BUT [illegible] TO [illegible] UP [illegible] IN LIGHT [illegible] DIAL AND APPOINTED HAS SUBSIDIARY [illegible] SOCIAL [illegible] PROVINCES. [illegible] SMALL STATES HAD COMPLAINED THAT [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

R 171300Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9000
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 03971

CHRGD: STATE
APPRV: CHG:C.NAAS
DRFTD: POL:JSTEMPEL
CLEAR: MAAG:PGAST
DISTR: POL CHG CHRON MAAG EP

E.O.12065: GDS 4/16/99 (STEMPEL, J.)OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, MILI, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ENTEZAM ADMITTED REGIME WAS HAVING INTERNAL PROBLEMS, URGED US AND OTHERS NOT TO INTERVENE. SAID REVIEW OF U.S. CONTRACTS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. NOTED PGOI HELICOPTER FORCE IS VIRTUALLY OUT OF SPARES. REPLACEMENTS ARE A PROBLEM DUE TO DIFFICULTIES IN U.S. HE MENTIONED PROJECTED 8 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF PGOI SPARES LODGED IN TEXAS. HE TOOK A DIM VIEW OF COMMITTEE HARRASSMENT OF IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY (IAS). END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE AND ACTIG POL CHIEF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 15 TO DISCUSS NUMBER OF SMALL PROBLEMS. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST WERE DISCUSSED:

4. ENTEZAM INDICATED ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MAKES MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS, BUT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT BY EMBOFFS' EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO NAME MEMBERS, NOTING THIS INFO IS STILL CONFIDENTIAL. WHEN CHARGE TRIED TO DRAW HIM OUT ON STATUS OF REVOLUTION, ENTEZAM DIVERTED DISCUSSION TO U.S. CONTRACTS, AND SAID MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GEN RIAHI IS HEADING COMMITTEE WHICH IS DRAWING UP NEW THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR PGOI ARMED FORCES AND REVIEWING ALL CONTRACTS. ENTEZAM SAID PROCESS SHOULD BE FINISHED, HOPEFULLY, IN ONE OR TWO WEEKS. THEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO TALK MORE ABOUT U.S.-IRAN TIES AND FUTURE OF U.S. CONTRACTS. MEANWHILE, PGOI WAS HAVING QUOTE SOME INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, UNQUOTE AND ENTEZAM SAID HE HOPED U.S. WAS NOT INVOLVED; PGOI DID NOT WANT ANY INTERVENTION FROM FOREIGN POWERS. CHARGE CUT SHORT WHAT SOUNDED LIKE CANNED REMARKS (PERHAPS FOR BENEFIT OF OTHER IRANIAN READING AT A DESK IN CORNER OF ROOM) WITH FLAT STATEMENT THAT U.S. WAS NOT INTERVENING AND HAD NOT INTERVENED IN RECENT IRANIAN EVENTS. AFTER CONVERSATION GRADUALLY EASED AWAY FROM EXPRESSIONS OF FORMAL POSITIONS, ENTEZAM VOLUNTEERED THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD MET WITH SOVIETS, BRITISH AND CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES TO STRESS IRAN'S INDEPENDENT POLICIES AND DESIRE TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS. EMBOFFS PLAYED LIGHTLY ON THEME OF THOSE WHO SPREAD DISINFORMATION TO DISTURB GOOD U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS, AND ENTEZAM NODDED APPRECIATION OF POINT.

5. ENTEZAM THEN SAID PGOI DID HAVE REAL PROBLEM: ITS HELICOPTERS WERE OUT OF SPARES, AND U.S. WOULD NOT GIVE

OWN IMPRESSION THAT THE CHARGES ARE MISTAKEN. AS A SENIOR ADVISER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY DR. AMINI IS REQUIRED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE NEWS WORLD; HE IS NOT THE TYPE OF PERSON TO "CONSPIRE." ENTEZAM NODDED AND TOOK NOTES BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

6. COMMENT: THIS CASE IS BEYOND ENTEZAM'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WE FEAR. CHARGE HAS ASKED FOR A MEETING ASAP WITH DEPUTY PM YAZDI, WHO IS MORE INVOLVED IN KOMITAY AFFAIRS. POL COUNSELOR HAS ALSO ARRANGED ANOTHER MEETING WITH KHOMEINI INTIMATE DR. BEHESHTI FOR NEXT FRIDAY (APRIL 13) WHEN THE ISSUE WILL AGAIN BE RAISED, IF AMINI IS STILL UNDER DETENTION. NAAS##

3674
CA/IR. 12

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
NONE
POL, CONS, ICA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/9/99 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR
SUBJ: ARREST OF USICA NATIONAL EMPLOYEE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 7, CHARGE RAISED THE ARREST OF USICA EMPLOYEE DR. REZA AMINI. HE SAID THERE IS PERCEPTION OF A PATTERN IN THIS ARREST, ALONG WITH ARRESTS OF SOME OTHER IRANIANS WHO WORK FOR AMERICAN FIRMS.

3. ENTEZAM WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH OTHER ARRESTS MENTIONED (IRANIANS WORKING FOR AIU AND MOTOROLA, SEPTEL) BUT SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE OF AMINI. SPECIFIC INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT AMINI AND FIVE OTHERS HAD BEEN MEETING TO CONSPIRE AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. THESE CHARGES ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. THERE IS NO ANTI-AMERICAN PATTERN INTENDED, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID.

4. CHARGE SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR NO SUCH PATTERN INTENDED, BUT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER REPORTS ON AMINI CASE AS WELL AS OTHERS. AMIR ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO THIS WHEN HE COULD.

5. CHARGE ADDED THAT AMINI HAS WORKED FOR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY (USIS) FOR OVER 30 YEARS. HE DOES WHAT IS NORMAL FOR SENIOR ADVISORS OF THE EMBASSY, A JOB WHICH HAS EXISTED IN IRANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TOO, CHARGE WAS SURE. HE HAS KNOWN DR. AMINI PERSONALLY OVER ONE YEAR AND FOUND IT HARD TO CREDIT SUCH CHARGES AGAINST HIM. POL COUNSELOR, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, ADDED HIS

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S CENTRAL INTEREST WAS THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY DOING NOTHING, AND IN THE FUTURE WE WOULD DO NOTHING, TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY.

4. AMIR ENTEZAM REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN THE SAME WAY IT DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES; THE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, HE NOTED, HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT PUBLICLY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAD TO APPRECIATE THAT FOR 25 YEARS THE U.S. HAS BEEN VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS MONARCHICAL REGIME AND IN 1953 HAD HELPED REVERSE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE BY RETURNING THE SHAH TO THE THRONE. IT WAS, THEREFORE, UNDERSTANDABLE THAT EMOTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WERE WIDESPREAD AND THAT NORMALIZATION MUST BE APPROACHED CAREFULLY. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ASSURANCE THAT USG IS NOT INVOLVED IN TROUBLESOME EVENTS MENTIONED AND HOPED THAT WERE TRUE.

5. OTHER SUBJECTS RAISED WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
CHG:CWNAAS
NONE
CHG, POL, ICA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/9/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMIR ETEZAM

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MADE A COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ETEZAM ON APRIL 7 AND INFORMED HIM THAT, ON THE BASIS OF A RECENT MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND IRAN'S NEW CHARGE IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE UNITED STATES DESIRES TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WTIH IRAN AT A STEADY PACE. I NOTED THAT, DESPITE THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN IRAN, SOME SHARED BASIC INTERESTS CAN BE THE FOUNDATION FOR GOOD RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, STABILITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS ARE OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES.

3. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE REVOLUTION FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS NOT TO EMBARRASS OR TO COMPLICATE THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY THOUGHTS HE AND OTHERS MIGHT HAVE DURING THE PERIOD I WOULD BE CHARGE ON STEPS THAT EITHER SIDE MIGHT TAKE TO PUSH THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS FURTHER AHEAD. I SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE FRANK DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN WASHINGTON AND NOT LET SUSPICIONS FESTER. FOR EXAMPLE, I NOTED, SOVIET PROPAGANDA IS COVERING IRAN WITH CHARGES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH PLACES AS KURDESTAN AND TURKESTAN AND THAT SOME PARTS OF THE IRANIAN PRESS WERE REPEATING THIS VERY PROPAGANDA. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, HIMSELF, HAD RECENTLY SAID AMERICAN AGENTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TROUBLES IN THESE TWO AREAS. I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE THE AYATOLLAH THAT THE

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O R 220850Z MAR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4866
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 015
KUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 022
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 028
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 024
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 3167

LIMDIS

EO 12065: GDS 3/22/85 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN

REF: TEHRAN 3152

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON MARCH 21, I MENTIONED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM FACT THAT I HAD LEARNED FROM AN IRANIAN FRIEND ABOUT "AUTONOMY" COMMITTEES BEING FORMED IN AZERBAIJAN. ENTEZAM SAID HE HAD SIMILAR INFORMATION AND WAS DISTURBED BY ITS IMPLICATIONS.

3. HOWEVER, WHEN I ASKED TURKISH AMBASSADOR IF HE HAD ANY SUCH REPORTS, HE EXPRESSED VIEW INFORMATION WAS EXAGGERATED. HE FELT AZERBAIJANIS SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH BAZARGAN, BECAUSE "HE WAS ONE OF THEIR OWN".

SULLIVAN

BT
#3167

S E C R E T NOFORN

TAKE OFF AND MAX CLIMB OUT. WE RETURNED TO MEHRABAD AND WERE PLACED UNDER GUARD AGAIN. THE ISSUE OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE 24 AMERICANS WAS LENGTHLY DISCUSSED AND OUR FATE SEEMED TO BE A TRIP TO THE MAJOR KHOMEINI "COMMITTEE" IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE AGAIN CAME TO OUR AID, THE MUJAHEDEEN COLONEL WHO HAS HELPED THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 14 FEB WAS ON THE SCENE AND ASSISTED US IN OUR RETURN TO THE EMBASSY INSTEAD OF THE "COMMITTEE." THE TRIP BACK WAS LIKE A TRIP THROUGH NO-MANS LAND. WE WERE STOPPED SEVERAL TIMES, BUSSES WERE SURROUNDED BY MANY HEAVILY ARMED MEN AND WE WERE HELD AT GUN POINT UNTIL PAPERS WERE CLEARED. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 WE ARRIVED SAFE, ONCE AGAIN IN TH WOMB OF THE EMBASSY.

D. DURING OUR TIME SPENT AT MEHRABAD THE DATT SAW COL HOMAYOAN, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TRANSPORT WING AND COL HOSSEINI. THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS WERE NOT DIVULGED. THE DATT OBSERVED BRIG GEN IMAYAN AT 1ST TRANSPORT HQS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TALK WITH HIM.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (S/NOFORN) THE TRIP WAS VERY ENLIGHTENING AS WE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO CENTRAL CONTROL AND EACH CHECK POINT/OFFICE IS ITS OWN COMMAND. WORK GETS DONE BUT IT IS VERY COMPARTMENTALIZED. ACTION IS SLOW BUT THE WHEELS ARE GRINDING. HOMOFARS ARE IN CHARGE IN SOME AREAS AND WE OBSERVED A FEW OFFICERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF HOMOFARS. HOWEVER, THE BASE CAMP AT KAPKAN WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT JA'AL FROM MASHAD. WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BEWTEEN GEN IMAYAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE, THE MISSION WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN FLOWN.

REVIEW 03 MAR 85

ORIGINATOR	DATED	CLASSIFICATION	CONTROL NUMBER
USDAO TEHRAN	02 MARCH 79	SECRET NODORN	79-100
DATE RECEIVED IN DIA	**SUSPENSE DATE**	**REGISTERED NUMBER**	**FILE DESIGNATION**
			ICR 49210

DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL

USDAO TEHRAN MSG ITR 6 046 0110 79, dtg 790302, SUBJ: TRIP REPORT 20 MARCH (C), ARSS, IOI, SECRET NODORN//////////
//////////////NOFORN FOLLOWS//////////////////

OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE
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DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box)

THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN ☐ DESTROYED ☐ TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. _____
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	DATE		DATE

DIA FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD *(Previous Edition is Obsolete)* DIAR 50-2

U.S. G.P.O. 1976-721-484/59

S E C R E T NOFORN

(1ST TFB), VISIT AT THE COMMUNICATIONS SIGHT AND THE IMPRESSIVE 0200 RETURN TO THE EMBASSY FROM THE AIRPORT.

1/. THRU 21. OMITTED

22. DETAILS: (S/NOFORN) A. ON THE MORNING OF 27 FEB 79 DATT AND AAIRA WERE MET AT THE EMBASSY BY TWO MEMBERS OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER EMTEZAM'S STAFF. WE WERE DRIVEN TO MEHRABAD AIRPORT WITH OUR MUJAHEDEEN GUARD AND THE STAFF MEMBERS MR. SARMARD AND MR. ZAGER-NADER. ALL MOVED SMOOTHLY UNTIL WE ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE STOPPED AND REQUIRED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS FOR ENTRY. THE LETTERS FROM EMTEZAM CARRIED ONLY AS MUCH WEIGHT AS THE INSPECTORS WISHED TO GIVE. EACH NEW CHECK POINT OR MEETING IS A CONTACT WITH WHAT SEEMS TO BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT UNITS, ONE IS AT THE MERCY OF EVERY IRANIAN WITH A REASON TO CHECK PASSES. EACH IS IN CHARGE AND EACH MUST GIVE HIS APPROVAL. WITH THE FRONT GATE BROACHED IT WAS ONLY A SHORT DRIVE TO THE MILITARY BASE COMMITTEE', (LOCAL GROUP MADE UP OF A MULLAH AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PRECINCT OR FACILITY), WHICH AGAIN HAD TO PASS OUR CREDENTIALS. NEXT ON TO BASE OPERATIONS. THE BASE WAS FUNCTIONING AFTER A FASHION BUT WE WERE TOLD THE TRANSPORT WING WAS ON STRIKE! WE WOULD NEED APPROVAL OF A LARGER COMMITTEE' AND THEN ORDERS FROM THE C-130 CREWS SUPERIORS; AT THAT POINT THE CREW WOULD THEN DECIDE IF THEY WOULD FLY THE MISSION. AS STATED BEFORE AND DRIVEN HOME BY THIS EXCHANGE - IN THE REVOLUTION PEOPLE ARE FREE TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WISH. AN IRANIAN AF CAPTAIN TOLD AA THAT IN THE PAST THEY DID AS THEY WERE ORDERED, HOWEVER, NOW THEY COULD DECIDE IF IT WAS A GOOD MISSION. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE ALTERED OUR FATE. AS THE DATT AND MR. ZAGER-NADAR WERE SEARCHING FOR COMMITTEE APPROVAL THEY HAPPENED UPON THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, BRIG GENERAL ASGHAR IMAYAN, WHO WAS HAVING A STAFF MEETING WITH SOME OF HIS SENIOR HOMOFARS AND OFFICERS. BRIG GEN IMAYAN WAS A SCHOOL CHUM OF MR. ZAGER-NADAR, AND THE MISSION WAS THEN QUICKLY APPROVED. THIS MENT THAT WE COULD TAKE OFF, FOUR AND ONE-HALF HOURS AFTER ENTRY ONTO THE AF BASE. BEFORE DEPARTURE, WE HAD TO EAT LUNCH WITH THE PEOPLES SOLDIERS. LUNCH, UNLIKE IN TIMES PAST, WHICH WAS A VERY

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

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SECRET NOFORN
DAO 030279
DATT:TESCHAEFER
AAIRA:HFJOHNSON
NONE
DAO-1

USDAO TEHRAN IRAN
DIA WASHDC/AH/AH-8/DN-2E1, NIACT IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY RUSNAAA
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK RUDONBA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI RUHQHQA

S E C R E T NOFORN MAR 79

THIS IS IIR 6 846 0116 79

1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0116 79
3. TITLE: TRIP REPORT TO KAPKAN (C)
4. OMITTED
5. DATE OF [redacted] INFO: 790227
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790302
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790227, KAPKAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCE: U-UED-49218, M-2E1-15016
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE A, INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (DATT/AAIRA) TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFF: H. F. JOHNSON, CAPT, USAF, AAIRA
13. APPROVING AUTH: T. E. SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
14. SOURCE: USDAO DATT, AAIRA
15. SPECIAL INST: NOFORN CAVEAT UTILIZED TO PROTECT THE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES OF THIS OFFICE: DIRC:NO.
16. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) ON THE 27TH OF FEB, DATT AND AAIRA TRAVELED ON A NIIAF (NATIONAL ISLAMIC IRANIAN AIR FORCE) C-130 TO A REMOTE NORTHERN AIRFIELD (KAPKAN 3717E 5849N) TO EXTRICOTE 22 AMERICAN COMMUNICATION TECHNICANS REMAINING AT THE SIGHT. INCLUDED IS A NARATIVE OF THE DAYS EVENTS TO INCLUDE STOPS AT MEHRABAD [illegible]

DATT, IRAN
Classified by
Declassify on 03 MAR 85

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SECRET S E C R E T NOFORN

S-79-100

LUXURIOUS AFFAIR, CONSISTED OF LUBEO PALO (RICE, LIMA BEANS AND FAT MEAT) AND THE LOCAL LAUASH (BREAD). THE SIGNIFICANT THING ABOUT LUNCH WAS THAT OFFICER, ENLISTED, HOMOFARS AND DIPLOMATS ATE FROM A SINGLE POT AND ALL TOGETHER, UNHEARD OF IN TIMES PAST. AAIRA TOLD BY TWO NIIAF LT'S THAT THEY HAD TO PULL GUARD DUTY THAT NIGHT. THEY WERE IN FACT SEEN ON POST AT 0200 IN THE MORNING.

B. AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 WE MOVED TO THE FLIGHT LINE IN SEARCH OF OUR AIRCRAFT. NO ONE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. WE DROVE AROUND THE XXXXX FLIGHT LINE UNTIL WE HAPPENED UPON ONE OF OUR CREW MEMBERS - HE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AIRCRAFT WE WERE MET BY A HOSTILE, ANTI-AMERICAN AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. A HEATED DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEN AND OUR GUARD RESULTED IN HIS GRUDINGLY CONDESCENDING TO FLY THE MISSION. AFTER A GROUND XXXXXX BOUT FOR MAINTENANCE, A SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS FOUND AND THE FLIGHT TO KAPKAN WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CREW IN FACT WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL IF NOT OBSTINATE. ARRIVAL AT THE FIELD WAS LIKE EVERY OTHER NEW MEETING OF THE DAY. WE WERE IN CUSTODY UNTIL PAPERS WERE APPROVED. CONSIDERING WE HAD 30,000,000 RIALS WE WERE QUICKLY APPROVED. THE DRIVE TO THE BASE CAMP WAS UNEVENTFUL, TWO MUD VILLAGES WITH NO ELECTRICITY, AND MANY PEOPLE OUT TO SEE THE NEW COMERS, WERE ALL WE PASSED. ARRIVAL AT THE CAMP FOUND US UNDER GUARD AGAIN AND PEARED AT BY THE LOCALS ANTICIPATING THEIR PAY. APPROXIMATELY 5 DAYS EARLIER THE AMERICANS TECHNICIANS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND TOLD TO SHUT DOWN THEIR EQUIPMENT. THEY HAD PERSONAL AFFECTS STOLEN AND THEIR TREATMENT WAS DETERIORATING UNTIL KHOEMINI TROOPS ARRIVED FROM THE AIRBASE AT MESHAD. THE MESHAD TROOPS TOOK GOOD CARE OF THE AMERICANS AND WERE ONLY HOLDING THEM UNTIL THE SALARIES AND ACCOUNTS WERE SETTLED. SETTLING AND PAYMENTS TOOK ABOUT FIVE HOURS. A POINT OF INTEREST IS THAT THE LT IN CHARGE OF THE MESHAD TROOPS ADMITTED TO BEING PLO AND BOOSTED OF HAVING FOUGHT ALONGSIDE YASSAR ARAFAT. THE LOCAL TROOPS WERE VISIBALLY AFRAID OF THE MESHAD TROOPS.

C. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 ALL AMERICANS WERE RELEASED TO THE DAO. TAKE-OFF WAS AT 2300L AT NIGHT FROM A 3900 FOOT BLACKED OUT STRIP BETWEEN TWO MOUNTAIN RANGES. THE NIIAF CREW DID AN EXCELLENT JOB IN THEIR MIN-RUN

The problems essentially concern the inability of the Iranian Air Force to exercise authority at its two sites due to the intercession of local "committees" which have taken over the sites. At Behshahr, the Air Force commander, Lt. Sofazadi, reports that his own guard force has been melting away and that looting has begun. At Kapkan, General Zolali has been unable to establish any contact with Captain Mohammadi, who was last designated commander there.

It is believed that General Zolali's problem could be solved if you would provide him with some document which would establish his authority to supervise the sites. Armed with this paper, he could send Iranian Air Force teams to visit the two sites and arrange the necessary custodial undertakings. At the same time, my Air Attache could arrange that payrolls for the Iranian civilian maintenance force could be met and a system for continuing the serviceability of the sites could be organized.

If you agree with this suggestion, please make contact directly with the Iranian Air Force and advise me what function you wish my Air Attache to perform in this matter.

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador

Tehran, Iran
March 13, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Excellency:

After the departure of U.S. personnel from the Iranian Air Force station at Kapkan, you and I discussed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the equipment at that site as well as at the similar site in the Air Force station at Behshahr.

In pursuit of this subject, Brigadier General Zolali, Inspector General of the Iranian Air Force, recently asked my Air Attache, Colonel Schaefer, to provide him with some estimates of the sort of maintenance personnel who would be required to keep the sites and their associated equipment in serviceable condition. Colonel Schaefer gave this information to the Inspector General, as well as an indication that the United States Government would be prepared to continue to pay the salaries of these personnel until such time as the Government of Iran decides what action it intends to take with respect to these two sites.

After reviewing this information and discussing it with General Immanian, the Chief of the Iranian Air Force, General Zolali suggested that this Embassy inform you of problems which the Iranian Air Force has encountered in attempting to assure the security and integrity of these two sites. He asked that you direct appropriate action to permit the Air Force to carry out its responsibilities in this respect.

His Excellency
Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL

O 310935Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3558
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3710
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01547

CHRGE: STATE 1-31-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:L
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR SHIR TABR
ISF CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-31-86 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (C) KHOMEINI RETURN SET; CONFRONTATION APPARENTLY DEFERRED

REF: TEHRAN 1514

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY--KHOMEINI ARRIVAL SET. AYATOLLAH HAS AGREED TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SECURITY PROVISIONS FOR ARRIVAL HAVE BEEN AGREED TO, BUT THERE REMAIN DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT ON CONTINUING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI AND ENTOURAGE. END SUMMARY.

3. DR. MINATCHI INFORMED POLOFF EARLY MORNING JAN 31 THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR KHOMEINI ARRIVAL (REFTEL) WERE SET. SECOND MEETING HAD BEEN HELD BETWEEN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) LEADERSHIP AND GENERALS GHARABAGHI AND MOGHADDAM EVENING JAN 30 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. THIS HAD GONE WELL (MINATCHI PROMISED FURTHER DETAILS AT NOON MEETING.).

4. DURING TELEPHONE CALL LATE EVENING JAN 30, AT WHICH MINATCHI WAS PRESENT, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HIMSELF TOOK PHONE TO ASSURE HIS TEHRAN FOLLOWERS THAT HE WOULD CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL OR MAKING ANY MAJOR STATEMENTS ABOUT GOVERNMENT. BOTH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HERE AND LMI (ENTEZAM) SAY THIS WILL AVOID ARRIVAL CONFRONTATION WITH BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. (COMMENT: THEIR EVIDENT RELIEF REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE ARRIVAL MASKED THEIR CONCERNS OVER THE LONGER TERM. BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM, AS WELL AS OTHERS, SEEM VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESS WILL PRODUCE MODERATION ENOUGH TO CREATE A WORKABLE DEAL WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARMY. WE WOULD RAISE MORE CAVEATS, BUT CLEARLY KHOMEINI'S DECISION TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.)

5. BOTH MINATCHI AND SEPARATE SOURCE AROUND BAZARGAN WHO SPOKE TO BRITISH EVENING JAN 30 INDICATED THAT THERE REMAIN DETAILS OF ONGOING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI PARTY WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. THESE ARE EXPECTED TO BE SUBJECT OF ADDITIONAL MEETINGS BETWEEN ARMY AND LMI DURING COURSE OF NEXT TWO DAYS. SULLIVAN
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4. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM FELT CONFIDENT INITIAL DANGER OF MILITARY-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. NEITHER COULD GIVE ANY ASSURANCES THAT KHOMEINI WILL NOT ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND THUS PROVOKE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION, BUT MINATCHI THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD PRETTY WELL COMMITTED HIMSELF TO CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ULEMA BEFORE MAKING DEFINITIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN AGAINST ADVICE OF LMI. MAJOR FACTORS IN THAT DECISION AS KHOMEINI EXPLAINED PERSONALLY BY PHONE TO BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM WERE: (A) FEELING THAT KHOMEINI'S PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY TO CONTROL BURGEONING COMMUNIST THREAT (WHICH LMI IS TAKING VERY BUT VERY SERIOUSLY NOW); (B) NEED FOR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP TO PROMOTE PROPER SOLUTION AND MINIMIZE CONFRONTATION WITH MILITARY; AND (C) BELIEF THAT IF CONFRONTATION DEVELOPED, HIS PRESENCE WOULD INSURE THAT TROOPS WOULD DESERT GOVERNMENT EN MASSE AND MINIMIZE VIOLENT PHASE OF REVOLUTION. LOOKS TO US AS IF KHOMEINI WILL THUS COME INTO IRAN PREPARED TO TAKE SITUATION AS HE FINDS IT AND DEAL WITH MATTERS ACCORDING TO "FEEL" HE GETS ON ARRIVAL. ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, HE DOES NOT WANT VIOLENCE, BUT ALSO WANTS VICTORY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES ON HIM, TEMPTATION TO ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND "SWEEP AWAY CLAPTRAP OF THE OLD REGIME" MIGHT BE ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE. BEST HOPE FOR MINIMIZING VIOLENCE THEREFORE SEEMS TO REST ON LMI AND MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PERSUADING KHOMEINI TO TAKE IT EASY ON ARRIVAL. THIS COULD BE A SHORT-ODDS PROPOSITION. SULLIVAN
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O 301305Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3535
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3706
ET
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01514

CHRGE: STATE 1/30/79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:C
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMBRA
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
ADM CHRON/11

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-30-99 (STEMPEL, J.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (U) KHOMEINI RETURN AWAITS AIR FRANCE OK

REF: TEHRAN 1261 (EXDIS, NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SENIOR LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) OFFICIAL ENTEZAM TELEPHONED POLOFF AT 1330 LOCAL TIME TO SAY THAT AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. ONLY THING PREVENTING KHOMEINI'S ARRIVAL PLANS GOING FORWARD WAS AIR FRANCE APPROVAL FOR CHARTER. ENTEZAM NOTED (CORRECTLY) THAT TEHRAN AIRPORT IS OPEN, AND PRESUMABLY GOI IS GIVING ITS FINAL APPROVAL TO AIR FRANCE NOW. LMI HOPED TO HAVE FINAL APPROVAL BY MIDAFTERNOON OR EARLY EVENING. ASSUMING APPROVAL, KHOMEINI WOULD DEPART PARIS LATE EVENING JAN 30 FOR ARRIVAL TEHRAN JAN 31 ABOUT 0830 TEHRAN TIME. PLANS FOR HIS ARRIVAL ARE ESSENTIALLY THOSE WORKED OUT EARLIER (SEE REFTEL): KHOMEINI WILL ARRIVE, BE MET BY SELECT COMMITTEE THEN TAKEN TO BEHESHT-E-ZARA CEMETERY VIA SHAHYAD MONUMENT (SPEECH THERE). AFTER SPEECH AT CEMETERY, HE WOULD RETIRE TO HIS QUARTERS TO RECEIVE VISITS FROM IRAN'S ULEMA AND PERHAPS PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR AND CABINET. HE WOULD REMAIN IN TEHRAN TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FROM QOM.

3. AT JAN 30 MEETING WITH POLOFF, DR. MINATCHI PROVIDED FILL-IN ON DEAL WITH GOI WHICH LED TO RETURN PLANS. GENERAL MOGHADDAM (SAVAK) AND GHARABAGHI (CHIEF OF STAFF) MET WITH ENG. MEHDI BAZARGAN AND DR. YADOLLAH SAHABI, TOP LMI LEADERS, EVENING JAN 29. UNFORTUNATELY, HOJATOLLAH BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI (WHO HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO ATTEND) WERE NOT THERE; THEY EXCUSED THEIR NON-ATTENDANCE BY SENDING WORD THEY WERE PARTICIPATING IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY SIT-IN PROTESTING ARMY KILLINGS JAN 28-29. (COMMENT: THIS IS SECOND TIME THAT BEHESHTI HAS IN EFFECT DUCKED FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH KEY MILITARY LEADERS, BUT APPARENTLY GHARABAGHI WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A DEAL, BECAUSE THIS CAUSED NO DIFFICULTY.) BOTH MOGHADDAM AND BAZARGAN TOLD MINATCHI AFTERWARDS MEETING WAS VERY USEFUL, DESPITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS' ABSENCE. ARMY AND LMI MEN AGREED TO DIVISION OF LABOR FOR KHOMEINI RETURN (MILITARY TO PROTECT AIRPORT AND ROAD TO SHAHYAD MONUMENT, LMI TO HANDLE SECURITY FROM THERE), AND GROUP AGREED TO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS OVER COMING DAYS AS DESIRABLE. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, MILITARY MEN SAID THEY AGREED POLITICAL CHANGES WERE NECESSARY AND MILITARY WOULD ACCEPT THESE IF CARRIED OUT UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3499
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01447

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[illegible] WITH SECURITY FORCES. CONVERSATION ENDED ON NOTE THAT LMI WOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT AND IDENTIFY THOSE WHO WILL DISRUPT ONE, AND USG WOULD URGE NON-VIOLENT RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATIONS.

7. COMMENT: EVENTS OF PAST 24 HOURS HAVE CLEARLY RAISED PACKLES ON BOTH SIDES, BUT ENCOURAGING FACTOR IS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TRY AGAIN. ACCORDING TO MODERATE POLITICAL PEOPLE, DR. NASSER MINATCHI, MILITARY INDICATED THEY VERY MUCH WANT MEETING WHEREAS THEY HAVE BEEN STAND-OFFISH FOR PAST WEEK. ENTEZAM WAS PLEASED THAT SECURITY MEETING WOULD GO FORWARD, BUT PREOCCUPIED WITH PROBLEM OF GETTING LINES OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BACK ON RAILS. HE SHED SOME LIGHT ON EARLIER EFFORTS WHEN HE NOTED THAT IN FIRST AGREEMENT HE HAD WORKED OUT WITH BAKHTIAR, PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED WELCOME KHOMEINI, THEN RESIGN. KHOMEINI HAD AGREED TO REAPPOINT BAKHTIAR AND FINALLY TO LET HIM PICK HIS OWN CABINET. IN SECOND AGREEMENT, BAKHTIAR HAD PROPOSED TRIP TO PARIS WITHOUT CONDITIONS; THIS HAS EVENTUALLY BEEN FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. SCENARIO ABOVE SEEMS REASONABLE, EXCEPT THAT KHOMEINI APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO AT LEAST TENTATIVELY DECIDE TO CANCEL ORIGINAL (FIRST) AGREEMENT BEFORE JAN 29 VIOLENCE GOT UNDERWAY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSION THAT ENTEZAM THINKS PARIS ENTOURAGE PROBABLY SPIKED FIRST AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT. ACCORDING TO ONE JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT BAKHTIAR PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING JAN 29, PRIME MINISTER DEFINITELY BELIEVED HE HAD HAD AN AGREEMENT FROM KHOMEINI SIDE THAT WAS RENEGED UPON. MINATCHI FEELS ORIGINAL AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY STILL WORKABLE IN SOME FORM IF BAKHTIAR CAN SAY A FEW NICE WORDS ABOUT KHOMEINI PUBLICLY. APPEARS FROM LATEST THAT WE ARE BACK WHERE WE WERE FIVE [illegible] POSITIONS A BIT MORE STIFFER AND MORE

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THIS, LMI WAS GOING TO MEET WITH GENERALS MOGHADDAM AND GHARABAGHI EVENING JAN 29 TO TRY AND WORK OUT SAFE ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING JAN 29 HAD NOT IMPROVED MATTERS, BUT AT LEAST AIRPORT WAS GOING TO BE OPEN. ENTEZAM URGED USG IN STRONGEST TERMS TO PRESS MILITARY FORCES NOT EPT NOT TO FIRE WEAPONS AT CROWD BUT TO USE ANY OTHER METHODS OF CROWD CONTROL WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD MAXIMIZE POSSIBILITY SITUATION COULD BE RETRIEVED. EVEN SO, ENTEZAM WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. EMBOFF BLUNTLY TOLD ENTEZAM THAT IN VIEW OF USG, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT HAD TO WORK OUT ACCOMMODATION WITH MILITARY OR ELSE IT WOULD FALL PREY TO DEPREDATIONS OF OTHERS WHO WANTED VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY, NOT SETTLEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRUST BAKHTIAR; HE HAD NOT KEPT HIS WORD TO KEEP THE ARMY QUIET. EMBOFF SAID GOI FELT LMI HAD NOT KEPT ITS WORD, SINCE VIOLENCE HAD STARTED. EMBOFF AND ENTEZAM AGREED THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT COMPLICATED PROBLEM OF TRUST; SITUATION WAS TOO CRITICAL TO STAND ON BYGONES; HOWEVER, AND BOTH SIDES HAD TO WORK FOR SOME KIND OF ARRANGEMENT TO PERMIT KHOMEINI TO ARRIVE SAFELY.

6. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO GET KHOMEINI INTO COUNTRY AND "CUT OUT THE MIDDLE MEN". EMBOFF ASKED IF THIS MEANT PARIS STAFF. ENTEZAM REPLIED VERY CAREFULLY: YAZDI WAS ALL RIGHT; HE (ENTEZAM) HAD KNOWN HIM A LONG TIME. EMBOFF PRODDED HIM ON REST OF ENTOURAGE, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING UNLESS HE COULD SAY SOMETHING GOOD AND WAS "THEREFORE SAYING NOTHING". IN-COUNTRY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LMI LOCAL ORGANIZATION WERE MUCH MORE MODERATE THAN PARIS GROUP, UNDERSTOOD COUNTRY BETTER, AND HAD HEALTHIER RESPECT FOR RADICAL LEFTIST CAPABILITIES THAN "PARIS BUNCH". EMBOFF ENCOURAGED LMI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID HE HIMSELF WAS LMI OFFICIAL WHO HAD NEGOTIATED WITH BAKHTIAR AND WAS WILLING TO DO SO AGAIN IF NECESSARY; RIGHT NOW, LMI WAS FOCUSING ON UNDERSTAND-
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S E C R E T/E X D I S TEHRAN 1447/

O 291326Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3497
INFO
S E C R E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01447

CHRGE: STATE 1/29/7
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPE
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMB
DISTR: DCM-2 AMB DA
DUMMY/CHRON

POL 12-2

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-29-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINR, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) WILL TRY AGAIN FOR - DEAL WITH GOI

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL SAYS DESPITE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ANGER OVER ARMY SHOOTINGS OF PAST TWO DAYS, MOVEMENT WILL ATTEMPT AT EVENING MEETING JAN 29 TO WORK OUT SUCCESSFUL DEAL WITH MILITARY TO ALLOW KHOMEINI TO RETURN TO IRAN. TWO PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT AGREEMENT WERE FRUSTRATED BY SHOOTINGS AND, SOURCE THOUGHT, PERHAPS BY "CONFUSION" IN PARIS. LMI HOPES KHOMEINI CAN BE BROUGHT TO IRAN WHERE MODERATING ELEMENTS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND IN-COUNTRY LMI ORGANIZATION CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCK IS PUBLIC REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BY KHOMEINI AND GREATER LEVEL OF EXASPERATION ON BOTH SIDES THAN EXISTED FIVE DAYS AGO. END SUMMARY.

3. LMI'S AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED FOR MEETING WITH POLOFF STEMPEL (AND TO UNDERLINE URGENCY, EVEN OFFERED TO COME TO EMBASSY'S CARAVANSARI RESTAURANT IN VIEW OF DIFFICULT SECURITY SITUATION) LATE MORNING JAN 29. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING LMI ANGER AT ARMY'S SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS OVER PAST TWO DAYS, AND SAID LMI FIGURES FOR JAN 27 UNIVERSITY SHOOT-OUT WERE 45 DEAD, 300 INJURED. HE NOTED POLICE IN SANANDAJ HAD "RUN WILD" ON JAN 28, AFTER KILLING OF POLICEMAN DAY BEFORE, AND SHOT DOWN 200. (COMMENT: THESE FIGURES ARE PROBABLY HIGH.) ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY HEARD PRIME MINISTER GIVE ORDERS TO ARMY TO ARREST ENTIRE SANANDAJ POLICE FORCE DURING MEETING JAN 28 AFTER READING SAVAK REPORT WHICH BLAMED POLICE FOR INCIDENT.

4. EMBOFF NOTED ARMY SEEMED UPSET WITH VIOLENCE OF PAST TWO DAYS, BUT OUR INFORMATION INDICATED BOTH DAYS' ACTIVITIES WERE STARTED BY THOSE OTHER THAN LMI-ASSOCIATED FORCES. ENTEZAM SAID HIS MOVEMENT WAS ALSO CERTAIN TUDEH ELEMENTS HAD BEGUN JAN 27 SHOOTING AT UNIVERSITY, AND THAT PERHAPS GOI PROVOCATEUR HAD STARTED ROCK-THROWING JAN 29. ENTEZAM SAID VIOLENCE WAS STILL GOI'S FAULT, AND HAD DISRUPTED DEAL WITH KHOMEINI. EMBOFF SAID PERHAPS THIRD PARTIES WERE TRYING TO DISRUPT DEAL. LONG BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AND FACT IT HAD INCREASED ANGER ON ALL SIDES AND INHIBITED POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. ENTEZAM SAID BASIC PROBLEM NOW WAS KHOMEINI REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BECAUSE OF THE BLOODLETTING. DESPITE

S E C R E T/E X D I S TEHRAN 1

FOUR MONTHS), AND RETURNING ON SAME PLANE WITH AYATOLLAH. ANOTHER SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR WORKING OUT AGREEMENT, RETURNING TO PACIFY ARMY AND THEN WELCOMING KHOMEINI.

6. IN EFFORT TO GIVE POLITICAL PROCESS TIME TO WORK, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE ISSUED ANNOUNCEMENT MORNING JAN 28 UNDER SIGNATURE OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLING FOR 48 MORE HOURS CALM WHILE PRIME MINISTER "ARRANGES RETURN" OF KHOMEINI. BOTH ENTEZAM, AND MINATCHI THINK SOLUTION AT LEAST TO ARRIVAL PROBLEM MUST BE SET BY THAT TIME, OR LMI AND OTHERS WILL HAVE TROUBLE CONTROLLING CROWD REACTION.

7. COMMENT: MINATCHI IS NOT USUALLY GIVEN TO CONCERN OVER VIOLENCE, AND HE IS CLEARLY WORRIED. NUMBER OF U.S. JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ABOUT IN CITY OVER PAST THREE DAYS REPORT MOOD BOTH OF CROWDS AND OF ARMY IS GENERALLY TOUGHER. BUT QUESTION AT THIS POINT IS WHETHER POLITICAL PROCESS CAN CREAK THROUGH TO ENOUGH OF A SOLUTION TO HEAD OFF A CRUNCH BEFORE HOT HEADS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. SULLIVAN

ET

#1379

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 1379

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: DCM:CWNA
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEM
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRA
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DC
ECON-2 PM OR
CHRON/10

O 2812462 JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3454
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01379

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-28-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL POT BOILING VIGOROUSLY, THREAT OF VIOLENCE GROWS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BAKHTIAR'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL GO TO PARIS HAS TRIGGERED FRANTIC MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND BETWEEN TEHRAN AND PARIS. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT HIM TO NEGOTIATE KHOMEINI RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FOR FEAR OF VIOLENCE, WHILE LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) APPEARS TO BE MORE CONCERNED FOR A COMPLETE POLITICAL DEAL. CROWDS WHICH HAVE GATHERED (SOME FROM PROVINCES) TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ARE RESTIVE. TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE CALLED FOR CALM FOR 48 MORE HOURS, BUT POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MODERATE POLITICAL BROKER MINATCHI AND LMI'S ENTEZAM OVER PAST 24 HOURS, IT APPEARS THAT BAKHTIAR'S DECISION TO GO TO PARIS WAS WORKED OUT WITH CHIEF KHOMEINI LIEUTENANT IN TEHRAN BEHESHTI AND NUMBER OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. IT ALSO INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE TELEPHONE WORK WITH PARIS. APPARENTLY DEAL AGREED TO LATE EVENING JAN 27 JUST INCLUDED BAKHTIAR-KHOMEINI MEETING; LEADERS ARE MEETING VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGH DAY OF JAN 28 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, AND UNCERTAINTY LEVEL IS HIGH ALL AROUND.

4. MINATCHI BELIEVES CRITICAL POINT IS TO GET BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI TOGETHER TO SET TIME FOR KHOMEINI'S RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. CROWDS WHICH HAVE ASSEMBLED IN TEHRAN OVER PAST FEW DAYS TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH ARE BECOMING RESTIVE. SPEAKERS AT MOURNING RALLY JAN 27 EXPLICITLY STATED THAT IF KHOMEINI DID NOT RETURN JAN 28, ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BEGIN JAN 30. BOTH MODERATE TYPES AND LMI ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT UNDUE DELAY IN PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL DEAL THAT WILL BRING KHOMEINI BACK WILL MEAN VIOLENCE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. POTENTIAL FOR UNCONTROLLED REACTIONS BY GANGS OF PROVINCIAL VISITORS IS GROWING. THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF SOME LOOTING IN SOUTH TEHRAN AND OTHER INCIDENTS ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL OF OUR UNIVERSITY SOURCES SAY RADICAL FACTIONS TO LEFT OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ARE CALLING FOR "MORE ACTIVE" STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, SITUATION REMAINS UNDER CONTROL FOR NOW.

5. LMI'S ENTEZAM BELIEVES BAKHTIAR SHOULD WORK OUT FULL POLITICAL DEAL IN PARIS BECAUSE, UNLESS HE DOES SO, HE WILL BE HOSTAGE TO ARMY WHEN IT COMES TIME TO IMPLEMENT ANY AGREEMENT IN TEHRAN. ONE SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR MAKING SOME SORT OF OBEISANCE TO KHOMEINI, GETTING THE AYATOLLAH'S NOD TO BE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD (THREE-

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 13

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-256-246

O 221358Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3241
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01077

EXDIS

HAD HEARD TWO RUMORS: FIRST WAS THAT GEN OVEISSI HAD FLOWN BACK TO IRAN IN IRANIAN ARMY AIRCRAFT; SECOND WAS THAT SEVERAL GENERALS HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM IN U.S. EMBASSY. POLOFF FLATLY DENIED RUMORS AND ENTEZAM ACCEPTED THIS.

8. IN SEPARATE BRIEF CONVERSATION, EMBOFF LEARNED FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI (MODERATE RELIGIOUS POLITICAL BROKER) THAT MEETING BETWEEN LMI LEADERS AND MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY GO FORWARD EVENING JAN 22 OR EARLY MORNING JAN 23. MINATCHI COMMENTED THAT KHOEMINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN JAN 26 DESPITE ADVISE OF ALL HIS POLITICAL ALLIES HERE. (COMMENT: BOTH MINATCH AND ENTEZAM ARE DISDAINFUL AND DISTRUSTFUL OF THOSE AROUND KHOMEINI IN PARIS. THOUGH NEITHER WOULD SAY A DIRECT WORD AGAINST KHOMEINI CONFIDANTES YAZDI AND GHOTBZADEH, BOTH WERE QUITE CLEAR IN THEIR FEELINGS.)

9. MINATCHI ALSO ALLUDED TO CONFLICT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IN IRAN OVER HOW BEST TO HANDLE KHOMEINI PROBLEM. MINATCHI WAS GOING TO QOM AFTERNOON JAN 22 FOR LONG TALK WITH MAJOR AYATOLLAHS THERE ON HOW TO MINIMIZE VIOLENCE WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNS. HE SEEMED CERTAIN THAT "QOM TRIANGLE" OF AYATOLLAHS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BACK ANY KHOMEINI STRATEGY WHICH DID NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL FIG LEAF TO COVER IT. (COMMENT: WE HAVE HEARD BRAVE TALK FROM THE QOM GROUP BEFORE, BUT IT HAS MELTED AWAY BEFORE KHOMEINI ONSLAUGHT. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT CONVINCED THIS TIME WILL BE DIFFERENT.)

10. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: SITUATION IS TAKING ON RITUAL ELEMENTS: KHOMEINI IS PUSHING, HIS IN-COUNTRY ALLIES (LMI) ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES AND TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL, AND LOTS OF HINTS ARE BEING MADE THAT USG SHOULD CARRY THE BALL FOR BOTH SIDES. PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR PUTTING OFF SERIOUS COMPROMISE BETWEEN ONRUSHING OPPONENTS UNTIL THE LAST HOUR IS TURNING POLITICAL ARENA INTO ONE VAST GAME OF "CHICKEN." THIS DOES NOT HAVE STABILIZING EFFECT ON PARTICIPANTS WHEN DONE REPEATEDLY (NOV 5, MOHARRAM, ASHURA, ARBAEIN, AND NOW). MILITARY IS FACED WITH STRIKE OF SENIOR WARRANT OFFICERS (HOMOFARS) IN ISFAHAN, HAMEDAN, DEZFUL, AND MASHAD, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM. ON OTHER SIDE, BY ADMISSION OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, OPPOSITION'S MODERATE CLERGY ARE BECOMING RESTIVE WITH UNCOMPROMISING KHOMEINI LINE. BEST HOPE FOR NOW IS THAT EACH PARTY'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS WILL INCLINE IT TO COMPROMISE RATHER THAN SEEK HARD-LINE CONFRONTATION. SULLIVAN

5. POLOFF REPLIED THIS WAS SOMETHING USG COULD NOT DO, NOR WOULD IT EVEN BE USEFUL -- RECIPIENTS OF THIS ADVICE WERE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO ENTRENCH AND SCREAM "AMERICAN PRESSURE," THAN TO HEED IT. ENTEZAM SAID THIS SEEMED ONLY WAY TO AVOID BLOODBATH OR ARMY TAKEOVER. EMBOFF REPLIED COMPROMISE STILL SEEMED BEST SOLUTION. BAKHTIAR HAD LEGITIMACY, EVEN IF KHOMEINI DIDN'T ACCEPT IT. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD NOT ACCEPT LEGITIMACY OF ANY PRESENT RULING ORGANS -- PRIME MINISTER, PARLIAMENT OR REGENCY COUNCIL. POLOFF THEN BLUNTLY SAID PERHAPS IT WAS TIME SOMEBODY EXPLAINED TO KHOMEINI THAT COMPROMISE WAS ONLY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO BLOODSHED. GOVT DID NOT SEEM READY TO SURRENDER, NOR WOULD MILITARY LET IT GO EVEN IF IT DID. ATTEMPT BY KHOMEINI TO SET UP RIVAL GOVT UPON HIS ARRIVAL COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. ENTEZAM GULPED A BIT AND ASKED IF THIS MEANT POSSIBILITY OF COUP. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT POSSIBILITY HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN WHOLLY ABSENT FROM SCENE AT ANY TIME IN RECENT PAST. NO ONE, NOT MILITARY, NOR USG, NOR OPPOSITION REALLY WANTED EVENTS TO COME TO THIS.

6. ENTEZAM THEN CHANGED SUBJECT, AND SAID LMI WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH A U.S. TEAM TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN AND TO TRY TO AVOID CONFLICTS BETWEEN USG AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHICH WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. EMBOFF SAID HE WAS ALWAYS INTERESTED IN ANY POINTS LMI HAD TO MAKE, BUT IT SEEMS A BIT PREMATURE TO HAVE MAJOR DISCUSSIONS ON THIS POINT WHILE POLITICAL JOCKEYING WAS STILL SO INTENSE. ENTEZAM SAID OFFER REMAINED OPEN.

7. IN RELATED MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED CALL POLOFF HAD RECEIVED FROM LMI'S TAVAKOLI TO EFFECT THAT ENTEZAM WOULD BE PRINCIPAL LMI CONTACT WITH EMBASSY FROM NOW ON. ENTEZAM ALSO SAID LMI RT
[illegible]

[illegible]

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3240
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01077

CHRGE: STATE 1/22/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAK
DISTR: [redacted] AMB MIN-2 DUMMY/CHRON

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/11/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV
SUBJECT: LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH; CONFLICT WITH MODERATES' SHAPING UP

REF: TEHRAN 957

1. (C. ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: LMI'S ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF THAT LMI URGENTLY [redacted] MEETING WITH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO ARRANGE FOR PEACEFUL ARRIVAL OF KHOMEINI. LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH PRIME MINISTER, MAJLES, AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN. POLOFF STATED SUCCINCTLY THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT SOMETHING U.S. COULD DO AND EVEN ATTEMPTING IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HARMFUL. COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES SEEMS NECESSARY. KHOMEINI ATTEMPT TO SET UP RIVAL GOVERNMENT ON HIS RETURN COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. SOURCE SAID LMI STILL WISHED TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN TO AVOID FUTURE CONFLICT. MEANWHILE, MODERATE RELIGIOUS SOURCE INDICATED OPPOSITION MEETING WITH MILITARY WAS CRITICAL, AND OBLIQUELY CONFIRMED REPORTS OF RIFT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY

3. AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN 22 THAT LMI WISHED URGENTLY TO SCHEDULE MEETING BETWEEN KHOMEINI CHIEF BEHESHTI, LMI LEADERS BAZARGAN, AND GENERALS MOGHADDAM AND GHARABAGHI TO DISCUSS UNFOLDING KHOMEINI RETURN SITUATION AND URGED USG TO CONVINCE MILITARY THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. (MINATCHI, OF SHARIAT-MADARI MODERATES, MADE SAME PITCH WITHIN AN HOUR OF ENTEZAM'S [redacted] POLOFF REPLIED TO BOTH THAT USG HAD DONE SO THE [redacted] MORNING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. ENTEZAM SA[redacted] APPROACH TO MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO [redacted] IN 24 HOURS; A NEUTRAL PLACE HAD ALREADY BE[redacted] (ENTEZAM WOULD NOT SAY WHERE). [redacted] WAS VI[redacted] IMPORTANT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL KHO[redacted] RETURN. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT ENTEZAM AND LMI [redacted] NOW ACCEPT KHOMEINI'S JAN 26 RETURN AS A FA[redacted]

4. TURNING TO POLITICAL SITUATION, LMI SAID PROBLEM WAS NOW WITH PRIME MINISTER, WHO DID NOT WANT TO GIVE WAY, DESPITE "DISCUSSION" ON MATTER EARLIER. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND ONE OTHER LMI LEADER (NOT IDENTIFIED) WERE SCHEDULED TO SEE BAKHTIAR LATE AFTERNOON JAN 22. THEY WOULD PUSH LMI "COMPROMISE" (HIS WORD) WHEREBY REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD GIVE UP GOVERNING POWERS TO KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. ENTEZAM SAID BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR USG TO PRESS BAKHTIAR, PARLIAMENT AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN AND CLEAR WAY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

GET PUBLIC SECTOR BACK TO WORK BEGINNING JAN. 21. IF COMMITTEE'S AIM WAS THE SAME, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF ITS WORK PROCEEDED FAST ENOUGH TO PREVENT CONFLICT FROM DEVELOPING, SINCE BOTH SIDES SEEM COMMITTED TO GOING BACK TO WORK. ENTEZAM UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD ALSO HELP CONTAIN LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE TRYING TO MAKE INROADS INTO LABOR MOVEMENT. (COMMENT: WE HOPE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS WILL MOVE FAST ENOUGH, BUT IT WILL BE CLOSE.)

3. TAVASSOLI SAID TUDEH ORGANIZERS HAVE PUT OUT BULLETINS CALLING FOR MASS LEFTIST (AND PRESUMABLY ANTI-RELIGIOUS) RALLY FOR MID-MORNING JANUARY 21. LOCATION OF DEMONSTRATION WILL BE MEIDAN-E-QAZVIN, ABOUT A MILE NORTH OF TEHRAN RAILROAD STATION ON SHENSHOM BAHMAN STREET. (COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR TUDEH AND RADICAL LEFTIST PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES, THIS WOULD BE FIRST MAJOR TEST OF TUDEH STRENGTH IN WIDER PUBLIC COMMUNITY. THIS FIRST SALLY OF ORGANIZED LEFT, IF IN FACT IT OCCURS, MIGHT EXERCISE HELPFUL PROD TO LMI'S MODERATES TO INCREASE SPEED OF THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A MODERATE POLITICAL SOLUTION.)

4. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, DR. MINATCHI (AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER) CONFIRMED THAT TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITIONISTS AND BAKHTIAR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GONE FORWARD ON QUESTION OF HOW TO RESOLVE CONFLICT BETWEEN REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN NOT YET BEEN NAMED, PARTLY BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON ABOUT PROJECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IT AND REGENCY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAHS BAHSANJANI AND MOTAHARI MAY LEAVE FOR PARIS JAN. 20 OR 21 IF DEAL APPEARS POSSIBLE. MINATCHI MAY ACCOMPANY THEM. PURPOSE OF TRIP WILL BE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST HAVE SOME LEGAL TIE TO PRESENT REGIME OR MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER HERE WILL NOT BE
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LIMDIS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00697

LIMDIS

REF: 1. 365: GDS 1-20-[illegible] (STEMPEL,J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PORS, IR
SUBJ: RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION: POST-MARCH ACTIVITIES

SUMMARY: LMI SOURCES PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF JAN. 19 MARCH (BEING REPORTED SEPTELS). NO VIOLENCE NOTED, AND ONLY TWO LEFTIST GROUPS TRIED TO HORN IN. THESE WERE DISPERSED BY PARADE MARSHALLS WITHOUT TROUBLE. KHOMEINI-APPOINTED STRIKE COMMITTEE BEGAN WORK MORNING JAN. 22, WITH MANDATE TO GET KEY SECTORS, INCLUDING PETROLEUM WORKERS, BACK TO WORK. LMI HAS WORD LEFTISTS WILL TRY TO STAGE THEIR OWN MASS MARCH JAN. 21 IN CENTRAL TEHRAN. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND BAKHTIAR STILL PROCEEDING; RELIGIOUS DELEGATION EXPECTED TO GO TO PARIS TO ARGUE WITH KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST BE INSTALLED WITH SOME LEGAL FOUNDATION. LMI WORRIED THAT BAKHTIAR AND REGENCY COUNCIL WILL NOT GET DEAD. THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THIS SUBJECT SHOULD AVOID UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM. END SUMMARY.

1. POLOFF STEMPEL SPOKE WITH LMI OFFICIALS TAVASSOLI AND ENTEZAM (STRONGLY PROTECT) LATE EVENING JAN. 19 AND ENTEZAM AGAIN NOON JAN. 20. BOTH WERE PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF PARADE. THEIR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT ACTIVITIES DREW 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE (OTHERS, INCLUDING LOCAL PRESS, PUT FIGURE BETWEEN 1.4 AND 1.8 MILLION), AND DAY PASSED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. TAVASSOLI NOTED TWO LEFTIST GROUPS HAD TRIED TO BECOME PART OF PARADE BUT WERE TURNED AWAY WITHOUT INCIDENT BY PARADE MARSHALLS. SLOGANS WERE ALL ISLAMIC. LMI MEN ADMITTED CROWD VISIT WAS A BIT MORE DRAGGY THAN AT ASHURA MARCH, BUT THEY (AS WELL AS MOST OTHERS WE HAVE TALKED TO) ATTRIBUTE THIS TO LETDOWN IN WAKE OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE. "NOW THAT HE HAS GONE, PEOPLE HAD OTHER THINGS TO WORRY ABOUT--THE WEATHER, THEIR CORNS, LACK OF GAS, ETC."

2. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI-NOMINATED COMMITTEE ON STRIKES BEGAN WORK TODAY. DR. YADOLLAH SAHABI HAD BEEN NAMED CHAIRMAN, WITH DR. MOHAMMAD JAVAD BAHONAR, RELIGIOUS LEADER, AND ENG. ALI AKBAR MOINFAR AS MEMBERS. THIS GROUP WILL NAME TWO ADDITIONAL MEMBERS. ENTEZAM SAID SAHABI WAS RECONSIDERING WHETHER HE (ENTEZAM) SHOULD BE ON COMMITTEE, SINCE HE WAS DOING MUCH COORDINATING WORK ELSEWHERE. ENTEZAM ADDED HE WOULD BE FOLLOWING COMMITTEE'S WORK IN ANY CASE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED COMMITTEE'S WORK INCLUDED BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR, AND THAT ONE OF EFFORTS WAS TO GET COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN.

3. [illegible] NOTED PRIME MINISTER WAS MAKING MAJOR MOVE TO

(SEE SRF REPORTING). EVEN IF THIS IS THE CASE, LMI SEEMS TO BE IGNORING ROLE OF MILITARY, WHICH ACCORDING TO OUR LIGHTS, IS BY NO MEANS READY TO LIE DOWN AND ACCEPT LMI SOLUTION WITHOUT SOME HARD ARGUMENT AND INFIGHTING.

10. ON QUESTION OF TIMING OF KHOMEINI RETURN, THIS IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD ANY RESPONSIBLE MOVEMENT FIGURE SUGGEST KHOMEINI WOULD DELAY RETURN TO IRAN AS LONG AS IT TOOK TO SET ISLAMIC STRUCTURE IN PLACE, EITHER THROUGH TAKEOVER OR COMPROMISE. PROBLEM WITH THIS PROJECTION, FROM KHOMEINI'S VIEW, MUST BE THAT HE IS ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE FROM IN-COUNTRY GROUPS TO RETURN. LOCAL PRESS HAD CARRIED SEVERAL APPEALS TO HIM TO COME BACK, AND ALI AMINI IS REPORTEDLY IN PARIS TO URGE HIM TO RETURN. WE ASSUME AT LEAST SOME OF THESE APPEALS ARE GENUINE, NOT JUST THE EXPECTED PERSIAN "TAAROF".

11. CONVERSATIONS WITH LMI FIGURES OVER PAST TWO-THREE DAYS, PLUS KINDS OF STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF PARIS (SEE REF B FOR EXAMPLE) SUGGEST SOME UNCERTAINTIES IN KHOMEINI THINKING, AND INCREASING BACK AND FORTH COMMENTS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AIDES. APPEARS TO US AT THIS POINT THAT, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS GO ON HERE, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL INDECISION AND SORTING OUT GOING ON IN PARIS. GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES HERE IN IRAN AS WELL AS THOSE IN PARIS, IT IS CLEAR WE ARE NEITHER OUT OF THE POLITICAL WOODS, NOR YET FULLY ENGAGED IN WHAT COULD BE INTENSELY POLITICAL PROCESS OF RECONCILING IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES. ABOUT THE ONLY REALLY POSITIVE FEATURE OF THIS IS THAT KHOMEINI, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HAS HELD BACK FROM IMMEDIATE RETURN TO IRAN, THUS LEAVING SOME ROOM FOR MORE NEGOTIATION, AT LEAST FOR NOW. SULLIVAN
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-240-543

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181405Z JAN 79
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3143

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00926

LIMDIS

ARIM SANJABI WILL CERTAINLY BE ON COUNCIL, BUT OTHER AMES NOT RPT NOT KNOWN. ONE IMPORTANT POINT: THERE ILL BE NO RPT NO RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON COUNCIL. TAVASSO- I SAID PRESENT PLANS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY WORKED OUT CLUDE SPECIAL "ADVISORY GROUP" OF KEY RELIGIOUS LEADERS CH AS AYATOLLAHS TALEQANI, MONTAZERI, ETC. FOLLOWING NOUNCEMENT OF ISLAMIC COUNCIL, PRESUMABLY RESIGNATIONS MAJLES MEMBERS AND MINISTER, WHICH ALREADY STARTED N 17, WILL CONTINUE. PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR IS PECTED THEN "TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE" TO TRANSFER ER TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH WILL HEDULE ELECTIONS FAIRLY SOON (TAVASSOLI THOUGHT ABOUT O OR THREE MONTHS WERE THE WORKING TIME FRAME, BUT NO RM DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE).

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OMEINI COUNCIL AND REGENCY COUNCIL, TO WHICH ARMY WAS AL, TAVASSOLI SAID HE KNEW EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO K OUT SOME KI ND OF A DEAL, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT OMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF MINATCHI ORTS -- SEE REF A, PARA TWO).

3. QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN IS STILL SOMEWHAT UN- TAIN, BUT CURRENT THINKING OF KHOMEINI HIMSELF AS RESSED TO BAZARGAN IS TO DELAY HIS RETURN UNTIL LAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS INHERITED MANTLE OF ER, AND "ARMY IS UNDER MORE CONTROL". THIS DECISION UNDER STEADY REVIEW. SOURCE THOUGHT THIS WOULD OBABLY MEAN KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN IN SIX TO TEN DAYS OM NOW. DISCUSSION ENDED WITH SOURCE'S PROMISE TO P IN MORE REGULAR CONTACT OVER NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: TAVASSOLI WAS THE MOST FORTH- MING HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH REPORTING OFFICER, AND MED TO SAY BY HIS DEMEANOR THAT USG WAS BEING MORE ALISTIC" IN APPRAISAL OF SITUATION THAN IT HAD BEEN ORE. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS SPEAKING ON ORDERS FROM ZARGAN, WHO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT USG UNDERSTOOD INTS HE PRESENTED. TO THIS DEGREE, HE WAS AS FORTH- ING ABOUT LMI FUTURE INTENTIONS AS HE HAS EVER BEEN THING, AND WILLING TO SPECIFY AREAS IN WHICH HE NOT FULLY INFORMED. WHILE HE EITHER DOESN'T KNOW UT EFFORTS TO RECONCILE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI NCIL (REF A) OR IS A MASTER DISSEMBLER (REPORTING ICER BELIEVES THE FORMER), HE IS CONVINCED THAT TION FOR TRANSFER WILL BE WORKED OUT. BREEZY WAY TAVASSOLI AND ENTEZAM PASS OVER PROBLEMS OF NG LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ISLAMIC ORM EXPRESS SOME CONFIDENCE TO RUMORS THAT ALREADY DONE A DEAL OF SORTS WITH KHOMEINI

[illegible] AS JOINT STAFFER [illegible]
JULY 17, PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN [illegible]
WE DO NOT KNOW. [illegible] ESTIMATES OF [illegible]
[illegible] SERIOUSLY INJURED. (COMMENT: [illegible]
OUT OF LINE WITH OTHER REPORTS.)

4. [illegible] SAID SIMILAR BUT NOT AS VIOLENT [illegible]
HAPPENED IN DEZFUL, GILAN, AND ARAK. [illegible] HAD TO
CONTINUE TO PASS MILITARY TO MAINTAIN RESTRAINT. [illegible]
SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT EMPHASIZED STRONGLY
CONCURRENT NEED FOR GOI TO RESTRAIN EXCESSES OF OVERZ
ENTHUSIASM, AND TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH MILITARY LEADERS
WHO, WE ARE CONVINCED, DO NOT WANT NEEDLESS BLOODSHED
EITHER. SOURCE SAID THAT WITH MUCH MORE GRACE AND
MUCH LESS [illegible] MAIN PROBLEMS.

5. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO POLITICS OF PRESENT
SITUATION: BAZARGAN SAID [illegible] ISLAMISTS WERE
GETTING STRONGER. [illegible] SPEAKERS, ESPECIALLY RECENTLY-
RELEASED LEADERS, IN (MOSAHAD EXPANSION) WHO HAD
CALLED FOR [illegible] REPUBLIC, NOT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, WERE
[illegible]. UNIVERSITY GROUPS WERE ALSO ACTIVE,
AND SOME WHICH ALREADY HAD OCCUPIED BUILDING (ISLAMIC AND
NATIONAL OFFICE STUDENTS AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY).

6. [illegible] CLEARLY CALLED FOR [illegible]
[illegible] FOR DEMOCRACY. [illegible]
[illegible] WAS THE CASE, AND APPEAL [illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] BY "DISRUPTIVE" ELEMENTS [illegible]
[illegible] LED SERIOUSLY DISRUPTIVE, DISORDERLY [illegible]
[illegible] WAS TO KEEP LIVES OUT OF [illegible]
THIS WAS UNDERWAY.

7. [illegible] ACCORDING TO [illegible]
[illegible] ALL ANNOUNCED NAMES OF [illegible]
[illegible] JULY. [illegible]

3

ISCK #2250A 2322250
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CONFIDENTIAL/EYES

TEHRAN

TARGET: STATE 1/18/79
APPROV: DCM:GWAAS
DRAFTED: POL:JDSTEMPEL:C
CLEAR: 1.POL:CBLAMERA
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
PM OR ROON
CEBON/9

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-18-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SEEKS TO CALM
[illegible] STRATEGIC PLAN, ACCELERATE ITS PROGRESS

REF: (A) [illegible], (B) STATE 17037,

SUMMARY: [illegible] SOURCE [illegible] FOR MEHDI BAZARGAN, URGED [illegible] TO CONTINUE STRESSING ITS INDEPENDENCE OF THE IRANIAN [illegible] AND SIGN ON AND ORGANIZE ACTIVE GROUPS. [illegible] U.S. TO SHOW THAT A DEVELOPED TIME- [illegible] LMI MOVE INTO GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY IF SE- [illegible] INTERESTS [illegible] AND TO BE POSSESSABLE. LMI FEELS [illegible] CONFLICT BETWEEN [illegible] ALTERNATIVE COUNCIL AND [illegible] BUT LITTLE HOPE [illegible] AND WITH MINIMAL PROBLEMS. [illegible] THAT ISLAMIC [illegible] WILL NOT OVER- [illegible] THIS SUGGESTS [illegible] A REAL EFFORT [illegible] REGIME AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT [illegible] MAY HAVE SOME [illegible]. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS OF TIMING [illegible] ARE [illegible] TO IRANIAN [illegible] INTERVIEWERS [illegible] CONTINUE AND LMI IS NOT AND CAREFULLY ANALYZING [illegible] SITUATION [illegible] THEY FEEL WAY TO JUMP. END SUMMARY.

1. MOHAMMAD TABATABAI (AKA TABA'I), SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL, [illegible] IN [illegible] FROM LMI [illegible] AND PARIS. (A) LMI WAS GRATEFUL [illegible] AS [illegible] IRANIAN MILITARY FROM [illegible] VIA [illegible] AND URGED USG TO CONTINUE, [illegible] (B) LMI [illegible] HAVE NOW ESTABLISHED A MOVEMENT TO [illegible] AND ITS [illegible] [illegible] (COMMUNIST) IN- [illegible] WERE [illegible] [illegible] PRESENT IRANIAN BODY POLITIC.

2. ON QUESTION OF DEGREE OF MILITARY UNDER CONTROL, SOURCE [illegible] LMI [illegible] OF INFILTRATION IN A FEW [illegible] [illegible] MAJOR MOSQUES [illegible] OFFICERS ON THE STAFF: [illegible] IF [illegible] SHUT DOWN CHAOTIC SITUATION TO REPRESENT [illegible] [illegible] TEMPORARILY. GENERAL [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

REPLACEMENT BY KHOMEINI-ESTABLISHED SOLUTION. [illegible]
SEEMS TO BE ROOM FOR HORSE-TRADING, HOWEVER.)

3. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI HAS JUST ESTABLISHED [illegible]
COMMITTEE OF FIVE TO RESOLVE PRESENT STRIKES. [illegible],
WHO LED OIL COMMITTEE, WOULD BE EXCUSED SO HE COULD MONI-
TOR OIL SITUATION AND IMI'S OLDER STATESMAN [illegible] YAZDOLLAH
SAHABI WOULD CHAIR NEW GROUP, OF WHICH ENTEZAM IS TO BE A
MEMBER. ENTEZAM DECLINED TO NAME OTHER MEMBERS AT THIS
TIME. COMMITTEE WAS JUST STARTING WORK THAT MORNING, AND
IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE MOST STRIKES WITHIN A
FEW DAYS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE
EFFORTS TO BLOCK STRIKE SETTLEMENT, ENTEZAM SAID OIL FIELDS
WERE SPECIAL CASE, AND RADICAL LEFTISTS DID NOT APT NOT
SEEM TO POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO SETTLEMENTS ELSEWHERE.
(COMMENT: AS LONG-TIME BELIEVERS IN MURPHY'S LAW, WE
ARE NOT SO SURE PROCESS WILL GO THAT SMOOTHLY.) SULLIVAN
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-523

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 0833

CHRGF: STATE 1/17/79
APPRV: MIN:CWHAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:P
CLEAR: POL:PELAMBRAKIS
DISTR: AMB MIN-2
DUMMY/CHRON

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/17/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) FORMS STRIKE COMMITTEE, OPPOSITIONISTS DISCUSSING NEXT STEPS

SUMMARY: LMI BELIEVES SITUATION IN IRAN WILL STABILIZE BY JAN 21. KHOMEINI HAS NO PLANS TO RETURN TO IRAN BEFORE JAN 21, BUT COULD DO SO "WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO A WEEK." LMI WANTS REGENCY COUNCIL AND MAJLES TO MELT AWAY, BUT MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS IN SHARIAT-MADARI CAMP ARE SEEKING COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EITHER JOINT OPERATION OF TWO COUNCILS OR MERGER. LMI SOURCE SAYS KHOMEINI HAS ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING STRIKES; IT BEGAN WORK JAN 17. END SUMMARY

1. LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD POLOFF STEMPEL THAT SITUATION AFTER SHAH'S DEPARTURE HAD DEVELOPED BETTER THAN ANYONE HAD HOPED. HE THANKED U.S. GRACIOUSLY AND EXTENSIVELY FOR WORKING WITH MILITARY TO PREVENT BLOWUP. ENTEZAM SAID LMI HAD CONTACTED KHOMEINI AND AYATOLLAH HAD DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO RETURN TO IRAN IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WHEN PRESSED, ENTEZAM SAID NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, BUT LMI THOUGHT SITUATION WOULD STABILIZE FAIRLY WELL -- CROWD WOULD HAVE ONE BIG CHANCE FOR EMOTIONAL OUTPOURING AT JAN 19 MARCH -- BY JAN 21. KHOMEINI WOULD NOT COME BACK BEFORE THEN, BUT MIGHT DO SO WITHIN NEXT SEVEN DAYS. DECISION STILL BEING CONSIDERED IN PARIS.

2. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION AS TO HOW POLITICAL SITUATIN WOULD DEVELOP, ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD "INVITE" MAJLES AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO MELT AWAY. IF THEY FAILED TO TAKE THE HINT, THEY WOULD BE PRESSED HARDER AND DUMPED BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. POLOFF GOT MORE CONCILIATORY VERSION FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER, WHO SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD BE MEETING WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS TO SEE HOW PROBLEM OF DUAL GOVERNMENT -- REGENCY COUNCIL AND ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL COULD BE RESOLVED. MINATCHI'S PREFERRED SOLUTION IS TO MERGE THE TWO COUNCILS, AND THIS HAS SOME STRONG SUPPORT. OTHER OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED ARE JOINT MEETING OF TWO GROUPS, OR PARALLEL ACTIONS (SUCH AS BOTH GROUPS DESIGNATING SAME PRIME MINISTER). MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI HAS NOW RETURNED FROM PARIS AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SERIES OF MEETINGS. MINATCHI PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW WHAT WORD MONTAZERI WAS BRINGING BACK FROM PARIS. (COMMENT: WHILE KHOMEINI'S POSITION MAY EVOLVE THROUGH DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM'S VIEW SUGGESTS LMI WILL GO INTO SUCH A MEETING ARGUING SIMPLY FOR "DISAPPEARANCE" OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR

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CHRGE: STATE 1-16-
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPE
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBE
DISTR: POL-3 AMB D
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OR SHIP TAB
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-16-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PORS
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN POSTPONED

1. AMIR ENTEZAM, LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER TELEPHONED POLOFF ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF AFTER SHAH'S PLANE LEFT TO INFORM EMBASSY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL NOT RPT NOT BE RETURNING TO IRAN "IN THE NEAR FUTURE." HE KEYED THIS DECISION TO POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

2. ABOVE REPRESENTS LMI'S BEST INFORMATION, BUT ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOTE THAT A) TIME FRAME IS UNSPECIFIED, AND B) LMI IN RECENT DAYS HAS COOLED ON IDEA OF IMMEDIATE KHOMEINI RETURN. KHOMEINI'S PARIS ENTOURAGE MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS WHICH COULD CHANGE KHOMEINI'S INTENTION ON SHORT NOTICE.
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AYANDEGON WERE WRONG IN IMPLYING THAT KHOMEINI WOULD ATTACK ANY COUNTRY WHICH GIVES THE SHAH REFUGE. ENTEZAM SAID (AND WE HOPE HE SPEAKS ACCURATELY FOR KHOMEINI CAMP) THAT KHOMEINI UNDERSTANDS IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO OFFER SHAH ASYLUM IN U.S. OR EUROPE TO GET HIM OUT OF IRAN, AND COUNTRY THAT DOES SO WOULD NOT BE PENALIZED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

5. GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTEDLY TAKING OVER SECURITY FROM POLICE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF COUNTRY ARE "PROBABLY" LMI ACTION TEAMS. ENTEZAM SAID ALL THOSE WHO HAD TAKEN OVER IN THE NORTH, AROUND TABRIZ AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST AZARBAIJAN PROVINCE WERE DEFINITELY LMI. REPORTS WERE NOT IN FROM MORE SOUTHERN CITIES SUCH AS SHIRAZ. ALSO ON POSITIVE NOTE, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, MASS UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATION JAN 13, WHICH HAD AT ITS PEAK 200,000 PEOPLE (ACCORDING TO LMI, MORE EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS SAY JUST UNDER 100,000) WAS "ONE HUNDRED PER CENT CONTROLLED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT." ENTEZAM SAID LMI WAS AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THIS, SINCE TUDEH HAD BEEN STRONG IN UNIVERSITIES. (COMMENT: ENTEZAM CLEARLY THOUGHT THIS OUTCOME HAD RESULTED FROM GOOD ORGANIZATIONAL WORK WHICH LMI HAD DONE. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE LMI EXCLUSIVE CREDIT FOR THIS, SINCE HE AND OTHERS THOUGHT MARXISTS MAY JUST HAVE BEEN A BIT OVERWHELMED ON THIS OCCASION.) LMI WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATIONS WEEK-END OF JAN 18-19, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SHAH IS STILL IN IRAN OR NOT.

6. ENTEZAM NOTED THAT LMI HAD WELL-ADVANCED PLANNING FOR DAY OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE. AYATOLLAHS HAD MADE SOME OF LMI'S STATEMENTS AND WOULD MAKE OTHERS. LMI HAD TEAMS OF ITS OWN PREPARED TO PROTECT STATUES AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS. WHEN POLOFF ASKED ABOUT THESE GROUPS AND THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING SECURITY IN TOWNS, ENTEZAM SAID THEY CAME FROM VARIETY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS. (COMMENT: WE SUSPECT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM AND MOST OF THEIR ORGANIZERS ARE MUJAHIDDIN OR MUJAHIDDIN RELATED.)
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2974
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00670

EXDIS

CHRGE: STATE 1-14-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: DCM-2 AMB POL CHRON/5

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-14-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: LMI ON PRESENT EVENTS

SUMMARY: ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF NAMING OF REGENCY COUNCIL GIVES LMI NO DIFFICULTY. LMI EXPECTS MAJLES WILL APPROVE BAKHTIAR. KHOMEINI'S PROJECTED RETURN TO IRAN NOT RPT NOT AS FIRM AS PRESS REPORTS INDICATE. SOME GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING OVER SECURITY ARE LMI UNITS, FULL INFO NOT AVAILABLE ON OTHERS. THERE WILL BE CONTINUED DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGH WEEKEND JAN 18-19. JAN 13 UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONTROLLED BY LMI. LMI PLANS FOR POST-SHAH CALM ARE ADVANCING. END SUMMARY.

1. POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH WAS NAMED JAN 13 GIVES LMI NO PROBLEMS. VARASTEHAND TEHRANI WERE FORMER OPPOSITIONISTS WITH GOOD RECORDS, AND ALIABADI IS WELL THOUGHT OF. (MINATCHI OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFERED SAME VIEW.) REGENCY COUNCIL SHOULD UNDERSTAND IT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AROUND LONG, ONCE KHOMEINI RETURNS TO IRAN. ENTEZAM SAID PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS WERE CONTACTED BY COURT TO SERVE, BUT ALL DECLINED. HE PERSONALLY KNEW THAT KARIM SANJABI, YADOLLAH SAHABI, AND MEHDI BAZARGAN HAD ALL TURNED SHAH DOWN.

2. ENTEZAM SAID HE BELIEVES MAJLES WILL FUSS AND MUSS AND FINALLY APPROVE BAKHTIAR. WHILE SOME OF MAJLESMEN MAY PREFER MILITARY TAKEOVER (WHICH ALL BELIEVE WOULD FOLLOW REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR), FULY WILL VOTE FOR GOOD OF COUNTRY. LMI WILL BE DOING SOME DISCREET LOBBYING, HOWEVER, SINCE VOTE IS NOT RPT NOT FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

3. ON QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN, ENTEZAM SAID THAT CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, KHOMEINI HAS NOT RPT NOT MADE DECISION WHEN TO RETURN. LMI GROUP HERE, INCLUDING SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, WOULD PREFER RE DELAY HIS RETURN BEYOND FIRST OR SECOND DAY TO ALLOW MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION TO SETTLE. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS FRANKLY AFRAID FOR KHOMEINI'S SAFETY, SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHO DO NOT WISH KHOMEINI WELL. FANATICISM HAS DONE IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR NATIONAL LEADERS IN PAST FIFTY YEARS AND LMI DOES NOT WANT KHOMEINI TO BE NEXT ON THE LIST. SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAN WOULD BE "TOO HORRIBLE TO THINK ABOUT" IF KHOMEINI WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON HIS RETURN TO IRAN.

4. ENTEZAM SAID COUPLE OF LOCAL PERSIAN PAPERS, INCLUDING

[redacted]

[redacted] SECTION OF STATE [redacted]

[redacted] SUBJECT MATTER [redacted] WOULD BE OF [redacted] SINCE [redacted] ON DETAILS. HOWEVER,

2. [redacted] MEETING WITH DR. MINATOMI OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (CDHR) PRESIDENT [redacted] DEFENDER [redacted] OF PREVIOUS MEETING (REFTEL). MINATOMI SAID [redacted] OF OLDEST LEADERS' ORGANIZATION [redacted] ON JAN 9 [redacted] PRODUCED PLAN FOR CONCERTED EFFORT BY OLDER BY COUNTRY-WIDE TO URGE NON-VIOLENCE FROM MOSLEMS. THIS WAS AGREED UPON BY [redacted] IN PERSON AS OF JAN 9. MINATOMI SAID CDHR EXECUTIVE BOARD WOULD MEET JAN 14 TO FINISH TITLE COOPERATION WITH SECRETARY'S JUSTICE MINISTER BUT CAUTIONED THAT THIS COOPERATION WAS LIMITED TO JUSTICE MINISTRY AND ALMOST BASICALLY AS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. EMPHOFF EXCERPTED THIS.

3. MINATOMI SAID MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM [redacted] HAD [redacted] SOME VERY SERIOUS ABOUT SHAH'S IMMINENT DEPARTURE. MINATOMI DISCUSSED REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA WITH ALI MINI AND FELT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE SOME RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION ON COUNCIL. HE WOULD BE SEEING AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI JAN 13, AND WOULD RAISE MATTER. HE WAS CONFIDENT [redacted] WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SORT OF EFFORT.

4. MINATOMI SAID QUESTIONS SURROUNDING REGENCY COUNCIL WERE STILL TROUBLESOME. BAKHTIAR HAD TALKED ABOUT SPA-CING OF COUNCIL UNDER ARTILE 35, BUT SPAE WOULD BE LEAVING REGENCY COUNCIL. MINATOMI SAID RECENT DISCUSSION HAD CENTERED AROUND SEVEN-MEMBER COUNCIL WITH ONLY FAST 3 ARTICLE AS STATUTORY MEMBERSHIP. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT PRESENT THINKING WAS, BUT SUGGESTED THERE WOULD BE A LOT MORE DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH BEFORE ISSUE WAS SETTLED. SULLIVAN

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"WE ARE UNEQUIVOCALLY READY TO HELP." KHOMEINI DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO HARM THE ARMY "AFTER ALL, IT IS PART OF THE NATION." SOME BAKHTIAR MINISTERS HAD TOLD THE LMI AND NATIONAL FRONT (INF) THAT THEY WANTED TO RESIGN. LMI HAD ADVISED THEM TO STAY ON; A TRANSITIONAL GOVT WAS NECESSARY TO "PAVE THE WAY FOR AN EVENTUAL NATIONAL GOVT OF GOOD MEN." HE PLEDGED LMI COOPERATION TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AND ARSON, AND SERIOUS EFFORT BY KHOMEINI FORCES TO CONTROL STREET MOBS. EMBOFF SAID THIS WOULD CERTAINLY REINFORCE OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP SITUATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNEL.

4. AT THAT POINT, EMBOFF RAISED MATTER OF WHETHER LMI COULD CONTROL ALL STREET MOBS. ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LMI WAS FRANKLY CONCERNED ABOUT THOSE WHO ENGAGED IN RANDOM VIOLENCE, SUCH AS THE GRIMM ASSASSINATION. "I CAN STATE POSITIVELY THAT NONE OF THOSE PEOPLE ARE PART OF OUR MOVEMENT." EMBOFF REMAINED SKEPTICAL, AND ASKED IF LMI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE THERE. ENTEZAM REPLIED THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO SO.

5. ENTEZAM THEN RAISED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "DELICATE POINT" OF TIMING ABOUT TRANSITIONAL GOVT. LMI FEARS SHAH WILL TRY AND RETURN -- RUMOR ALREADY HAS IT THAT GEN. OVEISSI HAS MET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER TO OBTAIN BACKING FOR A COUNTER-COUP. LMI FELT IT COULD NOT WAIT TOO LONG TO MOVE TOWARD "TRULY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT." MOVEMENT UNDERSTOOD NEED TO LET BAKHTIAR RULE LONG ENOUGH TO GET SHAH OUT OF COUNTRY, BUT THOUGHT WITHIN THREE WEEKS TO A MONTH AFTER THAT, REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD "BE OBLIGED" TO INSTALL NEW GOVT APPROVED BY KHOMEINI. EMBOFF DESCRIBED OVEISSI RUMOR AS HEIGHT OF ABSURDITY AND LIMITED COMMENT ON SCENARIO TO SAYING USG APPROVED OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT, BUT DID NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON IFS AND BUTS.

6. EMBOFF ASKED ENTEZAM IF ANY THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC STATUS--WOULD ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ALLOW OR ENCOURAGE RETURN TO WORK WHEN SHAH LEFT? IF NOT, "THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO COUNTRY FOR IT TO EVENTUALLY TAKE OVERR ENTEZAM SMILED AND SAID "YES, WE HAVE SOME PLANS FOR THAT." HE INDICATED LMI HAD BEEN GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO EASING ET
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1979 JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2833
INFO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00431

ORIGT: GPLE 1/9/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:
CLEAR: POL:GPLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
CHRON/10

LIMDIS

Chron

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/9/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: TWO OPPOSITIONIST VIEWS -- BACKING OFF CONFRONTATION

REF: TEHRAN 367

SUMMARY: NEW LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) SOURCE SAYS LMI WILL NOT RPT NOT CHALLENGE BAKHTIAR GOVT NOW, WILL HELP TO MAKE SHAH'S EVENTUAL DEPARTURE AS PEACEFUL AS POSSIBLE, AND URGES U.S. TO PREVENT ARMY FROM OVERTHROWING CIVILIAN EFFORT. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS MOVING FASTER IN SIMILAR DIRECTION TO TRY AND AVOID TROUBLE WHEN SHAH LEAVES COUNTRY. SOURCE BELIEVES RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION ON REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD HELP EASE SITUATION AND SAYS SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP IS PROBABLY READY TO PARTICIPATE. END SUMMARY

1. IN TWO CONVERSATIONS MORNING JAN 9, POLOFF GOT IMPRESSION THAT BOTH MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LMI ARE PREPARED TO TOLERATE BAKHTIAR GOVT FOR LIMITED TIME IN ORDER TO EASE SHOCK OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY. BOTH SOURCES NOW BELIEVE SHAH INTENDS TO DEPART, AND RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO EMBOFF'S URGING THAT THEIR ORGANIZATIONS PLAN NOW TO MAKE POST-DEPARTURE SCENARIO AS ORDERLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. EMBOFF MET AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, FOR FIRST TIME (STRICTLY PROTECT). PROF RICHARD COTTAM HAD VOUCHED FOR EACH OTHERS' BONA FIDES, AND DISCUSSION IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF POST-SHAH IRAN. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED LMI BELIEF THAT "ARMY CAN NOT TURN AGAINST PEOPLE IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THIS." EMBOFF REPLIED THAT U.S., IN ITS CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, WAS URGING OBEDIENCE TO CIVILIAN GOVT, BUT LMI HAD BETTER STRAIGHTEN ITSELF OUT ABOUT EXTENT AND DEPTH OF U.S. INFLUENCE WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, ESPECIALLY ON VITAL ISSUES WHERE OFFICER PERCEPTIONS MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO MUCH FOREIGN PERSUASION. AFTER SHORT DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "CONTROL" AND "INFLUENCE," ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED LIMITATION ON U.S. ROLE (AT LEAST FOR PURPOSE OF DICUSSION).

3. EMBOFF REITERATED THAT U.S. WAS OPPOSED TO IDEA OF MILITARY COUP, DID NOT THINK IT WAS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS, AND HAD SO STATED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. FOR THIS REASON, USG WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT LMI AND OTHERS WERE DOING TO PREVENT PROVOCATION TO MILITARY WHICH WOULD LEND TO BLOODSHED AND CHAOS WHEN SHAH LEFT IRAN. ENTEZAM STATED

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3. COTTAM DESCRIBED AMIR AMIR-ENTEZAM, AN IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN, AS PROBABLY A VERY IMPORTANT LEADER AMONG THE KHOMEINI FACTION. AMIR-ENTEZAM TOLD COTTAM HE WISHED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY. COTTAM APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED HIM IN THAT DIRECTION.

4. MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS, ACCORDING TO COTTAM, WOULD TOLERATE BAKHTIAR AS LONG AS ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT DID NOT LOSE MOMENTUM. SHOULD THEY SENSE THAT SPIRITS WERE WANING AMONG DEMONSTRATORS THEY WOULD STEP UP ATTACKS ON BAKHTIAR. BAKHTIAR WAS REGARDED AS A WEAK PERSONALITY, UNABLE TO RESIST THE SHAH'S OFFER OF THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP NO MATTER WHAT THE COST TO IRAN.

5. COTTAM DESCRIBED IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA MENTIONED PARA. 4 REFTEL. COUNCIL WOULD BE COMPOSED OF A GENERAL OFFICER SELECTED BY THE SHAH, ALI AMINI (WHOM THE SHAH BELIEVED WAS LOYAL BUT WHO REALLY SUPPORTED THE OPPOSITION), BEHESTI (KHOMEINI'S CHIEF LIEUTENANT IN IRAN), PROGRESSIVE LAWYER NAZIEH AND, TO BREAK TIE VOTES, EMPRESS FARAH. SANJABI WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER; PARLIAMENT WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND ELECTIONS CALLED, NEW MAJLIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REVISE THE CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE THE SHAH.

6. FINALLY, COTTAM DESCRIBED A CONVERSATION WITH A RETIRED COLONEL WHO SAID THAT ALL OF THE RETIRED COLONELS (MEN FIRED BY THE SHAH) WERE REVOLUTIONARY BECAUSE THEY WERE LITERATE. MOST OF THE GENERALS WERE ILLITERATE AND INDEED THAT WAS WHY THE SHAH HAD PROMOTED THEM. THE GENERALS WOULD REMAIN LOYAL BUT THE COLONELS COULD ONLY TAKE SO MUCH STRAIN. LARGE NUMBERS OF COLONELS AND LOWER RANKING OFFICERS WERE BELIEVED TIED IN TO THE KHOMEINI ORGANIZATION. KHOMEINI'S GROUP HAD RECENTLY BEEN GIVING THE MILITARY PRIORITY ADDITIONAL ATTENTION. VANCE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 004510

ACTION
POL 3
INFO
AMB
DCM
PM
ECON 2
ADM
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OR
CRU 2

E.O.11206S GDS, 1-7-85, (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: FURTHER REPORT OF RICHARD COTTAM

REF: TEHRAN 00066

1. DEP OFF CALLED COTTAM JANUARY 7 FOR REPORT TO SUPPLEMENT REFTEL. COTTAM STRESSED THAT GROUP AROUND KHOMEINI AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN WERE FEARFUL OF A MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD LEAD TO BLOODY REPRESSION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS FINAL DAYS IN TEHRAN, JANUARY 2-3, OPPOSITIONISTS WERE QUITE DEFINITE IN THEIR INFORMATION ABOUT A COUP. THEY HAD NAMES OF SIX GENERALS, INCLUDING OVEISSI, RABII, AND KHOSROWDAD PLUS THREE OTHERS COTTAM COULDN'T REMEMBER WHO WERE THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY LEADERS. COUP PLANS BEING DRAWN UP IN A BUILDING OWNED BY "RESEARCH CORPORATION" ON SHAH ABBAS AVENUE. ACCORDING TO THE OPPOSITION, THE PLANNERS HAD DIVIDED TEHRAN INTO SIX DISTRICTS EACH UNDER A GENERAL OFFICER. ARRESTS AND APPLICATION OF STRICT MILITARY CONTROLS WOULD BE SET IN MOTION AT A GIVEN SIGNAL. MANY IN THE OPPOSITION FEARED THE U.S. WOULD BACK SUCH A COUP.

2. DESPITE HATRED FOR U.S. AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION, COTTAM FOUND KHOMEINI'S CIRCLE AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN

READY TO THINK IN SOPHISTICATED TERMS ABOUT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AFRAID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DESIROUS OF RELYING ON THE U.S. FOR IRAN'S DEFENSE. THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP BUT DID WANT U.S. BACKING AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS THOUGHT MOSCOW WOULD BE GREATLY DISTURBED BY A GOVERNMENT IN IRAN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO MIGHT EXERCISE INFLUENCE BEYOND IRAN'S BORDERS, INCLUDING AMONG SOVIET MOSLEMS.